reasonably be doubted. If we admit of such a decree in the laws of criticism, what is to become of the editorial labours of Steevens, of Malone, and of Ellis? particularly of the last-mentioned gentleman, who, by reversing the method adopted by Mr. Headley, has given to our elder poetry a popularity, of which a considerable portion at least must have been anticipated by Mr. Headley, but for this unfortunate error in his critical creed. This argument might be extended to a length more suited to a dissertation than to a note upon a note; but we shall only add, that even Ritson, the most laborious plodder in literary antiquities since the days of Tom Hearne, became a convert to the present more enlightened system.'-Vol. i. p. 83.

The law upon this subject, we take to be this. Where the orthography of a poet influences his rhyme, as Chaucer's and Spenser's does every moment, the whole ought to be sacred; but where that is not the case, we see no reason why our present improved and fixed system of orthography should not be adopted. The orthography of our old poets was so capricious and unsettled, that Shakspeare, in subscribing his own name to the different sheets of his will, spelt it in two or three ways; and in this very Herrick before us, we have a fac-simile of the poet's autograph spelt Hearick. Those who are familiar with old books know, that they often spell the same word half a dozen different ways in one page; and he, who religiously adheres to the orthography of the poet whom he is reprinting, is often only transcribing the fancies and blunders of his printer. It may be well in a work, professedly antiquarian, to enable the reader to trace the progress of orthography, together with that of poetry; but when it is an editor's object to tell the world what beautiful poetry it has neglected, it surely becomes him to give it in the most alluring form, and not to tease his reader so much with its orthography, that he shall not have patience to attend to its sense. The stickler for antiquity, who will not read Shakspeare except in the first folio, ought to object to see him acted except in an inn-yard, upon a stage eight feet high, with a green blanket for a scene, and a doublet and hose for the dress of Julius Cæsar. This is the way in which the poet was originally played; and all modern improvements are fantastic refinements. In altering Shakspeare's orthography, we do not affect his diction, any more than, by furnishing him with natural scenes and appropriate dresses, we lessen the probability of his plots. The taste of the day is not for blankets, inn-yards, and redundant letters; and if we would have our old poets heard and read, we must in some degree, make them conform to our prejudices. The best old poetry has so much the air of being written for all time, that it wants little but modern orthography, and the present age wants nothing but powers equal to its production, to make it pass for the effusion of yesterday.

ART. XII. A Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review against Oxford. Containing an Account of Studies pursued in that University. Second Edition. pp. 188. Oxford, Cooke and Parker. London, Mackinlay. 1810.

A Second Reply to the Edinburgh Review. By the Author of a Reply to the Calumnies of that Review against Oxford. pp.118. Oxford, Cooke and Parker. London, Mackinlay. 1810.

IT is no common responsibility that we take upon us, in offering to pass an opinion upon the contents of these publications. The subject of them involves, on one side, some part of the substantial fame of the University of Oxford; on the other, the authority of a distinguished literary Journal, which, as it pronounces its decisions with confidence, we must suppose does not form them lightly. We are far from comparing, in any view of public im. portance, the character and estimation of the parties concerned; yet even to the inferior of them we owe, by virtue of our common professional character, all the respect of the most delicate and scrupulous justice, and we feel that the severest discretion and impartiality will be required of us,while we venture to hold the scales on this occasion.

Professing, however, a perfect indifference of judgment, we freely own that our wishes are not equally neutral, but swayed, in some degree, by a feeling which leads us to hope that the assailants may be found to be in the wrong. Why so? Because it is always desirable that accusation should turn out to be unfounded. It is best that public men, societies, and institutions should, upon inquiry, appear fit to serve the world in some higher way, than as a theme for invective, however patriotic or ingenious.

The substance of the original accusation appears in the first Reply of the writer who has undertaken the cause of the University. His argument embraces the following subjects: I. Study of Aristotle, and (imputed) neglect of the mathematics. II. Falconer's edition of Strabo. III. Classical education. IV. A view of the studies at Oxford; and V. Miscellaneous Remarks on Plans of Education in general, &c. Subsequently the Edinburgh Review has rejoined; and, apparently laid out its whole strength in defence of its former positions, with some abatement of their extent. This rejoinder is encountered by the author's Second Reply, which seems to exhaust the whole subject. Here the cause rests for the present: and here probably (for reasons which will appear in the sequel) it will finally rest.

It should be observed, that the rejoinder of the Review (Art. VII, No. XXXI.) is treated by the author as the production of

three writers, each defending himself, and vindicating his former writings from the censures past upon them.' Unquestionably, his assumption is right. He draws it from the frequent violation of consistency: we, from what is perhaps a more certain proof, the striking diversity of mind and manner visible in the several parts, which marks it to be the production of at least three different, and indeed very different, writers.

The two Replies taken together, besides giving a distinct answer to the more direct charges, which compose the original case of the Reviewers, comprehend a variety of matter branching out from the main topics in question, or drawn forth by the author's spirit of excursive speculation. As he thinks freely, and not superficially, all his speculations have their value; but we must be contented on some points with simply referring to his own pages, that we may be able to give a fuller view of others, which either most affect the main subject, or are such as the rapid hand of a Reviewer can touch most easily.

Upon his first remarks, directed against a quality of the Edinburgh Review, which we believe it is proud to avow-its general severity, we must say frankly, that we have always thought this the weak part in the conduct of the Journalists. To reign by terror is but a low ambition, and can hardly answer the ends of good government either in the commonwealth of letters, or of a country. In all wise policy, besides the power to repress, there must be the disposition to foster, to encourage, and to tolerate. The rights of genius, and the interests of learning, we are persuaded, require such a mode of proceeding, and we heartily join with the author in his spirited and powerful remonstrance on this head. It comes from him too with a proper grace, as in his own immediate debate with them, he is evidently more disposed to provoke the power of his antagonists than to conciliate their moderation.

'This severity, however, although a prominent vice in the conduct of that Review, is not the grievance which has called forth the present complaint. A remedy, indeed, for that evil, in some measure adequate, may be found in the justice and candour of other critics who possess the confidence of the public. But when the examination of works in almost every branch of science and literature is made the vehicle for covert insinuation, and open railing against the English Universities, and especially against Oxford; when sarcastic sneers and allusions in one number are followed up by keen reproaches and bold accusations in the next; when the public are taught with unwearied and malicious industry to look upon us either as gloomy bigots, or lazy monks, or ignorant pretenders to learning and science; although the falsehood and malevolence of such charges may be visible to many, yet it must happen that such continual droppings will in time make an impression on the public mind; and if not seasonably counteracted, will probably alienate that

respect and confidence which we have heretofore enjoyed, and which it is the nation's interest, as well as our own, that we should never lose.'-First Reply, p. 10.

After praising a masterly analysis of La Place's Traité de Méchanique Céleste, contained in Number XXII. of the Edinburgh Review, the Author proceeds to notice some strong observations upon the state of science at Oxford, subjoined to that analysis. The precise charge against Oxford, is made in these words:

Where the dictates of Aristotle are still listened to as infallible decrees, and where the infancy of science is mistaken for its maturity, the mathematical sciences have never flourished, and the scholar has no means of advancing beyond the mere elements of geometry.'-No. XXII. p. 283.

To this it was replied

The only parts of Aristotle's writings which can interfere with the student's progress in natural philosophy, are his Physics; the doctrines of which it is well known were formerly made the basis of instruction in that department of science through all the Universities of Europe but it may safely be asserted that, for more than a century, the Physics of Aristotle have been set aside at Oxford, and, except for the sake of satisfying liberal curiosity, and of tracing the progress of science, they are never even consulted.'-First Reply, p. 15.

From the tenour of the Reviewer's argument, which was upon natural philosophy; and from the form of his expression, infallible decrees,' we should naturally think that he alluded to the Phy sics of Aristotle; and then the answer would be complete which informed us that for more than a century those physics have been set aside.'

But what was said about the dictates of Aristotle was not meant, it seems, of his physics, but of his logic and his metaphysics; and the logic of Aristotle is particularly hostile to inductive science.'-No. XXXI. p.

161.

Reply: Whatever terrors may have haunted him with respect to the latter of these works, I am happy in being able to release him at once from them all. The work forms no part of the system of education in this University. Whatever its merits may be, the student is neither required, nor expected, nor advised to read it. The whole of the question then resolves itself into the logic of Aristotle.'-Second Reply, p. 15.

It is impossible not to interpose a slight remark here. The critic coming forward, for the second time, to explain the precise nature of his imputation, alleges a blind devotion to the metaphysics of Aristotle, as corrupting the philosophical learning of Oxford; while the simple fact is, that they do not even enter into the plan of

Oxford study. Is it not indecorous, (to say nothing more,) in an accuser, when the case is come to a solemn and a final hearing, to make a statement so wide of the truth, and to be so far misinformed in the very matter and substance of his charge?

The Aristotelian logic remains, as the stumbling-block of the human intellect at Oxford. This logic, it is said, is peculiarly hostile to inductive science,' and is thought to hinder the reception of that great scheme of philosophy which Bacon introduced into the world.

A certain injudicious fashion has taught many persons, and learned Reviewers among the rest, to set Aristotle and Bacon at eternal variance with each other. Their names, their works, their modes of philosophising, are studiously contrasted; and an admirer of the ancient philosopher is held to be a decided foe of the modern. Syllogism and Induction having been made something like the flags of hostile schools, wherever Subject and Predicate are seen together, the zealous partisans of Observation and Experiment (for with them it is that the hostility commences,) immediately throw common sense overboard and prepare for action. Without being greatly surprised to find the Edinburgh Journal partaking in this popular propensity, which has the sanction of some great names to support it, we are glad to see a confutation of the error, that lies at the bottom of it, given by the author in his Second Reply. The confutation is an extended one, and deserves to be read attentively. The substance of it is nearly this, in his own words :

First, it is a mistake widely spread, that the organon of Bacon was designed by the author himself to supersede the organon of Aristotle. The author himself professes no such design, nor can I discover the slightest intimation of it throughout the whole work. To the province of natural philosophy is the whole treatise exclusively confined. With this province, the logic of Aristotle has no necessary or natural con

nection.

Among the causes which have hindered the improvement of science, Bacon frequently notices the injurious effects of Aristotle's works but in a manner which shews that it is not the inherent vice of his logic, but the precipitate and unphilosophical application of it, which did the injury.

By aphorism 125, it may be seen how entirely false the current notion is, that Bacon invented the method of Induction for arriving at those truths which Aristotle sought by means of Syllogism. In this aphorism, it is distinctly declared, that the method of acquiring first principles adopted by each is in kind the same. The defect of the ancients was an impatient, scanty, and superficial observation; the advice of the modern is to be cautious, slow, laborious, and persevering inexperiment, before we venture to elicit propositions, out of which other truths are to be syllogistically inferred. In short, "Syllogism and in