« The annual average of exports for five years in the last war, viz. 1796 to 1800, both inclufive, amounted to

"Annual average of exports for five years in the preceding peace, viz. 1784 to 1790 inclufive, amounted to

£. 34,145,076

17,317,703

"Annual average excefs of exports the laft five years of the war £.16,827,373.

"This is nearly double the annual average of exports for five years in the preceding peace.

"After exhibiting fuch irrefragable proofs from documents as laid before Parliament, and inferted in my Appendix, how or in what manner have I, according to Mr. Chalmers's vague affertion, invalidated my own remark and HIS DISCOVERY, by excepting the wars of 1756 and 1793? This I will challenge any champion of fophifiry to demonftrate. It will indeed require another volume of Apologies and Supplemental Apologies from his prolific pen to wipe away his nugatory attempt to pervert facts, by reafoning on a point of depreffion in trade, inftead of the fairer mode of average estimates, where objects fluctuate at particular periods for any given number of years."

Having thus fupported his own pofition, and proved, that in letter, fpirit, and fubftance, it is in direct oppofition to the confoling difcovery of Mr. Chalmers, Mr. M'A. proceeds to analyze this difcovery itself.

"He makes an unqualified affertion, that in every war there is a point of depression in trade, and from which it gradually rises beyond its former greatness. But let us first examine how he proves this favourite propofition. It is neither more nor lefs than by fimply comparing the point of depression, as he terms it, of the first years exports in the wars of 1756 and 1793, with the years of peace immediately preceding; but at the fame time he carefully avoids touching upon any other war or peace of the century, as fimilar, comparative eltimates would have completely deftroyed his hypothefis.. He ftates (and which may be admitted to be correct) that in 1756 the value, of cargoes was depreffed to 11,708,5151. from having been (the year before). 12,599,1121. And in 1793, the first year of the late war, the value, he fays, was deprefied to 20,580,180l. after having been in 1792, the year, preceding, 24,905,2001. But of what import is this difcovery? or does it in the finallest degree invalidate, as he roundly afferts, my fairer pofition,, by arguing on the annual average of five years exports in war, and the an. nual average of five years in the preceding peace? I have clearly laid down and illuftrated by facts, that in every war since the Revolution (except the last, and the war of 1756), our exports, compared with an equal number of years in the preceding peace, were always considerably diminished, but that soon after the return of peace the value of exports rose beyond their former level. This I have already moft incontestably demonftrated. But now in proving the general fallacy of Mr. Chalmers's pofition, and which by the by is a kind of negative proof that my caufe does not require, I fhall make it appear obvious that his doctrine will not ftand the test of fair argument, by comparing the exports of the other wars of the century with years of the preceding peace. But to come to facts: let the reader examine the Table of Exports in the Appendix, and he will find that in the first war of the century from 1702 to

1712 inclufive, there is no one year of that long period wherein the value of exports equalled what it had been in a year of the preceding peace. In 1701, a year of peace, the official value of exports amounted to 7,621,0531.; but the highest point of elevation (in contradiftinction to his point of depression) during the war, viz. the laft year (1712), was no more than 7,468,8571. Hence we perceive that in this war it never rose to its former greatness, and which is one period of many that flatly contradicts Mr. Chalmers's consoling discovery.

"In the fhort war of 1718, we also find, by fimilar comparison; that at no period of it did the value of exports amount annually to more than 8,681,2001.; but in a year of the peace preceding, viz. 1717, the official value amounted to 9,147,7001. In the long war of 1739 with Spain and afterwards with France, his propofition is true in one refpect, and proved to be false in another. In the fecond year of the war (1740) the value of exports was depressed to 8,869,9391. from having been in 1738, a year of peace, at 12,289,4951. and it gradually role in 1743 to 14,623,6531. But in 1744 it was depreffed to 11,429,6281.; in 1745 to 10,497,3291.; and for the three remaining years of the war the official value of exports fluctuated from eleven to twelve millions. Hence we perceive that the point of depreffion in trade happened the fecond year of this war, that it gradually rofe for three years only to its former greatness; that it was gradually depreffed again for three years fucceffively below what it had been in the preceding peace; and that during the remainder of the war it never rose to its former greatnefs. But in the war of 1756, as well as 1793 (which are the exceptions I have laid down), we find that in the last year of the war ending in 1763, the value of exports amounted to 17,251,6171. whereas in no year of the preceding peace did the value amount to more than 15,132,0041. and which happened in 1750. In the last war the value of exports for 1800, amounted to 35,990,000l. ; but in no year of the peace preceding did it amount to more than 24,905,2001. and which was in 1792.

"I have therefore doubly proved by incontrovertible facts, without a recurrence to any fophiftical or abftract reasoning, first, pofitively, that in. every war during the century, except the war of 1756 and 1793, our exports, Compared with an equal number of years in the preceding peace, were, always considerably diminished but that foon after the return of peace the value of exports rose beyond their former level. Secondly, I have, by the way of negative proof, confirmed unequivocally and incontrovertibly my own pofition, and at the fame time refuted most completely the di covery Mr. Chalmers has fo wifely made, and which he was pleafed to fay, I had adopted with great complacency as my own.

"All these facts, taken collectively or feparately, place this gentleman's consoling discovery, and major pretenfions to a knowledge of political reason-` ing, in a very aukward predicament, more especially after the furdy opi-' nions he has delivered, and the fplenetic cenfure he has lavished throughout his new Preface to an old Estimate: whereby he has unguardedly committed himself, and afforded me (though with great reluctance) an opportunity of making a real discovery; namely, that in printing, as well as in gardening, young shoots may be grafted on an old stock. And I leave him to digest the two following appropriate lines from his favourite author :

"We have some old crab-trees here at home,

That will not be GRAFTED to your relish.”—SHAKESPEAR.

If

"If, however, I may be allowed to conclude metaphorically on this occafion, and by way of retort courteous, Mr. Chalmers may be faid to have stunted his laurels between the young shoots and old trunk; or, in other words, more congenial to his logical nature, he may be faid to have placed himself stationary, between the major and minor of an absurd syllogism, rather exciting laughter than reproof."

Our author is not lefs accurate in his political than he is in his financial estimates; as appears from his curfory view of the inevitable confequences of a continuance of the late difgraceful peace, and of the known projects of Buonaparté; and in his brief examination of this treaty itself; the latter of which we shall extract.

1

"In this place let us only in a curfory manner confider the last treaty of peace with France, under the requifites for a good one, as reduced under three diftinct heads by that enlightened ftatesman Mr. Burke in reviewing fubjects of this nature; viz. 1. Stability; 2. Indemnification; 3. Alliance. "In examining briefly these three heads, it will now be admitted by the Minifters who neceffarily made the peace, as well as by the majority of the nation who fo loudly called for it, and by all parties who tacitly approved of the experiment,

"1. That the fhort experience of twelve months only, fince figning the definitive treaty, proves the inftability of the peace, and that the original great objects of the war had not been accomplished.

"Has not Bonaparte, by repeated acts of aggreffion fince figning the preliminaries, violated the fpirit of the peace? Has he not by his unjuft encroachments upon the status quo of Europe, and the relative state of the two nations as arranged by the preliminaries, proved the inftability of the treaty; and that even under any circumstances of forbearance it was not poffible to preserve the relations of peace and amity with a military ruler of an ambitious and revolutionary republic?

"2. Ceylon and Trinidada were the objects of indemnity or compenfation for the Cape of Good Hope, Goree, and Senegal, in Africa; for Pondicherry, Mahe, Cochin, Negapatam, and the Spice Ilands, in the Eaft; for St. Domingo, Martinico, St. Lucie, Guadaloupe, Tobago, and Curacao, in the Welt Indies; for St. Pierre and Miquelon, and the former right of fisheries, in North America; and for Surinam, Berbice, Demerara, and Effequibo, in South America. Hence it is obvious on which side of the account the balance of pofitive indemnities is to be placed. But there is ftill a greater preponderance in the feale against Great Britain, when the refult of the treaty has been confidered with all the collateral compenfations derived from it by the French republic. She has confolidated her power by attaining the fovereignty of the Italian republic, fubjugating Switzerland, and having Elba ceded to her, thereby extending the boundaries of her territory and line of coaft in Europe to more than Roman magnitude. She has by the ceffion of Portuguese Guiana, in South America, obtained a vaft tract of country, and the command of a most important river, giving her at any future-period the facility of making an eafy conqueft of the Brazils. She has alfo by ftrange windings of crooked policy cajoled Spain to cede to her Louifiana in North America, which on one fide would have put Mexico and Peru within her grafp, and on the other the north-east parts of America to the farthest boundaries of Canada. But her gigantic views in this

NO. LXXI. VOL. XVIII.

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refpect

respect have been for the prefent happily fruftrated, by her being com pelled to accept a fum inadequate to the compenfation from the States of America.

3. As to allies, we were left at the conclufion of the war without any, and it is problematical whether, at the prefent moment, we can gain the alliance of one fingle power on the continent. Do not the recent inftances of the invafion of Hanover, and the shutting up of the Elbe and the Wefer, juftify this conclufion? Bonaparte's intention, no doubt, was fign fed to the courts of Petersburgh and Berlin, and it may be inferred that he was at least warranted by the tacit confent of the latter power to put his plan in execution. What his arrangement of indemnifications to this power may be, futurity will difcover. But that Ruffia fhould fanction fo manifeft a violation of its folemn engagements is truly incredible; her commercial intercourfe with this country being so advantageous, that in this view alone it affords a ray of hope to encourage us to believe the will mediate with energy, or frike with decifion, in order to check the further progrefs of France in her attempts to paralyze (palfy) and difmember Europe."

Mr. M'A. concludes his introduction with a manly appeal to Britifh fpirit, and with the adduction of hiftorical proofs of our fuperiority in arms over our inveterate and unprincipled foe:

"Let Britons reflect on these valorous deeds, and hold them conftantly in view as fit objects of emulation; and we fhall have little to fear from the menaces of France; but on the contrary, Great Britain at the present juncture, with her forces judiciously drawn out and put in full exertion, is not only capable of defending herself by repelling every foreign attack, but, which is more effential for accelerating the purposes of warfare, we are, from the energies and refoures of the nation, likewise capable of acting offenfively, and carrying the terror of our arms either into the heart of the enemy's country, or to his remotest foreign poffeffions. If England fhould unfortunately be compelled to adhere to a defenfive war only, we may bid adieu to the glory and renown hitherto acquired by our ancestors, and tamely fubmit to the moft degrading terms of peace that a successful conqueror may dictate."

This truth we have frequently endeavoured to imprefs on the minds of our countrymen; Mr. Burke's comprehenfive mind was fully aware of its importance; and, we truft, it will have its due weight with thofe to whom his Majesty has been now pleased to confide the government of the country; for a change of men without s change of measures would be productive of little or no good.

We cannot take leave of our author without expreffing a hope, that the talents and information which he poffeffes will not be fuffered to lie dormant, but that they will be again exercised in the detection and exposure of thofe financial and political errors which are now afloat, and which, if they be fuffered to remain unanfwered and unconfuted, may be attended with ferious injury to the state.

An Effay on Education, in which are particularly confidered the Merits and Defects of the Difcipline and Inftruction of our Academies. By the Rev. William Barrow, L.L. D. and F.A.S. Author of the Bampton Lecture for 1799, and lace Mafter of the Academy, Soho-fquare. The fecond Edition, corrected and enlarged.

2 vol. 12mo. 95. 1804. Rivingtons.

WE

E were among the firft to pronounce this a work of great and uncommon met*, and our opinion has been confirmed by the judgment of the public. We fhould have here contented ourfelves with merely announcing this early appearance of a fecond edition, had there not been new fubje&ts introduced of such intereft and importance as to demand pa.ticular notice. Thefe additions are comprised in two long chapters, the one on dramatic performances at School, and the other on the English univerfities; fubjects fo connected with education, as to form an effential part of the work, and indeed to make us enquire why the former edition was published withoutthem.

The first of thefe chapters we opened with fome curiofity, to know what defence fo rigid a moralift as Dr. Barrow could fet up for a practice of immoral tendency; for we fully expected that he muft defend a practice which had been purfued with so much celebrity under his direction in Soho Academy, but we were agreeably disappointed. Experience feems to have decided him totally against plays at fchool; and experiment in moral as well as phyfical fubjects, is certainly the beft criterion of truth. We find that the Doctor had changed his plan or fyftem with refpect to plays before he relinquifhed his academy, and he very candidly ftates the caufe and refult of this change in an interesting note.

Private theatricals, as well as fcholaftic, are here wholly condemned on the moft rational and even liberal grounds; nor has the late unfortunate Pic Nic Society escaped a portion of chastisement. We might remind the author-de mortuis nil nifi bonum; but his ftrictures may operate as a preventative againft fimilar attempts hereafter. Thefe ftrictures are equally just and forcible. We regret, therefore, that our limits will not allow us to give them at length, and they would be injured by being abridged. The concluding part only of the chap ter is here quoted, which may serve as a specimen of the Doctor's sentiments as well as ftyle.

"The greatest mischief however to be feared from theatrical performances at school, and confequently the most decisive objection to them is, that they frequently generate in the minds of the pupils the love of diffipa tion, and an attachment to the profeflion of the stage. It is an evil of no

See ANTI-JACOBIN REVIEW, Vol. XI. P. 387.

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trifling