bers deftructive to each other. The following are his obfervations on the battle of Arbela.

"It is not to be doubted, that with an excellent arrangement, joined to the valour of his troops, Alexander completely defeated the fuperior forces of Darius. Neither is it to be questioned, that, in the military fchools of Greece, the battle of Arbela was pointed cut as the model for great actions. In it are aflembled all the manœuvres and operations known to the best Greek tacticians. For instance, the whole army drawn up in a line, obliquely inclined to that of the Perfians, in order to attack only one part of it, another line, oblique to the wing, to fupport the cavalry, the half-facings, to be ready to attack the enemy in flank, when advancing; a fecond line, behind the phalanx, to oppofe any attack on their own rear; thofe grand facings, or wheelings, from the centre backwards towards the wings, when the enemy fhould appear on the flank; that denfe body, or wedge, of cavalry, at the head of the oblique line, with which Alexander pufhed on, to penetrate the open space left in the Perfian line, the columns of infantry formed by the peltastes, or targeteers; the breaking through of the phalanx, by the Perfians; the mixture of light troops with the cavalry: in a word, the whole battle furnithes the most admirable leffons on the art of war of the antients."

Our author follows Alexander to the war in India, and battle with King Porus. Thence he paffes to the warfare of other Eaftern nations, and especially the Parthians; and prefents a melanchly detail of the fate of Craffus, which was evidently incurred by that general's want of skill and total ignorance of the enemy with whom he had to contend. He obferves that the Parthian mode of warfare is the fame (with different arms) with that which in latter times has been carried on by Hyder, Tippoo, and the Mahrattas:

"To icour the country, cut off convoys, exhaust their enemy by a long dance after them, through countries with which they are unacquainted, and in which they may be furprized by ambuthes; or, on the other hand, as circumstances require, or opportunities invite, to draw them into the plain country, where their immenfe bodies of cavalry may act against fmaller, though firmer, bodies of infantry, with advantage; where they may harafs them by constant skirmishes, without much lofs to themfelves, or completely furround them."

From the Macedonians and Afiatics our author proceeds to the Romans; and first confiders the legion as opposed to the Macedonian phalanx, and exemplifies the juftnefs of an obfervation which we quoted from the preface, that victory depends not merely on the mass, but the compound ratio of force and velocity, together with skilful direction. The united strength and vertality of the Roman body was fuperior to the mere ftrength of the phalanx. The phalanx was adapted only to specific ground, whereas the legion could act on any ground. Tais remark our author illuftrates from the battle in which Flaminius overcame Philip, and compelled him to accept of a peace on the ternis of the conqueror, and from the battle in which Æmilius Paulus defeated Perfeus the fon of Philip, and reduced Macedonia to

be

be a Roman province. We are next conducted to the wars between the Romans and Carthaginians; and our author prefents, from Polybius, a very masterly account of the battle of Cannæ. He clearly thews the pivot on which victory turned in a battle in which half the number of troops, generally inferior, beat eighty thousand Romans, because the smaller number was commanded by a mot confummate leader; and the greater number by an officer of ordinary talents with the prefumption and precipitancy of felf conceited ignorance. The battle of Zama was fought between two generals of the very highest skill, but the event there turned on the troops which they respectively commanded. The defeat of Hannibal there, when with an equal number contending against a General almoft equal to himself, the troops of Hannibal being bad, and of his competitor being good, merely fhews that the greatest abilities cannot avail without materials. From the time of Hannibal the Romans were fo much fuperior to the enemies with whom they engaged, that our author thinks none of their wars afford much military leffon, until the civil contest between Pompey and Cæfar. We do not altogether agree with him that, in this intermediate time, they met with no ferious refiftance in their ambitious career. The war of Numantia, protracted by careleffness and luxury, and brought to a close by the reftoration of discipline and energy, is not devoid of military inftruction, perfectly coincident with that which our author fo very ably delivers. The war of Jugurtha repreffed the Roman ambition, and both under Metellus and Marius called forth very great difplays of military ability, as may be feen in Salluft. The Cimbri and Teutones did more than check the ambitious career of the Romans, they threatened the state with deftruction. The ultimate victories of the Romans over the valiant hordes of these Northern barbarians, tend ftrongly to confirm the excellent and favourite pofition of our author, that in warfare genius and wisdom are most likely to be fuperior; at least where they have great difficulties to encounter. The efforts of Sylla againft Mithridates, a very obftinate and formidable enemy of Roman ambition, illuftrate the fame principle. Sertonius, with Spaniards, long an overmatch for the Roman legions, is an inftance of the fame truth; and we do with our author had not fo curforily paffed over the seventh century of Roman war hiftory. In the beginning of the eighth we find Cæfar at Dyracchium; and foon after are brought to the battle of Pharfalia, on which Dr. Thomion has bestowed very accurate attention; and of which he has exhibited a moft matterly view. Cæfar, he clearly demonftrates, with a much fmaller number of equal troops, (for they were all the beft in the world) from a difadvantageous fituation, defeated Pompey, with his great numbers, very ftrongly pofted. Cæfar certainly both in war and politics was uniformly fuccefsful, because he was a much abler man than any with whom he had to contend. In the ancient portion of the hiftory, the battles, which are the best defcribed, both afford and produce the most important military leffons are the battles of Marathon and Arbela; Cannæ and Pharfalia. The

Doctor

Doctor thinks it would be idle to attempt, in such a limited work, an account of the most important battles fought by the Romans in the latter periods of their empire; and we, in a great measure, agree with him. Indeed the events of the declining ages of Rome, afford lefs of military than of moral leffon. It was not the extraordinary individual Hannibal by military genius and invention overcoming the lefs able Flaminius and Varro, though at the head of fully, better troops, it was barbarian ftrength and energy against degenerate enervation. He gives a fhort account of Saracenic and Tartarian warfare, in the middle ages, over Afia, Africa, and Eaftern Europe.Next he brings us to events with which we are much better acquainted, the wars between England and Scotland. Both nations he juftly deems among the leaft barbarous of the middle ages. Both were nationally gallant and intelligent, they refpectively fucceeded according to the talents of the prince by whom they happened to be commanded. Robert Bruce, one of the greatest monarchs of Scotland, headed his army of thirty thousand men, when Edward the Second, one of the weakest princes of England, headed the English of one hundred thousand men. They met at Bannockburn, and the fuperior ability of Robert in the choice of ground, difpofition of his troops, and availing himself of events, decided the fate of the day. Not long after, Robert being dead, and a prince of very extraordinary ability, Edward the Third, on the English throne, the forces of Edward gained a fignal victory at Halidown Hill.

We are now conducted to the fecond part-war after the invention of gunpowder. This period is introduced by fome general remarks on the changes which it has produced in the art of war; after which we follow war hiftory from the partial employment of that fubftance to its very general ufe; including a view of the various inftruments to which the invention has given rife. Our author prefents a sketch of the battles of Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, which bore a striking resemblance to each other in difpofition, operation, and refult. At Crecy, Edward the Third was far inferior to the enemy in numbers, but occupied fuch a pofition as to give full effect to his troops, and, at the fame time, fecure them from being flanked or furrounded by the Gallic multitude. The French did not difpofe of their men fo as to avail themselves of their numbers; the Black Prince, who commanded the van, made fuch an impreffion as was irresistible where he pointed his force, and the confufion which he caufed there extended to the reft. The new artillery of the English affifted in completing the dismay of the enemy; but the genius of Edward the Third in planning, and the energetic heroifm of his fon in executing, determined the victory. At Poitiers, the Prince of Wales had with. twelve thousand to encounter fixty thousand; but now, at twentyfeven, mature in wisdom, as at feventeen he had been tranfcendant in heroism, he made fuch an arrangement as enabled all his men to act, and not nearly all the enemy. He irritated the French prince to advance into a lane, between hedges the most incommodious for his numbers, and which our Edward had previously prepared for his re

ception,

ception in a manner that Hannibal could not have exceeded. He lined the bushes with troops on each fide, attacked the defenceless, flanks of the enemy, while he him elf charged them in front; they endeavoured to retreat, but falling back among their own army, they communicated their confufion. Edward, forefeeing this probable contingency, had made difpofitions to avail himself of the disorder, by posting a party in ambufcade to attack the French in the rear. The battle of A incourt was gained by Henry against an army as much fuperior as that which his great grandfather and great uncle had to encounter. He adopted a fimilar order, fecured his flanks and rear, and bore on one point of the French force with fuch ability and effect as to produce confufion and rout to the enemy, and a most decifive. victory to the English. If the French commanders had been equally fkilful, they either would have avoided battle, or difpofed of their numerous and brave troops to much better advantage: but the valiant and wife princes of England defeated the French because Providence had bestowed upon then much better heads, and ftill firmer hearts, than on their antagonists. Thefe are qualities, it must be owned, which many English commanders poffeffed and exerted; when they did our history has few defeats to record from Frenchmen, or any other enemies. The battle of Flouden was gained by the fuperior ability of Surrey, over not a weak prince, but what had the fame effect, a prince totally ignorant of war. Our author now proceeds to Turkish warfare, but their victories appear to have been gained by ftrength and prowess over effeminacy, more than by ability over intellectual weakness. The Turks had a military fpirit, but never an eminent military genius. Next we are conducted to the wars in Italy, between the French and Spaniards, when artillery and musketry began to be well understood. Here is exhibited a view of French progress in military fkill. About twenty-five pages are devoted to the wars and inventions of Guftavus Adolphus, and that is one of the most interefting parts of the work. After an introduction on the modern modes of arranging armies he presents a very masterly view of the battle of Rocroi, wherein the fuperior genius of Condé (by the bye we rather think he was then only Count or Duke d'Enguien, his father or other predeceffor being alive), with an army not more numerous, overcame the finest body of infantry in the whole world. The victory of that Prince over Melos is certainly as ftriking an inftance in fupport of our author's general doctrine as could be adduced.

We next attend the Doctor over ground that every Briton must tread with delight-the wars of Marlborough. The battle of Blenheim is one of his most masterly exhibitions. Therein he clearly and lumi nously paints the Duke of Marlborough commanding an inferior force to Marshal Tallard, who had an opportunity of pofting himself fo ftrongly as to be inacceffible. The Duke of Marlborough faw Tallard was not availing himfelf of his advantages by fortifying approaches; he, therefore, availed himfelf of the omiffion, moved forward with fuch rapidity as gave the French no time for preparation. Marlbo

rough,

rough, affifted by Prince Eugene, fo arranged the whole combined troops that they acted as one body. Tallard, affifted by the Elector of Bavaria, made fuch difpofitions that they were two detached armies. Marlborough occupied ground (which the French a little before might have feized) that enabled every company and every man to act efficiently. Tallaid pent up a great body of his troops in a village whence they could not annoy the enemy, and could very little support their fellow foldiers. Seeing the difpofitions of their commander the English and their allies went on with the boldeft confidence. The fkilful general, with his army all moving in harmony, defeated the unfkilful general with his army in broken and detached bodies. In the character of Marlborough and Tallard we find victory and defeat. At Ramillies Marlborough gained a victory by equal fuperiority of talents and efforts. At Malplaquet, having to contend against Villars, a very able man, the ftill fuperior ability of Marlborough prevailed, but the victory was not fo fignal. Galway, commanding in Spain, though a brave man, at the head of as good troops as any which Marlborough commanded, was defeated, at Almanza, in enconntering a leader of fuperior genius, the Duke of Berwick. The fertile invention of the Earl of Peterborough recovered victory to the English in Spain. The next battle that is mentioned is the battle of Fontenoy, on the measures of which, our author touches delicately, and lays the blame, in a great measure, on the failure of the Dutch.

The third part brings us to war fince the introduction of the Pruffian tactics, and in prefatory pages, traces military arrangements from the time of the Greeks to the commencement of the seven years war. Our author gives a clear and concise sketch of the fucceffive battles of Frederic, and no part of his narrative more ftrongly evinces his doctrine, that the ableft men are likely to make the best generals. Indeed in Frederic it was frequently the mere invention of the moment that determined the victory. Dr. Thomfon now conducts us to a period which we contemplate with regret, our campaigns in America. But Frederic himself victorious at Rofbach, Miltiades at Marathon, Alexander at Arbela, Cæfar at Pharfalia, and Marlborough at Blenheim, do not more strongly evince the efficacy of talents and efforts to infure fuccefs than Howe with SUCH A BRITISH ARMY, totally inefficient. He had foldiers equal to any that ever exifted; but the foldiers had not a general. In this part of his narrative our author, we think, abounds too much in extracts from the hiftory of Stedman.

Laftly, we come to the wars that arofe from the French revolution. In his account of the firft campaign, 1792, he imputes the fucceffes of the French near the close of the year to the enthufiafm of supposed liberty in fome degree, but chiefly to the immenfe numbers which were brought into the field. The defcription of the battle of Jemappe is clear, but without any novelty of discovery or particular remark. He proceeds to the contests with the Pruffians and Auftrians, but here we find little generalization. The battle of Fleurus is accurately narrated, but without any retrofpection of that feparation of the allies,