be, when it is not, which fignifies nothing. We cannot fay that the Vol. VII. Divine Power can effect, that twice two fhould not make four; for that would be to cause that things fhould not be what they are, if they be at all, which is to cause that things fhould be and not be at all, when they are, which amounts to nothing. We cannot fay, that the Divine Power can make a found to be seen, and colour to be heard; for that would be to make colour and found all one, that is, things that differ, to be the fame while they differ, which is to make colour and found not to be colour and found while they are fo, which is to do nothing, and confequently argues no Power. We cannot fay the Divine Power can make that which is intrinfecally and effentially good,to be evil; and on the contrary: Or that which is neceffarily true to be falfe; and on the con. trary. For to make that which is intrinfecally and effentially good to be evil, is to make that which is always good to be fometimes evil, that is, to be evil whilst it is good, that is to make good and evil all one; which Vol. VII. the terms whereof fpeak a repugnancy to one another, and mutually deftroy one another, and the doing whereof is contrary to the nature of the thing which is fuppofed to be done, that is, is nonfenfe, and cannot be imagined to be. For Example, That a thing fhould be, and not be at the fame time. For a Power to make a thing to be, fo as it fhould not be while it is, fignifies nothing; becaufe fuch a Being as is not, is nothing; and to make fuch a Being, would be to do nothing, and confequently fuch a Power would fignifie nothing. So likewife we cannot fay, that the Divine Power can cause that the fame thing fhould be made and not be made, that that which hath been, fhould not have been; for the Power which makes a thing so as that it was not made, and caufeth a thing to have been, fo as that it hath not been, does nothing; and confequently is no Power. Nor can we fay, that the Divine Power can effect that any thing fhould be made by it felf, that is, be the caufe of its own Being; for that would be to cause that a thing fhould be before it is, that is, be, be, when it is not, which fignifies nothing. We cannot fay that the Vol. VII. 'Divine Power can effect, that twice two fhould not make four; for that would be to cause that things fhould not be what they are, if they be at all, which is to cause that things fhould be and not be at all, when they are, which amounts to nothing. We cannot fay, that the Divine Power can make a found to be seen, and colour to be heard; for that would be to make colour and found all one, that is, things that differ, to be the fame while they differ, which is to make colour and found not to be colour and found while they are fo, which is to do nothing, and confequently argues no Power. We cannot fay the Divine Power can make that which is intrinfecally and effentially good,to be evil; and on the contrary: Or that which is neceffarily true to be falfe; and on the con. trary. For to make that which is intrinfecally and effentially good to be evil, is to make that which is always good to be fometimes evil, that is, to be evil whilft it is good, that is to make good and evil all one; which which we believe to be a Divine Re Vol.VII. velation, exprefly tells us, that God doth foreknow them, and gives us Inftances of it in feveral Prophecies and Predictions. Now if any Man can fhew me as exprefs Texts, which fay, that God can make a Body to be in two places at once, I would believe it, tho' I do not fee how it is poffible; because it is reasonable I fhould believe, that infinite Power can do many things, the poffibility of which my finite Uuderftanding cannot reach. Now whereas the Papifts fay, the Scripture hath faid that from which this neceffarily follows, viz. This is my Body; this is not enough, unless they could either prove, that it is ne ceffary to understand all Texts of Scripture in a rigorous and ftrict propriety of the Letter, without admitting any trope or figure in the words; which they do not pretend: or else fhew a clear reafon, why this should be understood fo, more than a thoufand others; which they have not done, and I think never can do. But if it be further argued; If we grant in one cafe, that thofe things which feem to be contradictions to us may nor any other befides that; but if it be in two, it is both in this and in that, and therefore in neither of them, nor any where else; fo that a Power to make a Body to be in two places at once, is a Power to make it to be no where, that is, not to be at all, which is no Power; and there's the fame reason of the fame Body's being in contrary motion, or in motion and at reft, or in two contrary poftures at the fame time. ap So that by all these Instances it pears, that a Power to do any thing which implies a contradiction, and is repugnant to the nature of things, fignifies nothing, and the fuppofed Effect of it is only to bring terms together, which if they could be brought together, fo foon as they meet, will mutually take away and deftroy one another, which would be vain and to no purpose. have the more explicitly laid open these contradictions, with relation to the grofs Doctrine of Tranfubftantiation, in which all, or most of the contradictions which I have mentioned are involved. I know they ftifly deny, that thefe contradictions follow from Ꭲ 4 |