v. Gugenheim, 3 Fish., 426; Davis v. Palmer, 2 Brock., 310; Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How., 175; S. C., 22 How., 137, 16 L. ed., 368. product, if produced by hand tools, or by other | v. Fernie, 10 L. T. (N. S.), 864; Salt Mfg. Co. means substantially different from those employed by the inventor or discoverer. Patentees in the former case may claim the new product without qualification; but in the latter, they should claim the product, only when made by the described means or their equivalent, as the process inheres in the manufacture and constitutes an element of the invention. Neither claim, however, would be valid unless supported by proof of invention or discovery, for which proposition there is abundant authority in the decisions of the Supreme Court, and in the decisions of the English courts. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How., 265; Phillips v. Paige, 24 How., 167, 16 L. ed., 640; Jones v. Morehead, 1 Wall., 162, 17 L. ed., 663; Stimpson v. Woodman, 10 Wall., 121, 19 L. ed., 868; Knight v. R. R. Co., Camp. (Taney, C. C.), 109; Bean v. Smallwood, 2 Story, 411; Winans v. R. R. Co., 2 Story, 416; Hicks v. Kelsey, 18 Wall., 670, 21 L. ed., 852; Paper Collar Co. v. Van Deusen, 10 Blatchf., 119; Langdon v. De Groot, 1 Paine, 204; Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How., 175. Apply the principle of these cases to the case before the court, and it is clear that the patent cannot be sustained, as neither the process nor the means of effecting the result, nor the apparatus or its modes of operation are new or different from what had long been known to those skilled in the art; nor does the operation of comminuting the glue in flakes have the slightest effect to change the properties of the substance in any respect whatever. Comminuted glue differs in no respect from the ordinary glue of commerce, from which it is manufactured, except in the degree of its fragmentary condition as appears by the great body of the evidence in the case. Other substances of various kinds, it must be conceded, have been mechanically reduced in size in like manner; and, inasmuch as such articles or some of them bear a close resemblance to glue in flakes, which is unchanged in any of its properties, I am of the opinion that the reduction of the glue, as manufactured in flakes, to small particles, as described in the specification of the complainant's patent, does not involve the exercise of invention or discovery, without which it is clear that the product of the described process or apparatus cannot be regarded as a patentable improvement. Abundant support to that proposition is found in the English decisions as well as in the decisions made in this country. Penn v. Bibby, L. R., 2 Ch. App., 136; Harwood v. R. Co., 11 H. of L. Cas., 667; Jordan v. Moore, L. R., 1 C. P., 635; Kay v. Marshall, 8 Cl. & F., 261; Bush v. Fox, 5 H. of L. Cas., 716; Ralston v. Smith, 11 H. of L. Cas., 255; Tetley v. Easton, 2 C. B. (N. S.), 740; Horton v. Mabon, 12 C. B. (N. S.), 452; Ormson v. Clarke, 13 C. B. (N. S.), 340; S. C., 14 C. B. (N. S.), 490; Parkes v. Stevens, L. R., 5 Ch. App., 39; S. C., L. R., 8; Eq., 368; Envelope Co. v. Seymer, 5 C. B. (N. S.). 173; White v. Toms, 17 L. T. (N. S.), 349; Losh v. Hague, Web. Pat. Cas., 208; Saunders v. Aston, 3 B. & Ad., 885. Support to the opposite view, it is supposed by the complainants, is drawn from the following cases: Winans v. Denmead, 15 How., 343; Young But the court is of the opinion that no one of these cases supports the theory of the complainants, as it satisfactorily appears in this case that flake glue, comminuted by other means than those described in the specification, is as readily dissolved and prepared for practical use as when the flake glue is comminuted by the patented process and that the ground glue with equal convenience may be put up in small packages for the retail trade. Proof of the most convincing character is exhibited in the record, showing that flake glue has been ground into small particles at a much earlier period of time than the date of the alleged invention, described in the original patent, and several parcels of the ground product, together with the machine in which the product was ground, were introduced in evidence, which show to a demonstration that, if glue comminuted by grinding is substantially the same product as glue comminuted by the apparatus described in the said specification the patentee was not the original and first inventor of the patented improvement; but, in the view taken of the case, it will not be necessary to decide that issue in the pleadings, nor whether flake glue when ground is substantially the same as flake glue when comminuted by the apparatus described in the patent in suit, or substantially different, as will presently more fully appear; nor is it necessary to discuss either the third or the fourth proposition submitted by the respondents, as the court is of the opinion that the complainants fail to show that they are entitled to a decree for two reasons other than those submitted in those propositions: 1. Because the product of the process or apparatus described in the complainant's patent is not patentable, as the production of it did not, in the sense of the patent law, involve the exercise of any invention or discovery. 2. Because if the patented product and the product manufactured by the respondent are substantially the same then the original patentee was not the original and first inventor of the improvement, as flake glue was ground at a much earlier period than the date of the alleged invention; and if the patented product is substantially different from the product manufac tured by the respondent, then it is clear that the charge of the infringement is not proven. court below dismissed the bill, and the complain- | means by which a desirable change in the form ant has appealed to this court. of a common article of commerce is obtained; The patent bears date in July, 1870, and was but it consists only of the ordinary flake glue issued to the assignors of the complainant upon reduced to small particles by mechanical dirithe surrender and cancellation of a patent is- sion. The advantages from such division cunsued in October, 1864, to Emerson Goddard, assist in its more ready and rapid solution, its the alleged inventor of the article in question, greater convenience for packing and retailing, and afterwards transferred to them. and its whiter appearance and enhanced salableness. The whole claim is to an old article of commerce in a state of mechanical division greater than previously used, but unchan- [6 ged in composition and properties; and the be1efits arising from the increased division are such as appertain to all soluble objects when divided into minute particles. This statement, which is substantially a repetition in a condensed form of that by counsel, is supported by reference to numerous instances where similar results have followed the mechanical division of soluble objects into small particles; but we do not deem it necessary to mention them for the point involved presents no difficulty. There is nothing new in the fact that the solution of a soluble object is accelerated by increasing its fragmentary division; nor is there anything new in the fact that articles with rough angles and edges can be more readily put up into packages without injury to their wrappers when reduced by mechanical division into small particles; nor is there anything new in the fact that such articles generally improve in appearance by granulation or powdering. In the court below, the defendant questioned the validity of the surrender and re-issue; but, from the view we take of the alleged invention cr discovery it is unnecessary to consider this point. We shall treat the re-issue as for the same invention or discovery, differing in no substantial particular from that originally patented. In the specification accompanying the reissue, the patentee states that he has invented a new and useful article, which he denominates "instantaneous or comminuted glue;" and then proceeds to describe the glue of commerce previously found in the market and to point out the inconveniences attending its use, and the manner in which they are obviated by his invention. He states that the ordinary glue of commerce was then sold in the form of hard, angular flakes, and that it required a good deal of time to prepare it for use: first by soaking it in cold water, and afterwards by heating it in a hot water bath until the flakes were dissolved. 5] The time thus occupied, he says, is saved by his invention as his article does not require to be prepared for solution by soaking, is quickly permeated by water, so that it can be dissolved in large quantities ready for mechanical use in A distinction must be observed between a less than five minutes, and in smaller quantities new article of commerce and a new article for domestic use in less than one minute. An- which, as such, is patentable. Any change in other objection stated to the glue of commerce form from a previous condition may render the as previously sold is, that great inconvenience article new in commerce; as powdered sugar is was experienced in retailing it, from the diffi- a different article in commerce from loaf sugar, culty of putting it up in small packages, by and ground coffee is a different article in com reason of the sharp, angular corners and edges merce from coffee in the berry. But to render of the broken flakes, which cut the wrappers, the article new in the sense of the patent law causing a waste of time and stock. The new it must be more or less efficacious, or possess article, he says, can be put up by machinery or new properties by a combination with other in by hand into packages of uniform size and of gredients; not from a mere change of form pro regular form and weight, similar to those in duced by a mechanical division. It is only which ground spices are put up for domestic where one of these results follows that the prod use, and sold by retail traders. He also states uct of the compound can be treated as the re that the new article has a more pleasing appear-sult of invention or discovery and be regarde ance than the ordinary glue of commerce in as a new and useful article. The three advar that it has a white color and is, consequent- tages attributed to comminuted glue over the ly, more merchantable, and brings a higher flake glue were, previous to the alleged inver price. The specification then proceeds to describe the best process which the inventor has devised for making such instantaneous glue, and the apparatus or machinery he has used. These consist of a breaking machine, for crushing the flakes into small pieces, and of a rasping or grating machine, for comminuting the broken pieces into uniform grains. But for these mechanical means or processes the patentee makes no claim, observing, that it is obvious that other means or processes of crushing or reduction may be used to manufacture his article out of dry flake glue or gelatine by a crushing or breaking operation and that his claim is only to the comminuted glue as a new article of manufacture. It thus appears that the invention claimed is not any new combination of ingredients, creating a different product, or any new mechanical tion of Goddard recognized as following from a division of soluble objects into small particles in the treatment of a great variety of articles in constant use in the kitchens of families, and ja pharmacy. Where certain properties are known to belong generally to classes of articles, there can be no invention in putting a new species of the class in a condition for the development of its properties similar to *that in which other [ species of the same class have been placed for similar development; nor can the changed forma of the article from its condition in bulk to small particles, by breaking or bruising or slicing or rasping or filing or grinding or sifting, or other similar mechanical means, make it a new arti cle, in the sense of the patent law. This subject is elaborately considered by the presiding Justice of the Circuit Court, in his opinion, with reference to numerous adjudications of the courts of England and the inital States; and in his conclusion on this point we 519; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 52; Wales concur. Decree affirmed. 25] *THE BOSTON BEER COMPANY, Claimant of certain intoxicating liquors, Plff. in Err., V. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHU- (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 25-34.) Charter of Beer Company, not impaired by prohibitory liquor law-state prohibitory law, valid. 1. The charter of the Boston Beer Company, which was granted in 1828, with the franchise of manufacturing malt liquors in Boston, does not contain any contract, the obligation of which was impaired by the Prohibitory Liquor Law of Massachusetts, passed in 1869. 2. The right to manufacture, undoubtedly included the incidental right to dispose of the liquors manufactured; but it cannot be construed as conferring any greater or more sacred right than any citizen had to manufacture malt liquor. 3. A state law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is not repugnant to any clause of the Constitution of the United States. [No. 277.] Submitted Apr. 30, 1878. Decided May 13, 1878. In Error to the Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. This action originated in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston. That court, upon complaint being filed, issued a warrant for the seizure of the liquors in question, and the plaintiff in error was notified to appear and show cause why the liquors should not be forfeited under the Act of 1869, chapter 415. The plaintiff in error appeared, and the trial resulted in judgment of forfeiture. The claimant appealed to the Superior Court of the State and, upon the trial therein, judgment was again rendered for the Commonwealth. Exceptions were taken by the claimant to the rulings of the Superior Court and, the case having been taken to the Supreme Judicial Court of the State these exceptions were overruled, and the case being remitted to the Superior Court, final judgment was entered, declaring that the liquor was forfeited. To this judgment the present writ of error is prosecuted. The case further appears in the opinion. Messrs. Henry W. Paine and Frederick O. Prince, for plaintiff in error: Charters of incorporation, which are granted for the private benefit or purposes of the corporators, are held to be contracts between the Legislature and the corporators, having for their consideration the liabilities and duties which the corporators assume by accepting them. Cooley, Const. Lim., 278, and cases cited; Binghamton Bridge case, 3 Wall., 73, 18 L. ed., 142; Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 4 Wheat., v. Stetson, 2 Mass., 143. That the Corporation in this case was authorized to sell and dispose of its property, as well as to manufacture, does not admit of a doubt. Without this authority the charter would have been utterly worthless. Co. Litt., 56; Shep. Touch., 49; Thayer v. Payne, 2 Cush., 327; Pomfret v. Ricroft, 1 Saund., 321; Darcy v. Askwith, Hob., 234; U. S. v. Babbitt, 1 Black, 61, 17 L. ed., 96; Bk. v. Sharp, 6 How., 318; Huidekoper v. Douglass, 3 Cranch, 1; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet., 420; People v. Platt, 17 Johns., 215; Cooley, Const. Lim., 576; and cases cited; Thorp v. R. & B. R. R. Co., 27 Vt., 140. Was the franchise of the Corporation, granted in 1828, made irrevocable? The Boston Beer Company was incorporated "Subject to all the duties and requirements contained in an Act passed March 3, 1809." By Statute of 1829, chapter 53, section 16, this Act of 1809, and all Acts in addition thereto were repealed, with this qualification: "But this repeal shall not affect the existing rights of of any corporation, or any members of any corany person, or the existing or future liabilities poration now established, until such corporation shall have adopted this Act, and complied with the provisions herein contained." Section 17 declares that "this Act may be amended or repealed at the pleasure of the Legislature, and all such corporations as shall be established under this Act, or shall adopt the same in the manner herein described, shall cease and expire at the same time when this Act shall be repealed; Provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall take away or affect any remedy given by this Act against any such corporation, its members or officers, for any liability which shall have been created by the provisions herein contained, before the repeal of this Act." The 7th section of the Act of 1809 is restricted, both by its terms and its subject-matter, to action by the Legislature, after notice, upon the charter itself. General legislation, had without notice to the corporation and without action upon the specific grant made by its charter, is clearly not within the provisions. People v. Platt, 17 Johns., 215. The qualifications in the Act of 1829, chapter 53, section 16, has no reference to the subjectmatter of the 7th section of the Act of 1809, but relates exclusively to the rights of persons against the Corporation and its members, which it was one object of the Act to modify, if it should be accepted and its terms complied with by any then existing corporation. The language is wholly satisfied by such a construction, and its terms can properly imply nothing more. "The rights of any persons or the existing or future liabilities of any corporation, have a natural and appropriate meaning when applied to the rights of third persons, and the corresponding liabilities to third persons, of the Corporation and its members, but clearly do not fitly describe or indicate a power of the Legislature to alter, amend or repeal a charter." If this Corporation acquired by its charter, the right to sell its products, it must have had then legitimate. It might, then, have sold malt the right to sell in the usual course of business liquor as a beverage; it might have sold it at retail or by wholesale; it might have exported | absolute, and not subject to be limited by reand sold it in any quantity in other States, or straints imposed in the exercise of the police in foreign countries. power. It is conceded that the Legislature may still make all reasonable regulations, providing a material and essential part of the grant is not impaired. People v. Platt, 17 Johns., 215. The limit to the exercise of the police power must be this: the regulations must have reference to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. They must not conflict with any provisions of the charter; and they must not, under pretense of regulating, take from the Corporation any of its essential rights and privileges which the charter confers. Cooley, Const., Lim., 576, and cases there cited; Thorp v. R. & B. R. R. Co., 27 Vt., 140. Messrs. Charles R. Train and William Caleb Loring, for defendant in error: The powers and privileges, duties and requirements, of the plaintiff Corporation continued to be, after the repeal by Stat. 1829, ch. 53, sec. 16, of Stat. 1809, ch. 65, those set forth in Stat. 1809, ch. 65, precisely as they were before the repeal of that Act; because: 1. It is by force of the provisions of the charter (Stat. 1827, ch. 32), that those duties are the duties of the plaintiff Corporation; the charter (Stat. 1827, ch. 32, sec. 1) provides that this Corporation shall have certain powers, etc., to wit: those powers, etc., which are set forth in a certain instrument, to wit: Stat. 1808, 65. It was originally entirely immaterial that Stat. 1808 was a statute, and it is now entirely im material that it has ceased to be so. It was by force of the charter that those powers, etc., are the powers, etc., of this Corporation. The charter has not been repealed. 2. The proviso in Stat. 1829, ch. 53, sec. 16, is a clumsy saving clause, providing that the repeal of Stat. 1809, ch. 65, should not affect existing corporations, until they adopted this Act. 3. It is impossible to give to the repeal of Stat. 1809, ch. 65, the effect contended for by the plaintiff in error. The Legislature has assumed that such is not its effect. See Stat. 1871, ch. 110, sec. 5, providing that Corporations, subject to the provisions of Stat. 1809, ch. 65, shall make certain returns. It is directly contrary to the uniform course of Massachusetts legislation on the subject. See Stat. 1809, ch. 65; Stat. 1829, ch. 53; R. S.. ch. 38; Gen. Stats., 360; Stat. 1870, ch. 224. If the plaintiff's charter is amendable and repealable, the Corporation is subject to the same restraints in the use of its property, as may be imposed by the Legislature, in the exercise of police power, upon natural persons. Peik v. R. Co., 94 U. S., 164 (ante, 97). It is confessedly within the police power of the State to prohibit the manufacture of intoxicating liquors. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall., 129, 133, 21 L. ed., 929, 930. Assuming that the plaintiff's charter is not repealable, the obligation of the contract contained therein is not impaired, because the plaintins charter cannot be construed to contain a contract between the State of Massachusetts and the plaintiff Corporation, that its right of manufacturing malt liquors should be It is clear that if the plaintiff's charter does not contain such a contract, the Statute of 1869, chapter 415, does not violate its obligations; for it is clear that the restraints imposed on the manufacture of liquor by that Statute are such as can be legitimately imposed in the exercise of the police power. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, ubi supra. The language of the charter cannot be interpreted to provide that the plaintiff Corporation's right of manufacturing malt liquor shall be absolute, and not subject to be restrained by the State and future legislation in the exercise of the police power. Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 16 How., 416, 435; Opinion of the Justices, 9 Cush., 604; Farrington v. Tenn. (ante, 58), 17 Alb. L. J., 128; R. R. Co. v. Supervisors, 93 U. S., 595, 23 L. ed., 814; Thorp v. R. R. Co., 27 Vt., 142; Com. v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass., 383. It was beyond the power of the Legislature to make a contract, binding on the State of Massachusetts, that future Legislatures would not exercise the police power, so as to limit the plaintiff Corporation in the matter of manufacturing malt liquors. The Constitution of Massachusetts cannot be construed to authorize legislation to make such a contract. Com. v. Bird, 12 Mass., 443; Boston & Lowell R. R. Co. v. Salem & Low. R. R. Co., 2 Gray, 1, 32; Eastern R. R. Co. v. Bost. & Me. R. R. Co., 111 Mass., 125. The owner of an article has, as against the Legislature, under the 14th Amendment, no right to those uses of the article owned which are injurious to the common welfare. See Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1, 27; Blair v. Forehand, 100 Mass., 136; Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass., 454; Oviatt v. Pond, 29 Conn., 479; State v. Keeran, 5 R. I., 497; State v. Allmond, 2 Houst. (Del.), 612; License Cases, 5 How., 581; Munn v. Ill. (ante, 77); Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush., 53; Coates v. N. Y., 7 Cow., 585; State v. Noyes, 30 N. H., 279; People v. Hawley, 3 Mich., 330. In the following cases it was held that a prohibitory liquor law to the same effect as the Massachusetts Statute of 1869, chapter 415, did not interfere with the vested rights of a person who owned liquor at the time of its passage. State v. Allmond, 2 Houst. (Del.), 612; State v. Paul, 5 R. I., 185; State v. Keeran, 5 R. I., 498; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt., 328, affirmed by Gill v. Parker, 31 Vt., 610; State v. Court of C. P., etc. (36 N. J. L.), 72; Shaw, C. J., in Fisher v. McGirr, 1 Gray, 1, 27; Com. v. Anthes, 12 Gray, 29; Com. v. Logan, 12 Gray, 136; People v. Hawley, 3 Mich., 330; People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich., 244; Our House, No. 2, v. State, 4 Greene, Ia., 172; Santo v. State, 2 Ia., 165; State v. Bartmeyer, 31 Ia., 601; State v. Wheeler, 25 Conn., 290; and see, Stewart and Gookins, JJ., in Beebe v. State, 6 Ind., 501, 522; T. A. Johnson and Mitchell, JJ., dissenting, in Winehamer v. State, ubi supra, 460; T. A. Johnson, Mitchell and Wright, JJ., dissenting, in People v. Founbee, ubi supra, 458, 480; Trumbull, J., in Jones v. People, 14 Ill., 196; Parker, C. J., in Pearce v. State, 13 N. H., 536-586. Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion | amounts, as might be found necessary and conof the court. venient for carrying on the manufacture of malt liquors in the City of Boston. The question raised in this case is, whether the charter of the plaintiff, which was granted in 1828, contains any contract the obligation of which was impaired by the prohibitory liquor law of Massachusetts, passed in 1869, as applied to the liquor in question in this suit. Some question is made by the defendant in error whether the point was properly raised in 30] the state courts, so as to be the subject of decision by the highest court of the State. It is contended that, although it was raised by plea, in the Municipal Court, yet, that plea being demurred to and the demurrer being sustained, the defense was abandoned, and the only issue on which the parties went to trial was the general denial of the truth of the complaint. But whatever may be the correct course of proceeding in the practice of courts of Massachusetts, a matter which it is not our province to investigate, it is apparent from the record that the very point now sought to be argued was made on the trial of the cause in the Superior Court, and was passed upon, and made decisive of the controversy, and was afterwards carried by bill of exceptions to the Supreme Judicial Court, and was decided there adverse to the plaintiff in error on the very ground on which it seeks a reversal. The general manufacturing Act of 1809, referred to in the charter, had this clause, as a proviso of the 7th section thereof: "Provided always, that the Legislature may from time to time, upon due notice to any corporation, make further provisions and regulations for the management of the business of the corporation and for the government thereof, or wholly to repeal any Act or part thereof, establishing any corporation, as shall be deemed expedient." A substitute for this Act was passed in 1829, which repealed the Act of 1809 and all Acts in addition thereto, with this qualification: "But this repeal shall not affect the existing rights of any person, or the existing or future liabilities of any corporation, or any members of any corporation 'now established, until such corporation shall have adopted this Act, and complied with the provisions herein contained." It thus appears that the charter of the Company, by adopting the provisions of the Act of 1809, became subject to a reversed power of the Legislature to make further provisions and regulations for the management of the business of the Corporation and for the government thereof, or wholly to repeal the Act, or any part thereof, establishing the Corporation. This res The Supreme Court, in its rescript, expressly ervation of the power was a part of the contract. decides as follows: "Exceptions overruled for the reasons following: The Act of 1869, ch. 415, does not impair the obligations of the contract contained in the charter of the claimant, so far as it relates to the sale of malt liquors, but is binding on the claimant to the same extent as on individuals. The Act is in the nature of a police regulation in regard to the sale of a certain article of property, and is applicable to the sale of such property by individuals and corporations, even where the charter of the corporation cannot be altered or repealed by the Legislature." The judgment of the Superior Criminal Court was entered in conformity to this rescript, declaring the liquors forfeited to the Commonwealth, and that a warrant issue for the disposal of the same. This is sufficient for our jurisdiction, and we are bound to consider the question which is thus raised. As before stated, the charter of the plaintiff in error was granted in 1828, by an Act of the Legislature passed on the 1st of February, in that year, entitled "An Act to Incorporate the Boston Beer Company." This Act consisted of two sections. By the first, it was enacted that certain persons (named), their successors and assigns. "Be, and they hereby are, made a corporation, by the name of The Boston Beer Com31] pany, for the *purpose of manufacturing malt liquors in all their varieties, in the City of Boston, and for that purpose shall have all the powers and privileges, and be subject to all the duties and requirements, contained in an Act passed on the 3d day of March, A. D. 1809, entitled 'An Act Defining the General Powers and Duties of Manufacturing Corporations,' and the several Acts in addition thereto." The second section gave the Company power to hold such real and personal property to certain But it is contended by the Company that the repeal of the Act of 1809 by the Act of 1829 was a revocation or surrender of this reserved power. We cannot so regard it. The charter of the Company adopted the provisions of the Act of 1809, as a portion of itself; and those provisions remained a part of the charter, notwithstanding *the subsequent repeal of the [32 Act. The Act of 1829 reserved a similar power to amend or repeal that Act, at the pleasure of the Legislature, and declared that all corporations established under it should cease and expire at the same time when the Act should be repealed. It can hardly be supposed that the Legislature, when it reserved such plenary powers over the corporations to be organized under the new Act, intended to relinquish all its powers over the corporations organized under or subject to the provisions of the former Act. The qualification of the repeal of the Act of 1809, before referred to, seems to be intended not only to continue the existence of the corporations subject to it in the enjoyment of all their privileges, but subject to all their liabilities, of which the reserved legislative control was one. If this view is correct, the Legislature of Massachusetts had reserved complete power to pass any law it saw fit, which might affect the powers of the plaintiff in error. But there is another question in the case, which, as it seems to us, is equally decisive. The plaintiff in error was incorporated "for the purpose of manufacturing malt liquors in all their varieties," it is true; and the right to manufacture, undoubtedly, as the plaintiff's counsel contends, included the incidental right to dispose of the liquors manufactured. But although this right or capacity was thus granted in the most unqualified form, it cannot be construed as conferring any greater or more sacred right than any citizen had to manufacture malt |