nient for proving the divinity of our Saviour from the "O. T. But I cannot help it: I have done it with no "ill design, but purely because I think, and am morally sure, that the text, as it stands, will not properly ad"mit of any other construction. The LXX. have so "translated it before me, in an age when there could "not possibly be any bias of prejudice either for or against the forementioned doctrine; a doctrine which "draws its decisive proofs from the N. T. only. In the parallel passage, ch. xxxiii. 16, the expression is a little varied, but the sense according to a just and literal "translation is precisely the same, And this is he "whom JEHOVAH shall call OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS.'' 66 Zech. ii. 6-13. In these verses, agreeably to the prophetic style, there is a rapid change of persons, and in consequence of the peculiar degree of abruptness, some learned critics have imagined that one Jehovah God of hosts' was sent by another Jehovah God of hosts;' that the former must be Christ; and that therefore he must be Jehovah. This singular argument has lately been dwelt upon with much apparent satisfaction by a writer in the Monthly Repository (Vol. II. p. 412,) signing himself Cleric. Dunelm. and supposed to be an author who is by many thought highly of as an interpreter of the prophecies. As a counter-argument, I cite Exod. xxix. 2-6, (adduced by Gregory Blunt, p. 185,) where, if we neglect an unmarked change of person, we make Moses say to the Israelites, I am Jehovah your God.' Mic. v. 2. Whose goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting,' or, as Archbp. Newcome renders it, from the days of hidden ages.' As these words refer to one who was to come forth at a future time, the natural construction is, whose goings forth have been described from of old,' &c. At most, the passage could only favour the pre-existence, not the proper divinity of Jesus, (if it refer to him ;) and vs. 4. is a proof against the latter. He shall stand and feed his flock in the strength of Jehovah, in the majesty of the name of JEHOVAH HIS GOD.' I recollect only two other peculiarities in the O. T. phraseology, which would generally be supposed to fa your the doctrine of a plurality of persons in one God; the one is the plural form of Elohim, the other is the expression in Gen. i. 26. Let us make man.'-I shall conclude this note with the remarks of Geddes, (who, whatever may be thought of his theology, certainly understood the Hebrew language.) "Do the plural forms plied to the One true God?-No: not any more than -denote a plurality of persons when ap אלהי and אלהים and בוראים,denote a plurality of Lords אדוני and ארונים a plurality of פני and פנים,a plurality of Creators בוראי faces, or a plurality of lives.-It is truly strange that such a notion should ever have been entertained; and indeed it is only a modern notion, of the same age with scholastic theology. The Christian Fathers of the Church, who were eager enough to discover in the O. T. proofs of a Trinity, never dreamed of seeking one in is applied not only to the אלהים The term -"אלהים true God, but to false gods, and even to a single false Respecting the expression, Let us make man,' Geddes remarks that some of the Jewish writers," with. whom agree some of our best modern commentators, find in Let us make, no more than an emphatical and majestic mode of expression, insinuating both the power of the Creator, and the dignity of the created." He cites Song of Sol. i. 4, 11, viii. 8. as instances among several others of this poem, in which the plural is used for the singular. "Nor is it peculiar to the Hebrew. It is quite familiar to the Arabs. The Musselmans are certainly no Trinitarians: yet nothing is more common in the Koran than God's speaking in the plural number. We did-we gave-we commanded." C. R. p. 21. No. III. Remarks respecting Mr. Sharp's Canon, &c. I AM much concerned to learn, from Mr. Veysie's Second Letter, p. 101, that M Winstanley, some time before the spring of 1809, had withdrawn from his publisher all the remaining copies of his excellent little tract. Mr. Veysie says, "There is, therefore, some reason to suppose, that Mr. Winstanley was not himself perfectly satisfied with his own proofs." Against this supposition I place Mr. W.'s own words, (Vindication, p. 2) : "The following observations have lain by me for a considerable time, owing to causes which it is not necessary to state: I only mention this circumstance as affording some presumption that they have not been hastily prepared for the press, as I have had time enough to revolve and review them; and that I may without arrogance propose them to your candid reflection, as sufficient to convince you, &c." I think it a supposition quite as probable as Mr. Veysie's, that as Mr. Sharp's opinion excited little attention except among those who considered it as proved, Mr. W. found the sale very slow, and wished to close his account with his publisher. At any rate, I am convinced, from what we see in the tract itself, that if Mr. W. had been converted to Mr. Sharp's opinion, he would have been ready to avow it to the public, and would have endeavoured to show the fallacy of his own arguments. That he, or any other, would be successful in such an attempt, I do not believe. ་་ 68 " Mr. Sharp's Canon is as follows: "When the copulative xa connects two nouns of the same case [viz. nouns (either substantive, or adjective, or participles) of personal description respecting office, dignity, affinity, or connection, and attributes, properties or qualities good or ill] if the article , or any of its cases, precedes the first of the said nouns or participles, and is not repeated before the "second noun or participle, the latter always relates to "the same person that is expressed or described by the "first noun or participle." It is admitted on all hands 66 66 that this is a general usage of the Greek language; the only point is, whether the usage is so universal, that the nouns must, in such circumstances, refer to the same person. have already shown the degree of ambiguity which would arise from the neglect of this usage, (see note (f) p. 139); and I must say that if instead of being general, the usage had been universal, I should have preferred the supposition that the Apostle had made a minute grammatical error, than that he contradicted himself, (compare p. 41.) But if it not only can be shown that the usage is not universal, but that there was a propriety in the departure from it in the cases referred to, even the grammatical part of the argument must then be given up as futile. As to the latter point, (see note (B) p. 140; with respect to the former, I shall subjoin a few remarks chiefly derived from Middleton, Blunt, and Winstanley. 1. The cases corresponding in construction to those of the Canon, but not included in it, show that there is nothing in the construction itself which requires the inference stated in the Canon. Ὁ λιθος και χρυσος, and Την απειρίαν και απαιδευσίαν, have exactly the construction required by the Canon *; but this construction does not identify the objects. Names of different substances, and of different abstract qualities, are obviously inapplicable to the same substance or quality; and therefore the construction is of no force. 2. The exceptions admitted by Mr. Sharp to his Canon, also show that there is nothing in the construction itself which requires the inference. "There is no ex ception or instance of the like mode of expression "that I know of," says Mr. Sharp, "which necessarily requires a construction different from what is here laid "down, except the nouns be proper names, or in the "plural number." When we read Τον Αλεξανδρον και DIXITTOV, we see at once that they must be names of different individuals, and therefore the construction is of no force. In like manner we readily perceive that Tous τραγώδους τε και κωμῳδους, do not refer to the same * Middleton's Doctr. of the Gr. Art. p. 83. classes of men, and therefore the construction is of no force. It is well observed by Middleton, (as the reason why the inference of identity is less general in the case of plural than of singular nouns,) that "though one "individual may act, and frequently does act, in several "capacities, it is not likely that a multitude of indivi"duals should all of them act in the same several capa"cities," and that, "by the extreme improbability, that "they should be represented as so acting, we may be for"bidden to understand the second plural attributive of "the persons designed in the article prefixed to the first, "however the usage in the singular might seem to counte"" nance the construction." I need not remind the reader how appropriate this remark is to the passage where Paul is supposed to call Jesus Christ the GREAT GOD. See p. 41. 138. 3. The exceptions added by Winstanley, and by Middleton, in connexion with those allowed by Sharp, "fairly considered, must be fatal to the inference" de-. duced from the construction. (1) National appellations must be excepted; as, Ο Μωαβίτης και Αμανίτης. (2) The inference will not hold good where one of the nouns is plural; as, Συν τη μητρι και δούλοις. (3) Nor if one of them is a proper name; as, Οἱ πιστοι εικόνα εχουσι του αρχοντος Θεου πατρος και Ιησου Χριστού. Nor (4) if the attributives "cannot be predicated of the same subject without the most evident and direct contradiction;" as, Του αρτίου και περίττου, του δικαιου και αδι Nor (5) even if the signification of the personal words undergo any further mark of personal distinction unnecessary; as, Του πεπαιδευμενου και απαιδευτού, and Μεταξύ του ποιούντος τε και πασχοντες. With the 4th class of exceptions I would rank one of the passages which Mr. Sharp regards as proofs of the Godhead of Jesus. I contend that no early convert who had been taught Christianity by Paul, or who had even only read: his Epistles, could suppose that he meant the same person by THE GREAT GOD, and, OUR SAVIOUR JESUS κου 2. Middleton, p. 90. Vindication, p. 16. a Middleton, p. 92. |