pliance with the requirements of the statute, an injunction will be granted to estop further construction.1 2 § 91. In Illinois, the exercise of the rights of eminent domain is minutely regulated by statute, and in addition to the general rule that compensation must be made for real estate taken for railway purposes, and that the proceedings must be according to law, the rule is that where a statute provides a mode of obtaining damages for property taken for the use and construction of a railway, but the owner of the land has neglected to avail himself of the mode of relief thus pointed out, he will not be allowed to enjoin the construction of the road because of the non-payment of damages. And the owner of land through which a city has laid out a street, and who is dissatisfied with the assessment of damages, but has failed to avail himself of a legal remedy provided by statute, is not entitled to an injunction against the city authorities to prevent their entering upon his land.3 An injunction granted against a railway company to restrain it from taking possession of private property without first making payment, or tender of damages for the occupancy, will not usually be dissolved on motion, but will be retained until a hearing upon the merits.4 And where the bill on which an injunction is granted against the prosecution of an action of ejectment, charges that the conveyances on which defendant's Ledener v. Norristown, 1 Commissioners v. Durham, 43 Ill. 86; Ledener v. 23 Ind. 623. 2 New Albany, etc. v. Connelly, 7 Ind. 32. 3 Nichols v. Salem, 14 Gray, 490. * Ross v. Elizabeth, etc. 1 Green Ch. 422. title rests are fraudulent, the injunction will not necessarily be dissolved on the coming in of the answer, unless it fully and satisfactorily negatives the fraud, and a mere general denial is not sufficient for this purpose.1 § 92. But where the owner of real estate has invited a railway company to enter upon his land and has promised a right of way, though his promise, being verbal, is not binding, yet if he allows the company to go on with the construction of its road, he cannot afterward restrain the use of the track over his land until compensation is made. And where a company has been permitted under claim of right for twenty years to occupy the street of a city fronting complainant's premises, without objection or remonstrance, and by such long acquiescence has been induced to enter into a contract with the city binding itself to build a depot and platform in such manner as will cause but little inconvenience to complainant in addition to that arising from defendant's track, an injunction will not be granted to restrain the erection.3 § 93. Where adjoining proprietors of real estate are entitled to compensation for their interest or property in a street appropriated by a railway company, an injunction will be granted to prevent such appropriation until due compensation is made.4 But the people, being the aggregate body politic, and having no property traversed by the line of the proposed road, and therefore no property rights to be protected, are not 3 1 Roberts v. Anderson, 2 Johns. Ch. 202. 2 Pettihone v. LaCrosse, etc., 14 Wis. 443. Higbee v. Camden, etc., 5 C. E. Green, 435. * People v. Law, 34 Barb. 494. entitled to such relief.1 And where a municipal corporation, under claim and color of right, enters upon and takes private property for public uses, giving the owner a grossly inadequate compensation for the damages incurred, if the steps taken are regular in form so that the illegality does not appear on the face of the proceedings themselves, an injunction will be granted, the common law remedy by certiorari being insufficient.2 $94. Courts of equity are inclined to hold railway companies to a strict compliance with the terms and conditions upon which they have been permitted to enter upon land necessary for the construction of their lines, and in default of compliance with such conditions they are not entitled to the protection of equity. Thus, where a railway company is forbidden by statute from constructing its road upon the streets of an incorporated city without the assent of the corporate authorities, and where the city has granted a right of way to the company upon certain express conditions, which have not been fulfilled, the authorities will not be enjoined from re-entering and taking possession of the grounds granted the railway company, the privilege of re-entering in case of default on the part of the company having been reserved in the contract. 3 § 95. The sole object of a preliminary injunction being to protect the property or rights in controversy until a final hearing upon the merits, a court of equity will not interfere to take property out of the possession of one party and put it into the possession of another. 1 Id. 2 Baldwin v. Buffalo, 29 Barb. 396. Pacific, etc. v. Leavenworth, 1 Dillon's C. C. 393. And where complainants allege that they are entitled to the possession of a railway, but that defendants are in actual possession under claim of right, it is improper to restrain defendants from using the road until the right can be determined. 1 96. Any use of public streets for purposes unauthorized by the dedication of the land to the public, or by the law under which the dedication was made, may be enjoined where special injury is shown to result to the party complaining. Thus, the laying of the track of a railway company over land which has been dedicated to the public use for streets, being unauthorized by the dedication to the public use, will be enjoined.2 And in such case the injunction will be granted at the suit of the owner of the fee on the ground that the use of the streets for such unauthorized purpose is a special injury to him.3 97. The unauthorized extension by a railway company of its track is the attempted exercise of a valuable franchise, and is of itself sufficient ground for a perpetual injunction.4 But where a road has been properly discontinued, the forcible reopening thereof and removal of fences necessary in reopening it will not authorize a court of equity in interfering. Such acts are regarded as mere trespasses for which the law affords ample relief and they will not be enjoined in equity.5 § 98. Equity will sometimes interfere with the construction of public works for the purpose of protect 1 Farmers, etc. v. Reno, etc. 53 Pa. St. 224. 2 Schurmeier v. St. Paul, etc. 10 Minn. 82. 3 Id. People v. Third Avenue, etc. 45 Barb. 63. 'Nichols v. Sutton, 22 Geo. 369. ing parties in the enjoyment of their premises for the particular purposes for which they were acquired. Thus, commissioners of highways will be enjoined from laying out a road across complainant's railway track and grounds acquired for engine houses and other like uses of the railway. The land having been acquired for specific purposes, an injunction is regarded as the proper remedy to secure its quiet enjoyment.1 2 § 99. Under the authority of equity to interfere for the prevention of irreparable mischief, a railway company may be enjoined from planting trees so close to one's land as to overshadow it and to cause the roots to spring up to the damage of the soil. And where a statute provides that in the construction of levees. over private property a just compensation shall be paid to the owners for damages thereby incurred, an injunction may properly issue to stay proceedings until the damages have been ascertained and paid according to law. 3 § 100. Where a railway company in its capacity as a common carrier refuses to make a personal delivery of goods to a consignee, the fact that a statutory remedy has been provided will not prevent a court of equity from entertaining jurisdiction of the matter if the statutory remedy is inadequate.4 And where the course pursued by the carrier is such as to greatly injure if not destroy the business of complainants, and damages at law would afford no just compensation for 1 1 Albany, etc. v. Brownell, 24 N. Y. 345; Mohawk, etc. v. Artcher, 6 Paige, 87. 2 Brock v. Connecticut, etc. 35 Vt. 373. 3 Horton v. Hoyt, 11 Iowa, 496. |