obvious principles we irresistibly infer the existence of a Supreme intelligent Being, who is the first cause of all things. Any proposition, therefore, which denies the infinite wisdom, or the Almighty power of God, we must reject as untrue. We have also, in the profuse bounties of his providence, an equally convincing evidence of his infinite and impartial goodness; and consequently any thing which denies this must also be rejected. Admitting these propositions, reason will teach us, 1. That it is possible for him who constituted the mind of man to enlighten it by revelation. 2. That, as a revelation which points out an immortal existence to man beyond the grave, will increase his happiness, and as God is infinitely good, it is consistent with his character, and therefore probable, that he would make such revelation. 3. That such revelation, coming from him, cannot possibly contradict any principle which he has imparted to us, as undeniable truth, through any other medium.

From what has been said we are able to discover, not only the nature of human reason, but also its office in the affairs of revealed religion or truth. But we should not infer from hence that we are to reject every thing in revelation which does not come perfectly within the scope of reason. It has already been observed that there are many things which we know, or acknowledge to be true, which are above the perfect comprehension of reason. The object of revelation, as has been shown, is to make new discoveries to the mind, which reason could not reach, but which it vouches for as true, by convincing us

they are from God. If therefore, we were to reject every thing in revelation which our reason could not completely comprehend, it would become altogether useless, and the end for which it was given to us would be entirely subverted.

That man is capable of exercising his reason to advantage, and that it is his duty thus to exercise it in the important concerns of religion, is obvious from the language of the text, as well as from other scriptures. Our Saviour 'calls on those he addresses to judge of themselves what is right.' Now if we adopt the supposition that man is destitute of the natural or moral ability of judging correctly, we must consider our Lord as extremely arbitrary and unreasonable in his requirements; in fact, we must consider him as requiring contrary to his own instructions concerning the requisitions of God on his creatures. In the chapter from which our text is selected Christ plainly teaches us that no more is required of us than we are able to perform; and that we shall be guilty in the sight of God in proportion to our neglect of known duties. That servant,' says he,' which knew his Lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes. But he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes; for unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall much be required:' God himself, by the prophet, calls on us in a plain and explicit manner to exercise our reason, and promises us great blessings in doing it. Come now, and let us reason together, saith

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the Lord, though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; though they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool.' But I need not multiply quotations to prove the propriety and reasonableness of reasoning on this subject. I shall, therefore, proceed directly to the main object of this discourse, which is to show the unreasonableness of the doctrine of endless punishment.

In the discussion of the subject before us there are certain principles the truth of which I shall assume; as they are admitted true, and their importance is urged by Christians of all denominations. 1. That God has established a moral government in the world. 2. That men are the subjects of this government; and, 3. That, as subjects, all men are accountable to him for their conduct. With these principles constantly in view, the sentiment that God will punish men for their sins and acts of disobedience is perfectly reasonable; it is in accordance with all our ideas of right and justice. The question then before us is not, whether it is reasonable, just, and right, for God to punish his disobedient children; but whether it is reasonable to suppose he will punish them without mercy, and without end.

The only ground on which the advocates for. the doctrine of endless punishment have heretofore attempted to support this principle from reason is that of the infinity of sin. Sin, they say, is an infinite evil; and consequently deserves an infinite, or endless punishment. This sentiment is clearly expressed by the

Westminister assembly of divines, in the following question and answer, found in their catechism,- What does every sin deserve? Every sin deserves God's wrath and curse, both in this life, and in that which is to come.' Now if this doctrine of the infinity of sin can be established as truth, then I admit the doctrine of endless punishment would seem to flow from it as a natural and reasonable consequence ; but, on the other hand, if this principle cannot be established; and if, on the contrary, it can be shown that sin is finite and limited in its nature, all the support which the doctrine can derive from reason is at once taken away. Sin it is acknowleged by all, is the act of a finite being; and as no one ever thought of attributing infinity to any other act of man, we might rationally conclude that this, as well as all his other acts, was finite. But such is the fondnesss of man for his own peculiar opinions, and such his anxiety to maintain them, that the clearest dictates of reason are often overlooked; and such I conceive to be the case in reference to

the subject under consideration, Let us now examine the different grounds on which the advocates for the doctrine of the infinity of sin have attempted to support their systems.

1. Sin, it is contended, is infinite, because committed against an infinite God. The greater the being sinned against, and the more perfect the authority opposed by sin, the greater will be the crime. As therefore, God is infinite in all his perfections, and as his authority over man is also infinite, sin, being against this God,

and in opposition to his authority, must consequently be infinite. This argument certainly appears somewhat plausible at first view; but let us examine it-let us bring it to the test of reason and see if it be not more specious than solid. Suppose this principle were to be adopted in the jurisprudence of our country, or carried into practice in the government of families. What would be the consequences which would follow? Surely they would be such as to cause all the better feelings of the heart to revolt against them. In all civil governments, the authority delegated to rulers and magistrates by the constitution of the country, extends equally over all the subjects or citizens. But, I ask, are all these subjects or citizens alike guilty in the view of the law for opposing this authority? This will not be contended for by any man in his right mind. On the contrary, all governments, even the most despotic, make a wide difference in the criminality of the different individuals who may violate their laws : and while they would punish with death the man who in the perfect exercise of reason, should deliberately commit murder; the idiot, or the insane person who should commit the same act, would be screened from all punishment. Now if the degree of criminality which is to be attached to the actions of mankind, is to be determined by the dignity of the person or authority which is opposed by these actions, all such distinctions must forever cease; the idiot, or the insane man deserves just the same punishment for the same act, as the man who