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ference in the constitution and mechanism of the acting bodies. For instance, dead matter acts in the gross by the energy of its natural affinities alone; whereas living bodies are constituted of mechanical organs, adapted for modifying the influence of the laws of affinity according to intended purposes. But, in these, the laws of affinity are equally as powerful under another modification.

The organs of sense, therefore, subject to the same laws as matter in general, have their particular alliances. Their primitive particles are mutually allied, in order to form them; and as organs, mechanically and vitally constituted, they are related with the brain, and with external objects, by the intervention of certain media formed and modified under the same law. Thus, every organ of sense forms a link in the chain of relation which subsists between the brain, the seat of mind, and the external world. It is necessary here to draw a line of demarcation between physical and moral phenomena. Although the principles of both are the same, inasmuch as they are governed by the immutable laws of causation and material affinity, and inasmuch as one runs imperceptibly into the other; yet, as their extremes are very distant, and appear so little to resemble one another in their modes of manifestations, bearing an analogy with the three great kingdoms of Nature, it is necessary to form some line of separation between them.

The result of the relation between the mind and an external object, may be called perception; which consists in ideas being formed respecting that object. By perception, therefore, must be understood an impression made upon the mind, by some object, which impression renders the organ sensible of the existence of that object. Sensation depends upon the relation subsisting between an object and the nerve of sense alone. When that relation extends to the brain it constitutes perception. Sensation, therefore, is a blind feeling, unattended with pain, pleasure, or any other idea, inasmuch as it is not perceived by the mind. An amputated limb is subject to sensation, for a certain time, when stimuli are applied to it, although disconnected with the rest of the body. It would appear, therefore, that sensation is a property of the nerves, and that perception is a property of the mind; for the impression of the same object produces sensation in the one, and perception in the other. The property of receiving the impression may be called sensibility in the nerve, and perceptibility in the mind.

This subject may be illustrated further by examples :- -A person sitting down in a room where there is a clock, hears it strike eleven. He sets about reading or writing, very closely, and the clock strikes twelve without his hearing it, because

the mind was pre-occupied. In the first case, the organ of the mind had a relation with the sound of the bell, producing the phenomenon of perception; whereas, in the second case, although the auditory nerve was in the same condition, and equally exposed to the sound, as in the first case, yet, owing to the pre-occupation of the mental seat, the sound produced no ideas. This may be considered a case of simple sensation. Sensation and perception may be accounted for thus :-The impression in the former is conveyed to a certain extent only; and not so far as the seat of the mind; whereas, in the latter, it extends to the hemispheres of the brain. For instance, in sensation the impression may be conveyed so far as the seat of common sensation, at, or immediately beyond, the union of the cerebrum and cerebellum, without being referred from these to the cerebral convolutions; which is necessary in order to constitute perception. This supposition is in unison with the law of causation, because the impression which is already on the brain, being more powerful than the one which produced only simple sensation, that organ must necessarily exclude the weaker. In other words, the relation of the brain is greater with a stronger than with a weaker cause.

Now, the best line which can be drawn between physics and morals, appears to lie between sensation and perception. Sensation itself, and all the affinities of matter below it, down to the most insensible, may be considered as acting under the laws of physics; whereas perception, and all the phenomena of mind resulting from it, are dependent upon the agencies of moral laws.

The phenomena of certain species of mimosa are very pe culiar. They seem to rank between sensation and perception. When these sensitive plants are touched they instantly droop their leaves and prickles; but after a short time these expand again as they were before. This property can hardly be supposed to depend upon moral perception, yet it appears to depend upon something more than physical sensibility.

There are also some animals in which the phenomena of perception are not observable. Their organization is endowed with little more than the power of manifesting those of simple sensation. In these, the organ which constitutes the seat of perception is wanting.

Perception is the only channel to reflection, memory, conception, and thought in general. In combination with these powers, it constitutes experience, or the observation of facts. Perception simply is, probably, as acute in one individual as in another; but comprehension or reflection varies considerably in its power of activity in different individuals. The reason of this difference appears to depend upon the size and

strength of the organ acted upon. For instance, all the cerebral organs may be strong enough to be perceptible of sound, light, &c. so as to form simple ideas, or, perhaps, compound ideas, of the objects which produced the impressions; yet their powers may not be sufficient to compare these ideas, infer causes and draw conclusions from them, and produce all the phenomena which we call reasoning.

We shall, in the next place, enquire into the nature of TRUTH in general.

Truth must be considered as it regards things in themselves, and as it regards the individual who seeks it. It must, therefore, be considered in a physical, and in a moral, point of view. The universe, in all its parts, is absolutely true in itself, and forms the standard of moral truth. Morals are dependent upon physics with regard to truth, as they are with regard to every thing else; thus, Nature is physically true, and her relation with the mind renders her morally true. All our reasoning concerning things must be considered as moral, in the general sense, because we reason from the result of perception. Concerning physical truth, we know nothing more than that Nature is what she is; she must, therefore, be considered as the standard by which we are to form our judgment respecting moral truth.

Our knowledge of Nature is the result of experience; our notions of truth must, consequently, depend upon that experience; hence, moral truth is the highest degree of belief, produced by the strongest proof. This proof consists in the relation of the senses with the objects and circumstances in question, and in the consequences which this relation produces on the mind; for instance, perception, reflection, comparison, causation, judgment, and memory.

We mentioned above, that moral truth is the highest degree of belief; but it does not follow that truth and belief are always identical. The chief difference between the one and the other consists in this:-That the former is one immutable thing, admitting of no degrees; whereas the latter will admit of a great number of degrees, according to the nature of the proof which may give rise to it. As an example of the dif ference between them: I perceive the paper on the table before me; and, as I have the strongest proof that it exists there, which proof consists in its alliance with my nerves of vision, and those of feeling, it must be true that it lies before me; because, although I have every opportunity of which any other individual is possessed, of rectifying my mistake, yet these means are not capable of showing that I am in error. But, when I close my eyes, and remove my hands from it, I may believe it to remain in the same place still; but that be

lief will be inferior in degree to that which constituted truth: because, as things are eternally liable to a change of place and circumstances, some one may have removed the paper whilst my senses were excluded from it. I cannot prove its existence in the same place without appealing again to my senses. Again, a certain friend of mine was living and well yesterday. It is absolutely true that he was, because I saw and heard him; but, although I believe him to be alive and well to-day, yet that belief is not so strong as that which depended upon immediate perception, because all men are liable to death. Thus, then, absolute truth extends no farther than to present perception and observation.

Those who maintain the opinion respecting the identity of truth and belief, argue thus:-That which any person believes appears true to him, otherwise he would not believe it; and that which appears false to him, he, according to the same rule, disbelieves; therefore, what he believes is true, and what he disbelieves must be false. According to this rule of reasoning, the same thing must be both true or false, at the same time; for instance, if the history of a circumstance be told to two persons at once, one may believe it, and the other may disbelieve it; and as it appears true to the one and false to the other, it must, according to the above rule, be both true and false.

The difference between truth and belief may be further illustrated by the following examples :-A person might come and tell me that there was a balloon passing over the house where I was in. It is probable I might believe him, and, very likely, go out, and find that he had told me a falsehood, either to play a trick with me, or for some other purpose. In such an instance as this, my belief could not be true, although I had the strongest proof for it, next to that resulting from the evidence of my own senses.

Again, one person believes in the Christian religion, a second believes in the Mahometan, and a third in the Brahmin. Every one believes equally firmly that his own professed religion is the only true one; but, if there be only one true religion, two of these must believe in error, although their belief is quite as strong as that of him who believes in the true religion. If a fourth were to be arbitrator between these three individuals, he, in all probability, would differ from them all. From this view of the subject, therefore, it is clear that truth and belief may be quite at variance with each other.

What does truth, then, depend upon? It has been already observed, that truth either regards the mind, or it regards the object itself; because, a thing may be true in itself without

appearing so to us. We shall, in the first place, enquire into the nature of truth, as it relates to the mind.

Nature is the standard of all moral truth; man forms a part of Nature, and the mental faculties constitute the chief part of the human character. Truth, then, is founded upon the relation between these faculties and the object of enquiry. It is dependent on perception in the first place; and, in the second place, on the fitness of the associated ideas which the object produces. Absolute truth, then, as it regards the mind, depends upon immediate perception and observation; or upon the immediate relation which subsists between the brain and the object, through the medium of the external

senses,

Although perception and observation are the only foundation of truth, the sphere of their present activity is not very extensive. But, as man is endowed with the power of locomotion, and of memory, his knowledge progressively increases, as long as he exerts these powers. Those who are gifted with them, in a high degree, accompanied with an acute observation, are the most beneficial members of society. Their tendency is the development of facts, and the discovery of new properties in the works of creation.

Moral truth, as it relates to absent objects, constitutes only a moral belief, as it relates to the mind. The highest degree of moral belief, resulting from observations of facts, constitutes moral truth; but, as truth is immutable, and admits of no degrees, all proofs short of the evidence of the senses can only lead to a belief.

Facts must be considered as past, present, and future. Some facts are immutable, and eternal, for any thing we know ; thus, fire is always hot, the globe always moves on its axis, the sun is always in the heavens, the moon always revolves round the earth, &c. These facts, therefore, are the same respecting the past, present, and future. But, some facts can only be considered as far as it regards the past. For instance, a certain friend of mine was living yesterday, but I cannot tell that he lives to-day. This is a fact, as it regards the past, but only a probability with respect to the present; that is, a probability that my friend is alive to-day. Past facts are identical with experience, which constitutes the foundation of moral belief; for our belief is founded upon our knowledge of the properties and phenomena of things; thus, the laws of Nature are always the same; what is in consonance with these laws may be true, they are, therefore, objects of belief; but what is contrary to the laws of Nature cannot be true,—they are not, therefore, objects of belief.

As truth, then, depends upon our experience of the past,

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