if embroidered or tamboured in the loom, or otherwise, by machinery or with the needle, or other process not otherwise provided for." Act of July 14, 1862, secs. 10 and 13, 12 Stat. at L., 554-557 both below top, imposes 5 per cent. additional duty on each of the above enumerations totidem verbis. ed., 218; Wood v. U. S., 16 Pet., 362; U. S. v. Tynen, 11 Wall., 92, 20 L. ed., 154. In the present case, the statutes are in perfect harmony, and there is no room for the theory of repeal by implication. The test of the rate of duty we are consider. ing is that of embroidery, or not. The rate of The Act of June 30, 1864, sec. 7, 13 Stat. at duty upon plain linen goods is reconsidered in L., 209, middle, imposes duties as follows: "On brown and bleached linens, ducks, canvas, paddings, cotton bottoms, burlaps, diapers. crash, huckabacks, handkerchiefs, lawns, 139] *or other manufactures of flax, jute or hemp, or of which flax, jute or hemp, shall be the component material of chief value, not otherwise provided for, valued at thirty cents or less per square yard, thirty-five per centum ad valorem; valued at above thirty cents per square yard, forty per centum ad valorem. On flax or linen yarns for carpets, not exceeding number eight Lea, and valued at twenty-four cents or less per pound, thirty per centum ad valorem. On flax or linen yarns valued at above twentyfour cents per pound, thirty-five per centum ad valorem. On flax or linen thread, twine and pack-thread, and all other manufactures of flax, or of which flax shall be the component material of chief value, not otherwise provided for, forty per centum ad valorem." The 22d section was as follows, 13 Stat. at L., 216. near bottom: "And Provided further, that the duties upon all goods, wares and merchandise imported from foreign countries, not provided for in this Act, shall be and remain as they were according to existing laws prior to the 29th of April, 1864," It will be seen by this juxtaposition, that section 14 of the Act of 1861, and section 7 of the Act of 1864, are in their first and general paragraphs, nearly identical. Except as to that portion of the Act of 1864, describing linen yarns, which is placed in Italics, and the rate of the duty provided, they are nearly the same, word for word. In the paragraphs following they differ. The Act of 1861 contains the provision that "Manufactures of cotton, linen, silk, wool or worsted, if embroidered or tamboured, in the loom or otherwise, by machinery or with the needle, or other process not otherwise provided for," shall be subject to a duty of 30 per cent. The Act of 1864 does not contain this provision. but contains the following clause: "Provided further, that the duties upon all goods, wares and merchandise imported from foreign countries, not provided for in this Act, shall be and remain as they were according to existing laws prior to the 29th of April, 1864." It seems impossible to resist the conclusion that Congress intended in the Act of 1864 to revise the duties on brown and bleached linens generally, increasing them from 25 and 30 per centum, as they were by the Act of 1861, to 35 '140] *and 40 per centum, but on embroidered or tamboured manufactures of linen the duties were intended to remain as they were prior to the 29th of April, 1864. To induce a repeal of a statute by the implication of inconsistency with a later statute, there must be such a positive repugnancy between the two statutes that they cannot stand together. McCool v. Smith, 1 Black, 459, 18 L. the Act of 1864, and is fixed at 35 per centum where the goods are valued at 30 cents or less per square yard, and at 40 per centum where they are valued above that sum. This is a higher rate of duty than that imposed by the Act of 1861; and, if there were no repealing clauses, then it would necessarily operate as a repeal of the old duty, by its repugnancy. The rate of duty on embroidered goods is not reconsider. ed in the Act of 1864. This class of goods is not there mentioned, but falls under the description of goods "not provided for in this Act," which, it is declared, shall remain as they were on the 29th of April, 1864. They remain, therefore, subject to the duty imposed by the Act of March, 1861. That this is a correct interpretation of these statutes is shown by the later provision of the Revised Statutes of 1874, wherein the duties are set forth in precise accordance with the construction we have here given. 1. At pp. 465, 466, a duty is imposed on brown and bleached linens, ducks, canvas, etc., etc., of 35 per centum where the value does not exceed 30 cents per square yard, and of 40 per centum where the value is greater. 2. Flax or linen yarns for carpets are dutiable at 35 or 40 per centum according to their value. These duties are as provided in the Act of 1864, and the marginal reference is to that Act. 3. At p. 479 is the provision, "Embroidery, manufactures of cotton, linen or silk, if embroidered or tamboured, in the loom or [141 otherwise, by machinery or with the needle, or other process not otherwise provided for, thirtyfive per cent. ad valorem. Articles embroidered with gold or silver or other metals, 35 per cent. ad valorem." The rulings at the trial were all upon this theory of the laws imposing duties, and were correct. The judgment is affirmed. I, James H. McKenney, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the Court in the case of Chester A. Arthur, Collector of the Port of N. Y., Plff. in Err., v. Benjamin Homer. et al., No. 608, October Term, 1877, as the same remains upon the files and records of said Supreme Court. In testimony whereof I hereunto subscribe my name and affix the seal of [L. S.] said Supreme Court, at the City of Washington, this 20th day of March, A. D. 1885. James H. McKenney, Clerk, Supreme Court, U. S. CHESTER A. ARTHUR, Collector of the Port of New York, Plff. in Err., V. HENRY HERMAN, et al. (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 141-143.) An article of which cotton is a component part, but not the component part of chief value, is dutiable at 35 per cent. ad valorem, under section 6 of the Act of 1864, and does not fall within the terms of section 2, of the Act of 1872. [No. 606.] Argued Mar. 28, 1878. vides that there shall be collected on every non- two or more materials, the highest duty assessable upon any of its component parts. The article in question is manufactured from cow hair Decided Apr. 22, 1878. and cotton; of these the cotton is assessed at a higher rate of duty than the hair and, therefore, the article is assessed as a manufacture of cotton, and hence it is insisted, under the Act of 1872, as a manufacture of cotton it is enti In Error to the Circuit Court of the United Messrs. Stephen G. Clarke and Wm. Stanley, for defendants in error: The provisions of section 20, of the Act of 1842, have been held to be permanent in their character, and in cases where applicable, furnishing a rule of construction determining under what schedule or dutiable classification a given article will fall. Stuart v. Maxwell, 16 How., 150; Marlot v. Lawrence, 1 Blatchf., 608; Ross v. Peaslee, 2 Curt., C. C., 499; Smythe v. Fisk, 23 Wall., 374, 381, 23 L. ed., 47, 49. The defect in this argument is apparent. The article in question does not fall within the terms of either part of the clause of the Act of 1872, "All manufactures of cotton, of which cotton is the component part of chief value." The first part gives the deduction to manufactures of cotton, which might be understood to mean those which are wholly of cotton. If it also includes a manufacture of which cotton is one of the components only, the cotton must be the component of chief value. It certainly was not intended to embrace a composite article of which cotton was the chief component, and a composite article of which it was not the chief Mr. Justice Hunt delivered the opinion of the *component. In any aspect, it does not [143 court: In the year 1872, the plaintiffs, imported from England certain cheap goods, the warp of which was made of cotton, and the filling or woof of cattle hair. These were the only component parts of the goods. The Collector imposed a duty of 30 per cent. on the goods, under the Act of June 30, 1864. The importers protested against this charge as excessive, insisting that, under the Act of June 6, 1872, 17 Stat. at L., 231, but ninety per cent. of thirty-five per cent. could be legally exacted as the duty upon the goods. The last paragraph of section 6 of the Act of 1864, 13 Stat. at L., 209, is as follows, viz.: "On cotton braids, insertings, lace trimming, or bobbinet, and all other manufactures of cotton not otherwise provided for, thirty-five per centum ad valorem." embrace the goods in question. We think the judge erred in ruling in favor of the importer, and that there must be a new trial. CHESTER A. ARTHUR, Collector of the Port of New York, Plff. in Err., V. LEON RHEIMS. (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 143-145.) Tariff Act-construction of. 1. The rule that, when an article is intended to be made dutiable by its specific designation, it will not be affected by the general words of the same or another statute, which would otherwise embrace it, applies both to statutes reducing and to statutes increasing duties. 2. Artificial flowers are not entitled to be classed as a manufacture of cotton, which is entitled to the reduction provided for by Act of 1872. [No. 602.] The goods in question were manufactured from two materials, of which cotton was one, and may, therefore, in general terms, be said to 142] *be manufactured of cotton, and they are not provided for by any specific enumeration in the Act of 1864. They fall under the general Argued Mar. 28, 1878. Decided Apr. 22, 1878. clause of this Act, just quoted. Impliedly admitting the application of this provision to their goods, the importers, by their protest, insist "That the merchandise aforesaid is only liable under existing laws to a duty of ninety per centum of 35 per centum ad valorem, under the 2d section of the Act of June 6, 1872, 17 Stat. at L., 231, as being merchandise composed of animal hair and cotton." On turning to the Act of 1872, we find that the ninety per centum provision is made applicable to "All manufactures of cotton, of which cotton is the component part of chief value." The article in question is dutiable as a manufacture of cotton, that material being one of its components. But the record expressly states that cotton is not the component part of chief value. It is plain that this case does not fall within the terms of the clause. Mr. Justice Hunt delivered the opinion of the court: In 1874, the plaintiff, Rheims, imported into the Port of New York a quantity of artificial flowers. They were composed of iron, paper, wire and cotton. The jury found that cotton was the component part of chief value in the The argument of the importers, if we appre-flowers. ciate it, is this: the similitude clause of the The Collector imposed a duty of 50 per cent. Act of 1842, 5 Stat. at L., 565, sec. 20, pro- ad valorem, under the Act of June 30, 1864. The question is whether the importers were | CHESTER A. ARTHUR, Collector of the 144] *entitled to the deduction of 10 per cent., allowed by the Act of June 6, 1872. Under the instructions of the Circuit Judge, the jury found that the importer was entitled to the deduction. From the judgment entered upon this verdict, the present writ of error is brought. Port of New York, Plff. in Err., V. JOSEPH W. GODDARD et al. (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 145-147.) Tariff Act-interest. "That the duty shall not be assessed upon any Under the Act of 1864, the duty of 50 per cent. was imposed "On artificial and ornamental feathers and flowers, or parts thereof, of whatever material composed, not otherwise provided for, beads and bead ornaments." 13 Stat. at L., 213. As no other provision was made, the goods were presumably subject to this duty. The Act of June 6, 1872, 17 Stat. at L., 231, Argued Mar. 29, 1878. Decided Apr. 22, 1878. provides, in its 2d section, as follows: "That, on and after the first of August, 1872, in lieu of the duties imposed by law on the articles in this section enumerated, there shall be levied, collected and paid on the goods, wares and merchandise in this section enumerated and provided for, imported from foreign countries, ninety per centum of the several duties and rates of duties now imposed by law on said articles severally, it being the intent of this section to reduce existing duties on such articles ten per centum of such duties; that is to say, on all manufactures of cotton of which cotton is the component part of chief value; * ** on all iron and steel, and all manufactures of iron and steel of which such metals, or either of them, shall be the component part of chief value, excepting cotton machinery.” Many other articles are named. The general words of the Act of 1872, no doubt are sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the case before us. Artificial flowers are a manufacture of which cotton is the chief component and, were that all, would be entitled to the deduction asked for. But it is true, also, that they are dutiable under the law of 1864, not as a manufacture of cotton, but specifically, eo nomine, as artificial flowers. It has been held in many cases, as that of "almonds and dried fruits," the "canary birds," and at the present term, in the case of "thread laces" and of "chocolate," that, when an article is intended to be made dutiable by its specific designation, it will not be affected by the general words of the same or another statute, which would otherwise embrace it. 2. That the price was to bear interest at six per cent. until paid for, has no influence upon the question of the value of the goods. [No. 514.] States for the Southern District of New York. Ballard v. Thomas, 19 How., 382, 15 L. ed., 690. for defendants, in error, cited Gray v. Lawrence, court: In 1874 the firm of Goddard & Brother imported certain goods, of which the invoice, after giving the details of weight, etc., was as follows, viz.: "Bought 8,670.25 175.30 Fr's 8,494.95 Terms cash. If not paid, interest to be added at the rate of six per cent. E. & O. E. Paris, 24 January, 1874.” The importers entered the goods at the net price stated in the invoice: francs, 8.494. and declared on the entry as follows: paid on these goods, but are passed to our ac"Cash not count, and are subject to interest at six per cent. per annum." The case finds, as matter of fact, that 8,494 francs was the actual market value of the goods at the time of their exportation, in the principal market of the country from which they *were exported, and that the purchase by [146 the importers was at the figures named. This rule applies both to statutes reducing and to statutes increasing duties. Giving it such application here, we must hold that "artificial flow145] ers" are not entitled to be classed as *a manufacture of cotton which is entitled to the reduction provided for by Act of 1872. The ruling in this respect was erroneous, and Collector thereupon fixed the value of the goods the judgment must be reversed. 1, James H. McKenney, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the opinion of the Court in the case of Chester A. Arthur, Collector of the Port of N. Y., Plff. in Err., v. Leon Rheims. No. 602, October Term, 1877, as the same remains upon the files and records of said Supreme Court. In testimony whereof I hereunto subscribe my name and affix the seal of said [L. S.] Supreme Court, at the City of Washington, this 20th day of March, A. D. 1885. James H. McKenney, 814 Clerk, Supreme Court, U. S. The appraisers disallowed the discount of two per cent., on the ground that the importers stated in the entry that the cash was not paid. The for the purpose of duties, disregarding the dis count. The appraisers seem to have acted under the provision of the Statute of 1865 which declares "That the duty shall not be assessed upon any amount less than the invoice or entered value." 13 Stat. at L., 494. The actual value has been stated at 8,494 francs, and such was also the "invoice value." The entered or invoiced value spoken of in the Statute means the value as it is stated in or upon the invoice. That value was, francs, 8,494. The value means the cash value. The price at thirty days' credit might be different, and the 1 difference would probably be greatly increased! by a credit of six months or a year, but the value or cost would still be the same. The difference would be chargeable to the credit, and not to a difference in the value of the goods. That the price was to bear interest at six per cent. until paid for, or at sixty per cent., had no influence upon the question of their value. We think it quite clear that the net price is stated in this invoice to be the value of the goods, viz. francs, 8,494. Ballard v. Thomas, 19 How., 382. 15 L. ed., 690, is cited as an authority to the contrary. We do not so consider it. The Judge at the trial of that case charged the jury as follows: "It being admitted that the duties were levied on the prices at which the iron was charged in the invoice. they are lawfully exacted: ** * that the entry in the invoice, that the plaintiff would 147] be entitled to a deduction for prompt payment, could not affect the amount of duty chargeable." In delivering the opinion of affirmance in this court. Mr. Justice Nelson said: "In respect to the deduction from the price on account of prompt payment, we think the fact does not vary or affect the price of the article as stated in the invoice. It relates simply to the mode of payment, which may, if observed, operate as a satisfaction of the price to be paid, by the acceptance of a less sum." This is quite different from a case where the court is asked to fix the duties upon a different value from that stated in the invoice. It is said, again, that the valuation of the appraisers is conclusive. The statute already cited provides that it shall be the duty of the Collector to cause the actual market value or wholesale price of the goods in the principal market of the country from which they are exported to be appraised, “And such appraised value shall be considered the value upon which the duty shall be assessed." 13 Stat. at L.. 493. In this case, they have not professed to appraise or ascertain the market value of the goods. They simply give a construction to the invoice they decide its legal effect to be that 8.670 francs is there declared to be the market value of the goods. They held as a legal proposition that, in fixing the value, the discount of two per cent. shall not be allowed; and, as a result from this, that 8,670 francs, and not 8,494 francs is the value. Such is the effect of their return; and the view is strengthened, if strength is needed, by the statement of the case, that 8,494 francs was, in fact, the market value of the goods. The rulings are right and the judgment must be affirmed. 1. The Kansas Act of March 2, 1872, authorized the issue of bonds by a township to aid in the construction of depots and side tracks of a railroad. 2. Such bonds are not void, for the reason that they are made payable thirty years and thirty-five days from their date of execution therein written, but only drawing interest for the last thirty years of said time. 3. The Act authorizing their issue enacted that the bonds should be payable in not less than five nor more than thirty years from the date thereof; this provision was directory, and not of the essence of the power. The bonds issued were dated Sep. 10. 1872, made payable thirty years from Oct. 15, 1872, and were not registered by the auditor of the State until Oct. 17, 1872. They were thus practically thirty year bonds. 4. Where the County Commissioners were authorized by law to determine the result of the election, their action is conclusive. A bona fide purchaser of the bonds was under no obligation to look beyond it. was 5. Although no registration of the bonds made in the office of the auditor of the State, if the auditor's certificate of registration appears upon the bonds, it is sufficient. [No. 1024.] Submitted Jan. 18, 1878. Decided Apr. 22, 1878. In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas. Henry Strong, the defendant in error, sued the plaintiff in error in the court below, upon interest coupons which were attached to bonds issued by the Township, to aid the construction of depots and side tracks by the Atchison, Topeka and Sante Fé Railroad Company in the Township. The bonds were issued under the authority of an Act of the Legislature of Kansas, approved Mar. 2, 1872. Upon the trial the following questions arose, upon which the judges were divided in opinion: 1. Does the Act of the Legislature of the State of Kansas referred to in said bonds, authorize the issuance of the bonds of a township, to aid in the construction of depots and side tracks, as recited in the bonds? 2. Are the bonds mentioned in plaintiff's petition void, for the reason that they are made payable thirty years and thirty-five days from their date of execution therein written, but only drawing interest for the last thirty years of said time? 3. Is the defendant estopped by the recitals in said bonds, from introducing testimony offered by defendant? Judgment having been entered for the plaintiff, in accordance with the opinion of the presiding judge, defendant sued out this writ of error. The case further appears in the opinion. Messrs. George R. Peck, W. N. Allen, Henry Keeler and J. B. Johnson, for plaintiff in error. Messrs. H. Strong and A. L. Williams, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Strong delivered the opinion of the court: The Act of the Kansas Legislature approved March 2, 1872, expressly authorized the issue of township bonds "To aid in the construction of railroads or water-power, by donation thereto, or the taking of stock therein, or for other works of internal improvement." Like all expressions of Legislative will, this provision of the Act must receive a reasonable construction, and we cannot doubt that, in the grant of power to aid in the construction of railroads or other works of internal improvement, is included authority | case. The proof offered was, that, in the records to assist in the construction of depots and side of the County *Commissioners of the [278 tracks of a railroad. Such constructions are constituents-essential parts of every railroad, without which it would be incomplete and incapable of serving the uses for which it is intended. The cost of building them is always, and properly, charged to construction account, and not to repairs or expenses of operation; and a mortgage of a railroad, without further description than such as is necessary to identify it, covers its side tracks and depots. We do not see any force in the argument pressed upon us by the plaintiff in error, that, because it was the duty of the railroad company to furnish suitable side tracks and depots, the Act of 1872 cannot be construed as authorizing the issue of township bonds to aid in building such structures. It was equally the duty of the company to build the main line, and it is not questioned the Township was empowered to aid in doing that work. Nor is there anything 277] in the proviso to the Act that *tends in the least degree to the conclusion that the Legislature did not mean to authorize aid to the building of depots. The first question certified to us was, therefore, correctly answered by the Circuit Court in the affirmative, and the first assignment of error is overruled. The second question certified is, "Are the bonds mentioned in the plaintiff's petition void, for the reason that they are made payable thirty years and thirty-five days from their date of execution therein written, but only drawing interest for the last thirty years of said time?" The 2d section of the Act authorizing their issue enacted that the bonds should be payable in not less than five nor more than thirty years from the date thereof, with interest not to exceed ten per cent. per annum, all in the discretion of the officers issuing the same. These provisions were obviously directory, and not of the essence of the power. The bonds issued were dated September 10, 1872, made payable thirty years from the 15th day of October, 1872, with interest thereon from that time at the rate of seven per cent. When they were delivered to the railroad company does not appear, though they were not registered by the auditor of the State until October 17, 1872. They were thus practically thirty year bonds, bearing a less rate of interest than the rate authorized. Their legal effect is precisely what it would have been had the date inserted been October 15, instead of September 10, 1872. Substantially, therefore, the legislative direction was followed. See Comrs. Marion Co. v. Clark [ante, 59]. The doctrine of that case is applicable to the pres ent. The third assignment of error is that the court erred in not holding the Township was not estopped by the recitals in the bonds from introducing the testimony offered. The bonds were executed by the township trustee, and attested by the township clerk. These were the officers designated by the statute to execute such bonds. The recitals were that the bonds were made and issued in pursuance of the provisions of the Art of the Legislature of March 2, 1872. But whether the recitals were an estoppel against showing what the defendant proposed to show, or whether they were not, is quite immaterial in this County of which Rock Creek Township is a part, it appeared the Board had canvassed the vote at the election held to determine whether the Township should issue the bonds, and had determined the result to be, for the issue, fiftytwo votes, against the issue, fifty-one votes, making one hundred and three votes in all cast; but that in fact no canvass was made, and that only one hundred and two votes were cast, fiftyone of which only were in favor of issuing the bonds, and that one person who voted in favor was not a qualified elector. Now, if the town clerk and treasurer were not the persons authorized by law to determine the result of the election, the Board of County Commissioners were, and their action, according to all our rulings, was conclusive. A bona fide purchaser of the bonds was under no obligation to look beyond it. It was not his duty to canvass the vote, much less to ascertain whether those who had voted were qualified electors. The law cast the duty upon the Board, and in such a case the action of the Board must be found in the records. If it be admitted that the purchaser of the bonds was under obligation to inquire whether an election had been held, and what its result was, the only place to which he could resort for the information sought was the records of the Board; and had he sought there, he would have found that the township clerk and treasurer could rightfully issue the bonds. It follows that the evidence offered by the defendant was quite immaterial, or, if not, that it was destructive to his defense. The defendant further offered to show that no registration of the bonds exists, or ever has been in the office of the auditor of the State, though the auditor's certificate of registration We cannot think does appear upon the bonds. this evidence, if admitted, could in any degree avail the defendant. Indorsed on the back of each bond was the following: "State of Kansas, ss. I, Auditor of the State of Kansas, do certify that this bond has been regularly and legally issued, and the signatures thereto are genuine, and that the same has been duly registered in my office according to law. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal of office at the City of Topeka, this 17th day of October, A. D. 1872. [seal] A. Thoman, Auditor The certificate was all that was required for the holder of the bonds. If the state auditor failed to make in his office an entry of his action, we do not perceive how his failure in this respect can invalidate bonds upon which he has certified a registration. The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, Plff. in Err., V. THOMAS J. MEHAFFY. (See S. C., Reporter's ed., 312-316.) Commercial paper-presumption as to holderestoppel by recital-seal-constitutional provision-new trial. 1. The holder of commercial paper, in the absence |