Upon the subject of the valuation of the goods insured there has always been a great diversity of opinion, not only among speculative writers, but also among merchants themselves. Some contending for the prime cost, others for the current price at the time of the loss; some insisting on the price at the time and place where the goods are shipped, others on the price at the port of discharge.' P. 533.

In England, if the policy be an open one, it is an invariable rule to estimate a total loss, not by any supposed price which the goods might have been deemed worth at the time of the loss, or for which they might have been sold, had they reached the market for which they were destined; but according to the prime cost; that is, the invoice price, and all duties and expences till they are put on board, together with the premium of insurance. This is the only true, at least the only legal, mode of estimating a loss, whether total or partial, on goods; and therefore, whether the goods would have arrived at a good or a bad market is always immaterial. Neither is the difference of exchange to be at all regarded in the adjustment; for the underwriter does not insure against any loss arising from such causes.' P. 534.

A ship is valued at the sum she is worth, at the time she sails on the voyage insured, including the expences of repairs, the value of her furniture, provisions and stores, the money advanced to the sailors, and, in general, every expence of the outfit, to which is added the premium of insurance.

⚫ A partial loss upon either ship or goods, is that proportion of the prime cost, which is equal to the diminution in value occasioned by the damage. P. 535.

The opinion of the celebrated lord Mansfield, in the case of Lewis v. Rucker,' appears, in the language of lawyers, to be fully abstracted by the serjeant.

The nature of the contract is that the goods shall come safe to the port of delivery; or if not, that the insurer will indemnify the insured to the amount of the prime cost. If they arrive, but lessened in value by damage received at sea, the nature of an indemnity speaks demonstrably, that it must be, by putting the insured in the same situation, (relation being had to the prime cost, or value in the policy), which he would have been in, if the goods had arrived free from damage; that is, by paying such proportion, or aliquot part, of the prime cost, or value in the policy, as corresponds with the proportion, or aliquot part, of the diminution in value occasioned by the damage. The duty accrues upon the ship's arrival and landing her cargo at the port of delivery; and the insured has then a right to demand satisfaction. The adjustment can never depend upon future events or speculations: How long is he to wait; a week, a month, or a year?-In this case, the price rose; but, if peace had been made, the price would have fallen : But the defendant did not insure that there should be no peace.' P.539.

'No private scheme or project of trade of the insured can affect the insurer. P. 540.

We are led by this case of Lewis v. Rucker' to extend our inquiry into partial losses.

The insurance was on goods which were valued in the policy, but whose real value depended, at the time the insurance was effected, on a fluctuating market. The goods which were damaged in the voyage, came to a fallen market, where the price was less than the value in the policy. The insured insisted on being paid the difference between the price for which the goods were sold in the port of delivery, and the value in the policy. But it was determined that he was only entitled to the proportion of the value in the policy which their diminution in value bore to the price of sound goods, of the same sort, in the port of delivery; thus using the relative prices of the sound and damaged goods at the port of delivery as the means of ascertaining the propor tion of the prime cost which the insurer was bound to pay.' P. 540. In the case of Le Cras v. Hughes,

which came before the court of King's Bench many years afterwards. there was a partial loss upon a valued policy, but the value in the policy exceeded the interest of the insured. There, lord Mansfield and the other judges of the court declared, that it was the constant usage in such cases, to adjust a partial loss in the same manner as if the policy were an open one; and that the computation must therefore be by the real interest on board, and not by the value in the policy.

That was an insurance on a ship and goods on board," At and from Onoa to London; valued at the sum insured." There was no value mentioned in the body of the policy, but only the sums wrote against the different names on the back. There were other policies on the same ship and goods, amounting in the whole to 99,5007, which exceeded the amount of the interest of the insured. The ship and a great part of the cargo were lost, about one tenth only of the goods being saved. One question at the trial of this cause was, how the loss, which was considered as a partial one, should be adjusted. The broker swore that, on such policies as this, where a total loss happened, the whole sum was paid: But where it was only a partial loss, they considered it as an open policy, and paid a proportion, not of the sum insured, but of the value of the goods.--The court of King's Bench, when this came before them, thought it, at first, like the case of Lewis v Kucer. But the interest of the insured, in the ship and goods, being less in value than the sum insured, the court held, that this case differed from that of Lequis v. Rucker, and that the constant usage in such cases was, upon a total loss, to pay the whole; but, upon a partial loss, to consider it as an open policy. The court were therefore of opinion that the computation in this case must be by the real interest of the insured on board, and not by the value in the pólicy.' p. 540,

An endeavour to render completely intelligible the manner of adjusting a partial loss, according to our ideas of the practice, will not perhaps be unacceptable.

A. ships for Malaga, on sale, for his own account, goods, costing or fairly estimated at 1000l.

The goods arrive damaged, and sell for 8001.

1. If, on arriving sound, they would have produced 1000l. the assured demands from the insurer 2007.

2. The goods arrive damaged, and sell, as already supposed, for 800.-Had they been sound, they would have sold for 12007.-The assured now claims from the insurer, neither 2001. nor 400l., but the following proportion:

If 1200l. lose 400l., what will 1000l., the sum insured,. lose?

The answer is 3337.; and this sum the assured demands. 3. The goods arrive damaged: if sound, they would have produced 800l.; being damaged, they sell only for 600l. If 800l. lose 200l., what will 1000l. lose?

The answer is 250l.-a sum which forms the claim of the assured on the insurer.

From book I, on Marine Insurance,' our quotations have been already abundant. We lament that the contracted space in which we move forbids an accumulation of extracts. The systematic distribution of this work might have supplied many titles (among others, the important and comprehensive chapter on • Warranties') of peculiar utility, at a period of war.

Three books remain unexamined. We must content ourselves with a cursory view of their principal objects.

The nature and form of the contract of Bottomry and Respondentia' is clearly defined.

• Bottomry is a contract in nature of a mortgage of a ship, on which the owner borrows money to enable him to fit out the ship, or to purchase a cargo for a voyage proposed; and he pledges the keel or bottom of the ship, pars pro toto, as a security for the repayment: And it is stipulated that if the ship should be lost. in the course of the voyage, by any of the perils enumerated in the contract, the lender also shall lose his money; but if the ship should arrive in safety, then he shall receive back his principal, and also the interest agreed upon, which is generally called the marine interest, however this may exceed the legal rate of interest. Not only the ship and tackle, if they arrive safe, but also the person of the borrower, is liable for the money lent and the marine interest.

When the loan is not on the ship, but on goods laden on board, which, from their nature, must be sold or exchanged in the course of the voyage, the borrower's personal responsibility is then the principal security for the performance of the contract, which is therefore called

respondentia. In this consists the principal difference between bottom ry and respondentia. The one is a loan upon the ship, the other upon the goods. In the former, the ship and tackle, being hypothecated, are liable, as well as the person of the borrower; in the latter, the lender has, in general, only the persohal security of the borrower. But the personal responsibility of the borrower is not, in all cases, the only security of the lender. Where the money is lent for the outward and homeward voyage, the goods of the borrower on board, and the returns for them, whether in money, or in other goods purchased abroad with the proceeds of them, are liable to the lender. The money is to be repaid to the lender, with the marine interest, upon the safe arrival of the ship, in the one case, and of the goods, in the other. In all other respects, these contracts are nearly the same, and are governed by the same principles.' . 632.

It is of the essence of this contract that the sum lent be put in risk; and it does not, in truth, become a bottomry or respondentia contract, till the risk commences.' P. 647.

If, when the sea-risk is ended, the borrower delays payment, the common interest begins to run, ipso jure, without any demand. Discusso periculo m jus legitimá usurá non debebitur. But this interest runs only on the principal, not on the marine interest; for this would be interest upon interest: Accessio accessionis non est.'

P. 650.

The contract the parties-the thing hypothecated— the principal and marine interest-the perils of the lender, whether he be liable to general average, or be entitled to the benefit of salvage-are titles discussed at large in seven chapters, which compose the second book.

A dissertation on the nature and utility of Insurance upon Lives' introduces the third division.

The insurance of a life is a contract whereby the insurer, in consideration of a certain premium, either in a gross sum, or by annual payments, undertakes to pay the person for whose benefit the insurance is made, a stipulated sum of money, or an annuity equivalent, upoǹ the death of the person whose life is insured, whenever this shall hap pen, if the insurance be for the whole life, or in case this shall happen within a certain period, if the insurance be for a limited time.

The precarious dependence of a numerous family upon the life of a single person, naturally suggests the idea of seeking some protection against a calamity, which sooner or later must befal them; and this, probably, suggested the first idea of insurances upon lives, as an expedient by which a pecuniary indemnity, at least, might be secured to the sufferers, sufficient to rescue them from the poverty and distress with which they were threatened.

Upon this principle rests the utility of insurances upon lives. Persons having incomes determinable upon their own lives, or the lives of others, arising from landed property, from church livings, from pub

lic employments, pensions, annuities, &c. by paying such an annual premium as they can spare from their present necessities, may secure - to their widows, their children, or other dependants, an adequate sum of money, or an equivalent annuity, payable upon their deaths. By such insurances, also, may the fines to be paid upon the renewal of leases, or upon the descent of copyholds, be provided for. So, where a person, having only a life income, wants to borrow money, but can only give his own personal security for it; he may, by insuring his life, secure to the lender the repayment of his money, though he should 'die before he is enabled to discharge the debt.' P. 664.

Insurances on lives-in England strictly legal-are scarcely sanctioned by other states of Europe; and, in France, have never been tolerated.

Four chapters complete this book. Their contents relate to the contract of insurance-the warranty of the health and age of the life insured-the interest of the person insuring in the life insured--and the risks to which the insurers are liable.

A short historical account is given of the successive establishments of chartered companies for life-insurance, of which each seems distinct in its constitution-the Amicable Society, the Royal Exchange and London Assurance Companies, the Society for Equitable Assurance, the Westminster Society, and the Pelican Company. We have enumerated these associations, as the learned serjeant bestows on them a liberal and merited eulogy, which we have pleasure in extracting.

Considering the great multiplicity of insurances which have of late years been made upon lives, the number of litigated cases that have arisen upon them is extremely small. One principal reason is, that the happening of the event insured against is always a fact of easy proof, which can scarcely ever afford any subject of dispute. Another is the great difficulty of practising any fraud in such insurances. But to no cause is this fortunate circumstance more to be ascribed than to the bonour, integrity, and liberality of the several companies engaged in this branch of insurance. P. 679.

Insurance against Fire' is treated in the fourth book This indemnity, so well understood and so generally resorted to in our own country, is encouraged by no other European government.

After preliminary observations on the advantages and disadvantages of a practice here almost universal, and an enumeration of the principal fire-offices, the author proceeds to consider, particularly, the interest of the insured-the risk which the insurers undertake-the assignable nature of the policy, according to the usages of the different offices-and the proof of loss.