Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives
Interest in constitutionalism and in the relationship among constitutions, national identity, and ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity has soared since the collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Since World War II there has also been a proliferation of new constitutions that differ in several essential respects from the American constitution. These two developments raise many important questions concerning the nature and scope of constitutionalism. The essays in this volume--written by an international group of prominent legal scholars, philosophers, political scientists, and social theorists--investigate the theoretical implications of recent constitutional developments and bring useful new perspectives to bear on some of the longest enduring questions confronting constitutionalism and constitutional theory.
Sharing a common focus on the interplay between constitutional identity and individual or group diversity, these essays offer challenging new insights on subjects ranging from universal constitutional norms and whether constitutional norms can be successfully transplanted between cultures to a consideration of whether constitutionalism affords the means to reconcile a diverse society's quest for identity with its need to properly account for its differences; from the relation between constitution-making and revolution to that between collective interests and constitutional liberty and equality.
This collection's broad scope and nontechnical style will engage scholars from the fields of political theory, social theory, international studies, and law.
Contributors. Andrew Arato, Aharon Barak, Jon Elster, George P. Fletcher, Louis Henkin, Arthur J. Jacobson, Carlos Santiago Nino, Ulrich K. Preuss, David A. J. Richards, Michel Rosenfeld, Dominique Rousseau, András Sajó, Frederick Schauer, Bernhard Schlink, M. M. Slaughter, Cass R. Sunstein, Ruti G. Teitel, Robin West
Results 1-3 of 68
proper scope of legitimate differences that ought to be given constitutional
protection . Broadly speaking , one can distinguish between two basic kinds of
conceptions of the scope of legitimate differences referred to respectively as ...
... the relevant meaning ; special interest groups interested in the disputed statute
, each of which provides its own reading ; journalists , specialized or not , who try
to assess the reaction of public opinion to a given interpretation , and so forth .
Ackerman ' s response relies on the diverse quality of the two expressions of
popular will given their different degrees of mobilization and debate . 58 However
, the higher quality of an expression of will that has zero binding value does not ...
What people are saying - Write a review
Toward a First Amendment Jurisprudence
CONSTITUTIONALISM AS BRIDGE BETWEEN SELF
13 other sections not shown