gree effential to the fuppofed inherence of other qualities, in what is termed fubftance, we are truly at a lofs to conceive, without concluding that he has fuffered himself to be impofed upon, by a palpable error springing from the grofseft analogy. The paffage ftands alone in the character of unqualified fallacy; and, is fo diftinctly marked from the luminous reafoning, and profound research, which the author elsewhere difplays, that our attention was unavoidably attracted by it.

"We are impelled to action," fays our author, at the conclusion of his firft chapter "or we defift from it, as we are conftrained by the ftronger motive. Our paffions are not the children of our choice. We neither feel, nor cease to feel, according to any fuppofed power of the will. What, indeed, is the will, but the fentiment of defire which prevails in our

minds."

The queftion refpecting the influence of the will over the actions of men, is treated by the author in another part of his work, in the moft able and philofophical manner; and we referve to our inveftigation of that part, the obfervations which we may have to offer on this difficult and difputed fubject. In the mean time we may acknowledge, with a flight qualification, our affent to the truth of the foregoing fpeculations. Volition, as a faculty the exercife of which is independent of motive, has been rejected from all recent fyftems of philofophy. When we are told, however, that it confifts only in the fentiment of de fire, which prevails in our minds, we have, in fact, little more than a fubftitution of fynominous terms. Were volition, on the other hand, to be defined the predominating and active influence of the ftronger motive, the denial of its exiftence as an independent principle of the mind, would be involved in the definition, and even the term itself might thus be fhewn, to Be fuperfluous in metaphyfical language. Had the author, then, carried his reasonings to this conclufion, their merit would have been enhanced; fince the inference may be fairly deduced from the premises which he adopts. The author proceeds to the following obfervations, as legitimate corollaries from his previous investigations:

"Moral writers have in vain declaimed upon the government of the paffions, where they have failed to fhew, that it is only one sentiment which can subdue another in the human breast. If you wish to make men virtuous, endeavour to inspire into them the love of virtue. Shew thein the beauty of order, and the fitnefs of things. Seek to elevate the mind to the contemplation of divine perfection, in which alone is affembled, whatever is most excellent in intellectual nature. Reprefent vice, as indignant virtue always. will represent it, as hideous, loathfome, and deformed. But do not hope that your precepts can avail you, if you forget, that will cannot be changed while sentiment remains unaltered. There is no power by which men can create, or deftroy their feelings. Sensation alone, overcomes sensation. Belief cannot be forced, nor can conviction be coerced; and, when one fentiment effaces another in the human mind, the change cannot be afcribed to any thing else than to the prevailing fentiment itself."

We

We do not purpose, in this place, to enter at large on an examination of the principle adopted in the foregoing reafoning; but shall reserve our remarks upon this part of the fubject, for the opportunity to which we have just alluded. We cannot, however, fuffer the bold and unqualified affertions, comprehended in it, to pass without fome animadverfion. It could hardly have been the intention of the author, to deny the habitual or even occafional controul of reason (in the ftricteft philofophical acceptation of the term) over the paffions, and thus to leave the mind "without chart or compass" the sport of, every varying Sentiment. If fuch be his defign, how different from the fublime views of the ancient mafters of philofophy! or the fagacious maxims of their illuftrious fucceffors! In truth, no extenfive acquaintance with moral science is required to demonftrate its inconfiftency; the facts which difprove it, are daily and hourly obtruded, not only on the obfervation, but on the conciousnefs, of every individual. Until thefe mighty opponents of lawless speculation are filenced, we cannot subscribe to the opinion, that in the purfuit of virtue, paffion is required to countervail paffion, and impulfe to overcome impulfe. The minds of men who have engaged in the cultivation of virtuous habits, may, indeed, become gradually lefs and lefs fubject to the inroad of fentiments hoftile to virtue; but in the difcipline which precedes this fortified condition, it is well known by every one, that paffion and impulse are oppofed by calm and deliberate resolution, that the mastery over them is obtained, not by violence, but by perfeverance, not by occafional difruptions, but by fteady and fober determination. A more erroneous, or perilous principle of conduct can hardly be conceived, than that which renders the practice of virtue dependent, chiefly on the exquifitenefs of moral feeling. Few, indeed, is the number of thofe who are capable of relishing the beauty of order, or delighting in the fitness of things, whofe minds can be elevated to an adequate contemplation of divine perfection, or whofe averfion from vice in all its gay and alluring forms, is fufficiently intense to paint it to their minds invariably, as loathfome, hideous, and deformed. Few, we repeat, even of cultivated understandings, cherished in the tranquility of retirement, are capable of preferving without decay the energy of fuch fentiments. Were the great mafs of mankind to indulge the idea of leaving the evil propenfities of their nature to the precarious controul of their appetite for good, melancholy indeed would be the confequence to the interefts of virtue!

The truth is, that the hypothefis is equally liable to vulgar and to philofophical objections; it is derived from a mifapprehenfion of the original conftitution of the mind. The fentiment which accompanies action, and which fome metaphyficians have denominated volition, others motive, and a third clafs, defire, is effentially different in its nature from the fimpler qualities, or conditions of the mind, which are ufually termed paffions. Thus, anger, love, difdain, are conditions of the mind, the existence of which is independent of the prefence of any other rational or active faculty. They are felf-fuftained,

and

and fubject to no alteration in their intrinfic nature, by any other power of the mind. They may, however, be blended with each other, fo as to produce a refult different from that which proceeds from them when acting individually and fucceffively.-On the other hand, that principle of action which has been termed volition may be the refult of the combined influence of reafon and feeling, the conclufion from comparifon and judgment, from retrofpective and profpective observation. Though complex in its nature, it may with propriety be faid to be fimple in its operative power; it may be calm and deliberate, or violent and overbearing; but its violence is feldom proportioned to the countervailing force of oppofing motives, nor is its gentleness always overcome by the ftrength of adverse propenfities. To maintain, therefore, that palion is required to controul paffion, and impulfe to counteract impulfe, is to prefuppofe a capacity of counteraction in these agents; an hypothefis not lefs groundless in its origin than it is pernicious in its tendencies.

The fecond chapter, opens with a brief difcuffion of the ideal theory, and the doctrine of external existences.

"It is unneceffary for me," fays the author "to repeat the arguments by which Locke, and other celebrated writers have proved, that the fenfible qualities of matter exift only as they are perceived. They must be ignorant of the first principles of philofophy, to whom it is requifite to fhew that sensation can alone be found in fentient beings. Let us examine, what are, and in what confift the changes which we really perceive, when we say, that a piece of wax is melted by heat. In its first state the piece of wax amounts to a complex idea, compounded of a certain number of fimple ideas, fuch as figure, colour, fmoothnefs, hardness, and a certain temperature not equal to heat. In its fecond state, the complex idea of the wax is no longer the fame, but partakes, both of heat and fluidity. We have in each instance two distinct complex ideas, because all the component fimple ideas are not the fame. We are fenfible of hardness in the firft, and of fluidity and heat in the fecond; but the change has taken place in our own feelings, and it would be absurd to say, that a difference in our fenfations is a difference in an external object."

Thus far our opinions coincide effentially with thofe of the author; although there is room for objection against the mode in which he has ftated them. He proceeds:

"When we defire to analyse what any thing is, which we denominate an external object, we always find that it may be refolved into certain fenfible qualities. If I be defired to explain what I perceive when I examine a fine marble ftatue, I can only repeat the catalogue of my own feelings. I fay that I am fenfible of the whiteness of the ftone, of the beauty of the form, and of the juftnefs of the proportions, that I feel hardnefs and fmoothness; and that I judge differently of its magnitude, while I observe that magnitude under different vifual angles. Thus, then, inftead of defcribing the external ftatue, I am in fact expreffing my own fentiments, stating my own feelings, declaring my own judgments and detailing preceptions, which exift only in my mind. The active and paffive state of external objects, are determined by changes which take place in their fenfible: qualities.

qualities. But what are these qualities of external objects, unless they be fenfations in our own minds, which we have attributed to things fuppofed to exift around us? We cannot define nor describe what we neither feel nor perceive. Nothing can be felt nor perceived where it is not. The changes which exift in our own feelings, and in our own perceptions, must be erroneously itated to have had place in remote and exterior objects.'

There is a fingular obfcurity, and even questionable ambiguity, in the manner which the author has adopted in the foregoing statement of a much controverted subject. In one clause he labours to establish the identical propofition, that percipients alone can perceive; in another, he makes his readers aware that ideas exift only in the mind; and in a third he infinuates cautioufly, but dogmatically, that the notion of external exiftences is an error and an abfurdity, whilft, at the fame time he is compelled, in the courfe of his own defeription of intellectual conception, to refer at almost every step, to fuch a notion, as to an acknowledged truth. Now, although we might accord with our author, that “it would be abfurd to fay, that a difference in our fenfations is a difference in an external object," that is, to affirm that these two effentially diftinct propofitions are one and the fame; yet we are far from maintaining it to be impoffible, or even improbable, that they may not ftand towards each other in the intimate relation of caufe and confequence. In the fame manner we object to the obvious influence which may be drawn from the fentence which closes the preceding quotation. "The changes" fays the author "which exift in our own feelings, and in our own perceptions, must be erroneously stated to have had place in remote and exterior objects." If the writer mean to affert that the changes taking place in thefe different circumftances are not, or cannot be, identical, we apprehend that he will meet with few opponents to fo felf evident a position. If, however, in this concluding statement of the refult from the foregoing argu ments, he defigned to have it understood, as his opinion, that the changes which exift in our own perceptions are erroneously conceived, to be accompanied by correfponding changes in remote and exterior objects, we maintain that he affirms that of which there is not a shadow of direct evidence. The truth is, that the queftion refpecting external existences, no less than the difficulty refpecting the mode of communication (were the fact admitted) between the material and the intellectual world, muft from the very conftitution of our minds remain to all eternity an inexplicable mystery. Our doubts and perplexities about it, may, indeed, be dreffed in new fhapes, and affume an infinite diverfity of afpects; but the fact remains unaltered; and they evince the jutteft principles of philofophy, who exhibit the fact in its genuine form, and relinquifh at once the presumptuous and unavailing task of combating its difficulties. We are again and again compelled to cenfure, in terms of unqualified reprobation, the unpardonable. error of indulging in the purfuit of fuch vifionary trifles.

The author afferts that "we cannot define or defcribe, what we neither feel nor perceive," and we are not difpofed to deny the truth

of

of his pofition; but to the fentence which fucceeds, we have one material objection to offer. "Nothing," he declares" can be felt or perceived, where it is not." Does the pronoun it, refer to the thing or to the perception? According to the ordinary conftruction of language, the reference is to the object perceived; and, if this be true of the preceding claufe, the affertion involved is without adequate proof, or fupport. What may be the conditions of the fuppofed intercourfe between mind and matter, we are utterly ignorant; nor is it at all more certain, that prefence, contact, or any other plaufible circumftance (fuggefted by analogy from the material world) is more requifite for perception, than the moft fanciful and irrelative condition that can be conceived.

The following paffage comprehends the scope of the author's views, concerning the doctrine of active and paffive faculties.

"The doctrine of paffive mental power is one of the moft fingular among the fallacies, which deceived the excellent judgment of Locke. A common reafoner may be permitted to think, that the obfcure paffage is nothing less than a contradiction in terms. If there be always a power by which the mind perceives, power must be exercifed, when the mind does perceive. Now the exercife of a power implies precifely that, which is commonly called an action. Provided that there be any fuch states as active and paffive, it seems evident that the mind must be paffive when it is percipient. There can be no doubt, indeed, that this must be the cafe if the foul receive impreffions from external objects. But we need only appeal to experience, in order to be convinced, that all original sensations, and all immediate perceptions exift in our minds independently of the will, without any agency of intellect, and without the exertion of that power, which philofophers have termicd paffive."

There are much confufion and uncertainty, both in the language and in the argument of the preceding difquifition; and in one place (which we have marked by italics) the author appears to have involved himself in a contradiction of hypotheses.

Admitting the unity of mind, on the ground of there being no direct evidence of the feparate existences of diftinct faculties, the queftion which is here agitated, refolves itself in ftrict propriety into an inquiry respecting times and occafions, viz. is the mind fometimes active and fometimes paffive? or is its condition uniform during the intellectual changes and operations which are obferved to take place? Now, as our acquaintance with mind extends only to the operations which are attributed to it, and as our knowledge of thefe operations confifts merely in the obfervation of their refults, it follows, that concerning these refults, and them only, are we capable of reasoning, or even of forming any diftinct conception. In what terms, then, fhall we speak of the feeble and mistaken efforts to penetrate the veil of irremediable obfcurity, or of the vifionary wanderings through unmeasured space, of which the foregoing difquifition is an example: fuch pursuits, let it be observed, once for all, are unworthy of the philofopher, baneful to the interests of science, and fubverfive of the fundamental