ON RULES OF PRUDENCE IN POLEMIC THEOLOGY.

The following rules are translated for the Panoplist, by an obliging correspondent, from Stapfer's Theologia Elenchtica. In the original, the composition is divided into sections, the numbers of which we have thought it unnecessary to print. This extract is taken from chapter 2, sect. 141 to 265. It is probable that the whole work may be translated, and printed in a volume, should the public call for it. Stapfer is said to have been much read and ad

mired by the great President Edwards; which will doubtless be considered as no ordinary recommendation. ED.

THE necessity of prudential rules, in Polemic Theology, has already been demonstrated.

That, which relates to the glory of God, to the eternal salvation of man, to the defence of essential truth, and to the refutation of essential error, cannot be treated with too much caution.

The appropriate ends of Polemic Theology, are the demonstration of truth, and the refutation of error. In this science, therefore, every thing should be so arranged, as that nothing may be omitted which may conduce to the attainment of its end; and, on the contrary, every thing should be avoided, which may impede the attainment of its end: hence true prudence conVOL. X.

sists in using the best means in the best manner.

These prudential rules relate either to the disputant, or to the mode of disputation.

A wise man will surely propose to himself the best end; which, in Polemic Theology, whether divine truth is to be demonstrated, or error refuted, or an errorist convinced, is no other than a love of truth; for all these aim at truth, that the purity of the divine word, which is truth itself, may be preserved and vindicated.

Therefore the FIRST rule of prudence is this:

Let a person, who is disposed to undertake a controversy, scrutinize himself; let him examine the end and design of his undertaking, whether it be a sincere love of truth, or whether it be ambition, or a censorious spirit, or some other sinful passion.

For if a sincere love of truth possessed the minds of all who hold the sacred office, most controversies would immediately terminate of their own accord, and that peace, so ardently desired, would be restored to the Church. But if erudition is pre

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ferred to piety, and religion becomes an art, the natural and only effects are discord and debate.

But no one can convince another of the truth, who, being tinctured with false notions, has no certainty of the truth himself.

For he, who demonstrates any principle, becomes convinced of its truth by his own demonstration; but if he doubts that principle, it must be that the demonstration was not sufficiently evident to himself: he cannot, therefore, by that demonstration, hope or expect to convince another of the truth of principle.

Wherefore the SECOND rule of prudence is this:

Let no one commence a controversy on a principle in religion, unless, having laid aside all his preconceived opinions, he has acquired a certainty of the truth, founded on demonstration.*

It is the special duty of a wise man to employ no means, which do not conduce to the end proposed: hence he, who undertakes a controversy, ought for his own sake to beware of every thing, in his understanding, or in his heart, which may obstruct the attainment of the end.

The human mind, on account of its extreme imbecility and depravation, is so deeply imbued with false notions and prejudices, and is so distracted by them, that it often mistakes the truth and defends error.

For preconceived notions,

On this and the two succeeding rules, the very Rev. and celebrated Praffius should be read. In Primitiis, Tubing. Dissert. De Prajud. Theol. p. 17. seq.

arising from heedlessness,, or from perverse education, or from rash judgment, or from authority, have such control over many persons, that even those, who esteem themselves learned, frequently assent to the truth for no other reason, than because human authority has given it influence over their minds.

Indeed any one, who does not derive the truth from the very fountain of truth, and does not studiously labor to arrive at certainty, is guided only by prejudices of authority; and then he esteems any proposition true, either because he has heard it from some man in high repute, or because it is extant in the writings of some celebrated character, or because it is found in mystical books.

Superstition only can arise from blind assent. He, who is thus hurried forward by blind assent, never discerns the connexion and harmony of truth, however it may flow from his own principles; nor is able to demonstrate it to the conviction of another. Nor can he know the importance of defending a truth, unless he has an intimate and correct apprehension of its connexion with fundamental principles: whence arise many unimportant disputes, which ultimately terminate in a mere strife of words.

As the preservation of pure truth is the ultimate end of Polemic Theology, every thing which is hostile to truth should be laid aside.

Whence arises this THIRD rule:

Since the depraved affections of the heart, especially ambition,

a spirit of persecution, and attachment to sects, are very hos tile to the truth, we should, therefore, entirely divest ourselves of them before we enter upon a religious controversy.

On the part of the will, it must surely be granted, that such depraved affections, as ambition, a spirit of persecution, and partiality for sects, are extremely injurious to the truth.

For he, who is inflated with ambition, seeks not truth, but applause: hence those unhappy religious contests, (these are the words of the celebrated Praffius,) in which no one will yield to another, lest he should appear to have been in an error; hence so many logomachies, or disputes about words; hence the seeds of new disputes; hence a fondness for contradiction, and pertinacity in the defence of error; hence, also, truth is lightly esteemed, while celebrity alone is sought.

Thus some, alienated from the love of truth, are influenced only by a fondness for disputation, which flows from a spirit of persecution. He who is imbued with this spirit, cannot tolerate those who dissent from him, but regards their every word with suspicion; and, by exaggerating their errors, infers heresy from any thing, although the system of truth is not affected: Hence new disputes originate. How much the progress of truth is thus obstructed, scarcely admits of computation. In this way, the mind is exasperated rather than convinced.

Most men are so attached to that religion in which they were educated, that they defend opin

ions, derived from that source, without ever examining their truth for themselves. Thus they confide more in human, than in divine, authority; whence arises such a blind zeal and fondness for sects, that we condemn those who do not entertain the same sentiments on controverted subjects with ourselves.

We ought to conduct our inquiries after truth, as if we had not yet discovered it; and to manage our controversies, as if we were inclined to no sect.

These are special rules, or cautions, which respect the person who undertakes a controversy; but even in the controversy itself, or in the mode of conducting it, rules of prudence are

no

less necessary, lest there should be an aberration from the end proposed.

Two things are sought in a controversy; a demonstration of truth, and a retutation of error. Hence both the demonstration and the refutation should be so arranged as to effect the conviction of the errorist, and the preservation of truth, which is the scope of Polemic Theology.

For this purpose it is especially requisite, that the premises should be infallible; whence arises this FOURTH rule:

Since, in Polemic Theology, truth should be so demonstrated, that the results may be certain; therefore we should neither confide in our own, nor in another's authority, because it is a fallible premise, or principle.

For a demonstration ought to rest on premises which are certain; and such premises must be derived from reason,or from Rev

elation; or there must be on earth some man who is infallible,whose judgment, incapable of error, can decide even without demonstration on any article of faith But experience, independent of the testimony of Sacred Scripture, affords sufficient proof, that such a man, who is truth itself, and incapable of deceiving or be ing deceived, never existed; Hence in religion no confidence should be placed in human au thority, whether our own or a nother's, except it be supported by demonstration: But we should recur to the sin.ple principles of reason or revelation, where we may find solid bases on which we may securely rest our feet. For both reason and revelation acknowledge God as their author.

From this maxim, that truth must be demonstrated, it is particularly necessary to observe this FIFTH rule:

Iftruth is to be demonstrated to the conviction of another, that method should be observed in communicating it, which will surely produce conviction, unless the opponent labors to be blind.

For, to convince another by a demonstration of truth, there must be some method observed in the demonstration. The method should be this: let indubitable principles be premised, and from these, by just connexion and correct ratiocination, let others be deduced; those principles, therefore, should always be premised, from which the subsequent can be understood and demonstrated.

This method should be employed in treatises on doctrines

of faith, lest, by an unnatural and restricted method, the truth be founded on such premises as the opponent still doubts, which will greatly obstruct conviction.

The doctrines of faith should therefore be taught in such connexion, that one may always rest upon another, and the latter always detive light from the for

mer.

For if those principles which are especially fundamental in religion, are assumed as granted, and others are founded upon them; all conclusions drawn from such principles cannot but be doubtful to an opposer of truth: but when the foundation of the whole edifice is correctly laid, the superstructure will be immoveable.

All the doctrines of faith will inevitably be uncertain to him, who errs respecting the foundation of the Christion religion; unless the truth both of natural and revealed religion, and the peculiar foundation of the relig ion of a sinner, which is perfect salvation by Christ alone, are first demonstrated. These fundamental articles being established, all the other doctrines of faith may be founded on them.

Hence these primary principles, on which the certainty of all the other doctrines depends, should never be treated cursorily, unless all the conclusions derived from them ought to be rendered doubtful.

In a demonstration which has for its end the conviction of another, there must be the evi dence of demonstration.

Hence arises this SIXTH rule:

In Polemic Theology all obscurity should be avoided that

by the evidence of demonstration, the opponent may be rendered certain of the proposition in debate.

For the reason why the opponent should assent to the truth, is, because he perceives the connexion and force of the demonstration; but while he does not comprehend the demonstration, he cannot be drawn to assent; or if he should assent, unless there is perspicuity in the reasoning, his assent will be blind

assent.

Wherefore all obscurity in the reasoning should be avoided, and simplicity carefully studied, that nothing may remain doubt ful.

Hence, in the first place, all indefinite phraseology should be excluded, and the most simple diction employed: for obscure terms rather deceive than persuade, and are adapted only to disseminate disputes and logomachies, whereby the truth is greatly injured; especially since under these very terms much meaning is frequently concealed.

In the second place, in the communication of truth, the argumentation should be so arranged, that the opponent may perceive the connexion between the predicate and the subject in debate; for on this depends the evidence of a demonstration, and wherever this is wanting there can be no certainty with respect to the subject which was to have been proved.

These are special rules, which must be observed in the demonstration of truth, if we would attain the end proposed: in the same manner, in the refutation of error, all those means which

conduce to the end must be employed, and all those which may obstruct it must be avoided.

But above all, unless we design to wander from the point in debate, the state of the controversy, or the errors to be refuted, should be well understood, in the manner we have already expressed.

Whence this SEVENTH rule:

To refute the errors of any sect, the whole system of that sect must be well understood in its connexion, that the state of the controversy may be correctly defined.

Every sect has prejudices* and hypotheses peculiar to itself, to which it is extremely attached; but among these hypotheses, there are certain primary prejudices which are fundamental to their other sentiments.

Now the whole of any system of error should be examined in connexion, that we may know how one error is allied to another, and how every particular error contributes a share to establish a general hypothesis.

For in this way only will the system of the errorist be well understood; and its foundation being undermined, the whole edifice will inevitably fall.

Therefore they are inconsiderate, who manage controversies by explaining and refuting individual errors, separately considered, having no regard to the whole system and to the mutual relation of one error to another; because the import and scope of most errors can be understood only in connexion one another.

with

Pre-judgments, or preconceived opia