THE BRITISH CRITIC, FOR JULY, 1815. ART. I. Discourses on the Malevolent Sentiments. By John Hey, D. D. 8vo. pp. 213. THE publication of these Discourses is attended with circumstances of somewhat a peculiar nature. They were printed by their learned Author as early as 1801, and were at that time dis tributed only among his private friends. In the spring, however, of the present year, Dr. Hey thought proper to change his plan of private distribution, and to present the world at large with the result of his enquiries upon this curious and intricate subject. Scarcely had his intention been carried into execution, when in the fullness of his years he was summoned to a better world, leaving the present volume almost a posthumous work. As a lecturer upon Divinity, few theologians could be placed in competition with Dr. Hey. During the time that he sat in the Professor's chair in the University of Cambridge, he was eminently successful in inspiring the minds of his young auditors with a love for their sacred study, and in imparting that interest to the drier and more abstruse departments of theology, which commanded the attention even of the thoughtless and the indolent. The most satisfactory proof of our assertions will be found in the four volumes which sontain the substance of his lectures, which cannot be sufficiently admired for the various and extended learning, the profound thought, the copious and correct document, and the calm discussion for which they are distinguished. Above all, the mild and unruffled spirit which pervades the whole, cannot but furnish a striking document to the young and ardent mind of that peculiar temper with which all the intricate questions of polemical theology ought to be handled. From this very calmness, however, the reader will perceive that a few metaphysical VOL. IV. JULY, 1815. B refine refinements have resulted, with which the fancy rather of the reader will be amused, than his judgment directed. These - however are so very few, as scarcely to deserve our attention, except as the results of that calm and profound enquiry, which is the distinguishing feature of the author's mind. We much regret that these volumes, which contain such stores of theological information conveyed in the simplest, yet at times in the most animated form, and which may be justly considered as the very best compendium both to incite the ardour and to direct the judgment of the student, should have sunk into such utter neglect. We are happy of such an opportunity to recal the attention of our readers to this admirable work of the late Professor, and we trust, that the admiration which it once comananded, will be again revived, and that it will find its way not only into the libraries of the professed theologian, but the reading desk of the younger student. The volume before us is evidently the result of a long and matured speculation upon a subject which has been involved in much obscurity, and has rather been perplexed than illustrated by the laborious and frequent discussions which it has undergone. From Aristotle to Adam Smith, the theory of human passions has ever been the object of philosophical enquiry; it must however be confessed, that little has been added in later ages to the Nicomachean ethics of the ancient sage, and that as a masterly delineation of the moral construction of man, it still continues to maintain its accustomed rank. The great source indeed to which we may refer the repeated failures of the moralists of our own age, is the total omission of Christianity in all their speculations and enquiries. It would appear from the works of many of our best metaphysicians, those especially of our sister kingdom, that moral philosophy and Christian principle were two separate and distinct objects, and that all discussions on the former were impeded and obstructed by the consideration of the latter. Now if the Gospel be in truth a revelation from God, it is to be expected a priori, that as it prescribes our duty and enforces certain motives for its performance, it should not only disclose to us, as far as they concern our→ selves, the attributes of God, but that it should acquaint us with the secret springs of human action. The great example of Mr. Locke, has demonstrated that no man will be a worse philosopher for being a Christian; and the publication of Dr. Hey will also shew that no man will investigate the sources, and discuss the motives of our moral actions, with less perspicuity and effect for engrafting upon his abstract speculations the leading principles of the Gospel, and for illuminating the dark recesses of the heart with a ray of divine truth. We shall find that neither is the course of our investigation obstructed, nor the chain of our reasoning embarrassed even in a single link by such an admission. The coolness of moral philosophy will thus indeed receive a warmth, and its formality an interest which it never before acquired; and what in our view of the subject is of far the greatest importance, its abstract speculations will be resolved into principles of practice and motives of duty. The great design of Dr. Hey in the work before us is to vindicate the goodness of the Creator, in giving us those affections which are generally termed malevolent, and to show that being placed by him in our hearts for those good purposes which our present state requires, they are abused by us for the very worst; and also to shew what part man ought to take in their discipline and regulation. Dr. Hey reduces these Malevolent Sentiments under four principal heads: 1. Hatred. 2. Envy. 3. Malice. 4. Resentment. The method which he pursues with respect to each is, first to consider its nature, secondly to enumerate its good and bad effects; and thirdly to offer practical rules for its discipline and management. In considering Hatred, Dr. Hey enumerates the various feelings of disgust for which the term is indiscriminately used, separating them from those of envy, jealousy, contempt, &c. with which they are apt to be confounded. He considers it as opposite to love, and to be strictly speaking, that sentiment which is generated in the mind by a being either animate or inanimate, having so frequently caused unpleasant and painful feelings, that the idea of it becomes habitually associated with such feelings. This definition will appear to the reader imperfect, it has done so indeed already to its author, who very justly observes, that we may use a sentiment for the purposes of life, when we are unable to give a satisfactory and a metaphysical account of its nature, which he exemplifies particularly in our notion of Beauty, which is sufficiently clear for all practical purposes, yet most difficult to be accurately determined or satisfactorily defined. Dr. Hey resorts therefore to another method of approximating the idea of this feeling to his readers minds, by presenting to their view its object. "Think then what it is that you feel when you see a person of a rude, haughty character, coarse manner and ungraceful appearance; despising the rules of decency and decorum; hard, insen sible, uncivilized; inattentive to the feelings of those with whom he converses; overbearing tlie delicacy of modest sense, and making meek virtue and unassuming worth shrink in silent con fusion. Or think what you feel when you meet with one who is mean, sordid, effeminate, cowardly, without love of order, neatness, cleanliness; void of elegance and taste, of narrow B 2 mind mind and confused intellect, yet busy, officious, curious, impertinent; deficient in wisdom, yet full of low artifice and hidden duplicity. All these qualities heightened by an ill-contrived exterior, and expressed in an illiberal countenance. Think what you feel on the sight of a person who has been frequently the occasion of making you yourself in particular dissatisfied; or appear unfortunate or despicable. Whether by his unmerited and ill-applied prosperity, or his insolence in boasting of it, or by his baseness in attaining it, or in any other way. Think what has been the effect when you have been eager to indulge your finer fcelings; to expand yourself, as it were; to communicate your love of truth or virtue; or your relish for some liberal art; to expatiate on whatever has struck you as lovely, noble, ingenious; as likely to enlarge your sphere of beneficence; and all these efforts have been checked by want of sympathetic spirit; have been blighted by the chilling coldness of your companion. Or think, lastly, what has been the state of your mind when all the expectations were disappointed, which you had formed on the character, age, profession of those with whom you have conversed. When from men in years you have expected sound sense and unembarrassed argument, the result of practice and experience; or moderation and serene cheerfulness, with settled habits of easy virtue, the effects having nearly finished their earthly labours, and of looking forward to a better world:-And you have been struck with the prevalence of some animal propensity, some cunning craftiness, eager ambition, sordid avarice, or perhaps vain affectation of youthful vivacity and licentiousness. Or when from a robust form and habit of body you have expected fortitude and magnanimity; and have been surprised and disgusted with childish cowardly ap prehensions, and effeminate terrors. "A due attention to our conceptions and feelings in such circumstances as these would make our idea of hatred much less vague than it appears to be at present." P. 6. After a long disquisition upon its nature, and an examination into the scriptural usage of the term, Dr. Hey proceeds to consider the beneficial purposes for which it was implanted in our breasts. "Hatred, like other malevolent sentiments, when considered as a good, or as the work of our Creator, must be classed with those remedies for evils, (for it is impossible but that evils will come) which are not in themselves perfectly free from evil. Poi. sons which are antidotes to poisons, medicines or operations which cause bodily pain in order to diminish bodily pain upon the whole, are of this class: And indeed so are all punishments, which are painful methods of preventing evils; of preventing hurtful attacks on person and property. And so is war, since that must be estimated as good which lessens evil; all those are good, so long am evil is leatened by them." P. 18. " Nor |