will find, in general, that they are as conclufive againft one, or both of them, as against the endless duration of future punishment. The Univerfalifts, in common with their opponents, appeal to Revelation; they profefs to refpect its authority; they ought therefore to be fatisfied with its decifion. We may be miftaken in our reafonings and conjectures, but what God has faid muft be true. If the Divine Word be in their favour, I will not pretend to oppofe to it the Divine Attributes; and fhould it appear that God has pronounced punish. ment to be eternal, I think I have already proved, beyond a doubt, that his Attributes do not con tradict it. To the law then, and to the teftimony. SECTION II. On the WISDOM, POWER, and GOODNESS of GOD.. As God is the firft caufe of all," fays Mr. Vidler, 66 it is confiftent with reafon that he fhould "feek the happiness of all his creatures;—and that "whatever the goodness of God hath willed, and "his wisdom planned, that his power will execute." Mr. Fisher, in reply, obferved," If God, as 66 you affirm, fhould feek the happiness of all his "creatures, and his power will accomplish what his "wifdom planned, and his goodness willed; we ask "how it came to pafs that there fhould be fo much ❝evil and mifery in the world as there confeffedly ❝ is? And if it have not yet been the case, that "the power of God hath co-operated with his will "effectually to prevent the entrance of fin and its "confequent evils into the world, how doth it appear B 2 appear from a confideration of the Divine Attri "butes only, as they have been already exercised in "the government of the world, that his power will "finally accomplish what his goodnefs wills refpect "ing the happiness of all his creatures? Why not "then prevent them from being miferable at all? "As God is infinitely good and infinitely powerful, he muft be too good to will the existence of fin, "and too powerful not to be able to prevent it." This was a blow at the root, and Mr. V. felt its force. "If I understand this paragraph aright," fays he," it implies, either "1. That my premises are wrong, and God is not "infinitely wife, powerful, and good, but that he "is either weak, foolish, or wicked, or all of it, or, "2. Though he be infinitely wife, powerful, "and good, that he has willed bad things, plan"ned foolish things, and executed them; or, 3. That he has willed good things, planned "wife things, but is difappointed in the execution of ❝ them; or, 4. Though the Divine character be infinitely wife, powerful, and good, and that whatever his "goodness willed and his wifdom planned, his power ❝ will execute; yet that we know nothing about it, "but are left in total ignorance of it. "But if neither of thefe can be granted, then my inference from the Divine Perfections remains in full force.” * What pitiful fhuffling is this! Mr. V. does not deny that his argument is as conclufive against the introduction of fin and mifery as against their endlefs continuance; and yet he will not give it up! There God's Love to his Creatures, p. 12—15, 2 There is such a ftriking resemblance between this argument, and that urged by Epicurus against Divine Providence, that a perfon may be almoft tempted to think the one was borrowed from the other. "Either God is willing," fays this Philofopher, "to re move evils, and not able, or able and not willing, or neither able nor willing. If he be willing and “not able, he is impotent, which cannot be applied "to the Deity: If he be able and not willing, he "is envious, which is equally inconfiftent with the "nature of God. If he be neither willing nor able, "he is both envious and impotent, and confequently 66 no God. If he be both willing and able, which "is the only thing that anfwers to the notion of a "God, from whence come evils? or why does he "not remove them."* If Mr. V.'s reasoning be juft, it is easy to see that Epicurus's inference is the moft natural. For if God in his goodness, feeks the happiness of all his creatures, if his wifdom difcerns the way in which they may be made happy, and if his power muft execute the plan devifed by his wifdom, then it must necessa rily follow, that evil muft immediately ceafe, or rather, never could have exifted: but this is contrary to matter of fact; we must therefore infer that there is no Providence. Mr. V., as a chriftian minifter, cannot admit this conclufion; he must therefore aban. don the ground on which it is built. But I need not try to cut this knot; I can untie it very readily with the aid of the doctrine of Moral Liberty. On this principle I can deny his inference without admitting any one of his implications. In all the Divine difpenfations in relation to man, God has an eye to his Free Agency, and will not deftroy it. Mifery entered with the abufe of Liberty; and the poffibility of the abufe of it being continued, militates * King's Origin of Evil, p. 486. militates against the certainty of the Restoration in queftion; for to say that a man endowed with Liberty to fin, muft neceffarily be virtuous, is a contradiction in terms. I fay then in reply both to Epicurus and Mr. V., that the introduction of mifery, and its endless continuance, are owing to an abuse of Moral Liberty in man, and not to any deficiency in the wifdom, or power, or goodness of God. If Mr. V. fhould deny the doctrine of Moral Liberty, his difficulties will be increased rather than diminished. For if God has made men necessary agents, he is the author of evil. There can be no more propriety in charging it upon them, on this fuppofition, than there would be in charging my pen, rather than myself, with the errors contained in this book. Mr. V. would, therefore, have to inform us, how infinite Holinefs could be the author of fin, and infinite Happiness the author of mifery. Mr. Wright confidently afferts that "what is faid "about free-will by no means involves the Reftitu tion in uncertainty; for though God will ever treat his creatures as free, intelligent beings, yet "they will never become independent of him, or of "bis government; nor will be fuffer his counsel to be overturned, and his defigns to be defeated by the machinations of the enemy."* It is true that finners will never become independ ent of the government of God; but it is as true that they are now dependent, and that they are now miferable; and if prefent dependence does not provide against prefent mifery, then neither does eternal dependence against eternal mifery. But he will not 66 fuffer his counfel to be overturned, nor his defigns "to be defeated." I wish to know whether God has any counfels or defigns refpecting the happiness of bis intelligent creatures which are not connected with virtue? *Examination of Dr. Ryland's Sermon, p. 46. virtue! Can they be made happy without being previously made holy? Mr. W. will fay, No. It will follow then that if God's counfels and defigns refpecting their happinefs cannot be defeated, his counfels and defigns refpecting their holiness cannot be defeated. Now to come to matter of fact,-God defigns that men fhould be virtuous in this life; but thousands defeat thofe defigns by obftinate perfe verance in iniquity. The inference is, that God's counfels and defigns refpecting their happiness are defeated and if this may be the cafe for an age, it may for ever. SECTION III. On the JUSTICE of GOD. DIVINE Juftice," fays Mr. IVINE Juftice," fays Mr. Weaver, "is that "perfection in God, by which he endea (6 vours continually to make all intelligences juft.' If God endeavours continually to make all finful creatures juft, it is reasonable to suppose that there muft, by this time, be fome notable change, for the better, wrought in Satan and his angels; but the experience of the faints fully contradict it: perhaps thofe endeavours are very feeble. Mr. Wright fays, "With refpect to Satan and his "angels, they have never experienced their proper "punishment; but are referved under chains of "darkness unto the judgment of the great day; of "courfe we ought not to be at all furprised that "their punishment has not had its effect before they "are fully fubjected to it."+ Endless Mifery overthrown, p. 9. Examination of Ryland's Sermon, p. 48, 49. It |