plainly implies difapprobation; but because men had not then the purity of gofpel-precepts to direct their actions-nor thofe clear notions of immorta

lity, and a laft judgment, which, connected their actions with a future ftate-nor ideas of the malig nity of fin, which the facrifice of Chrift's death afterwards held out.-But our Saviour tells us, that in the beginning it was not fo-nor fhould be in the times of the gofpel, when men fhonld be reftored, as much as poffible, to the times of the beginning that is, to the times of man's innocence. -But as the lights, which men received from the gofpel fhone but feebly during the intermediate ftate, it pleafed God to relax fomewhat of the purity of moral difcipline for the hardness of men's hearts or in other words, because their hearts were not yet foftened by the precepts of the gospel. In times past therefore God fuffered all nations to walk in their own ways*: as they were then lefs accountable for their actions.

Now all this is exactly agreeable to the whole tenor of the gofpel, which always balances the talent, and the improvement. Thus too St. Paul tells the Athenians, that God now commandeth men every where to repent; and the reason follows, he hath now appointed a day, in which he will judge

* ACTS xvii. 30.

the

the world in righteoufnefs by that man whom he hath ordained. St. Paul applied thefe expreffions to the heathen nations; but the reason, with which he enforced them, applies equally to the Jews. Till God had appointed a day, in which he would judge the world in righteoufnefs by that man whom he had ordained—that is, till a future ftate was clearly revealed in the gospel, he would, in a degree, wink at their ignorance. To this diftinction alfo our Saviour frequently alludes, particularly in his fermon on the mount, where, in many inftances, he oppofes what they had heard of old time, to what he faid unto them. And the baptift exprefsly fays, fpeaking of the times of the gofpel, that the axe is now laid to the root of the tree. It before only lopped off a few branches.

Thus then we have an answer to the objections against christianity from the indulgence allowed, or winked at, in the old teftament. God's great scheme was not then compleat. It was drawing on only towards that perfection, which was intended to restore man as far as poffible to his primeval ftate-or, as our Saviour expreffes it, to what it was in the beginning.

Even yet we may fuppofe chriflianity to be in a progreffive ftate. In thofe glorious fcenes fhaZ 3

dowed

dowed out by St. John, under the image of the new Jerufalem, we may ftill expect chriftianity may attain a much greater height of perfection, than it hath yet attained. For aught we know, there may be many improprieties, which God now winks at; and which in a state of more refined purity will be restrained.

Before I conclude, I cannot avoid remarking the addrefs of the Arabian impoftor. He ac knowledged both the law of Mofes, and the law of Chrift; and one should have thought, if he had meant fairly, he would have adopted the purer parts of each into his inftitution. Overlooking however the refined precepts of both, which were calculated to draw men to what they were in the beginning, he founded his scheme upon the laxer morals of the intermediate state. Pure christianity would not have anfwered his defign. He made an application therefore to the corruptions of human nature; which, he was fure, would gain over a party in his favour. We need not wonder then at the avidity, with which an unenlightened part of the world embraced his religion.

XLVIII.

Faith is the fubftance of things hoped for the evidence of things not feen.-Hebrews xi. 7.

N this excellent definition of faith, I should only

IN

wish the two propofitions, of which it confifts, reverfed, by standing thus. Faith is the evidence of things not feen-the fubftance of things hoped for. It seems reasonable to fuppofe, we should firft have the evidence, and then confider that evidence as the fubftance. And indeed I know not, whether a good Greek grammarian might not make the original text accord with this transpofition.

Faith then is firft the evidence of things not feen that is, it depends on the evidence which we receive of those things: but the apoftle taking away one link from the argument (which he leaves us to fill up) makes faith ftand for the evidence itself; on which, in fact, it only depends.

When faith is thus eftablished on fufficient evidence, it becomes the foftance of things hoped for

:

-that is, it ftands for the things themfelves, and has the fame effect upon us, as the prefence of those things would have. A future ftate of happiness, for inftance, is among the things unfeen yet we may have fuch evidence for it, that our faith being fully established on that evidence, we may act, as if the things hoped for, were real fubftances. Juft in the fame way, faith relates to all the promises of God.

This text might be handled practically (without entering into the grammatical construction of it) by confidering faith as the great foundation of the promises of God; and then examining what effect it has on the generality of mankind.

Is it poffible, for inftance, that a man given up to the low pleasures of fenfe, can have any faith in the promises of God? If he firmly believed in the excellence of the one, it is impoffible he could be led afide by the baseness of the other.

Again, is it poffible for the avaricious man to have that faith, which is the fubftance of things hoped for? If he had, he could not place the riches of this world in a comparison with the joys of heaven. And thus of all other wrong inclinations.

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