the mythology of the Greeks improved by the conceits and alle, gories of the Platonicians." P. xxxix.

Though Mr. T.'s pamphlet profeffes to be an Answer to this Supplement, yet that gentleman prudently avoids entering into the fubject, on which the far greater part of that work is employed. With the exception of a few words which occur at the beginning at p. 26 and 27, and near the conclufion of the pamphlet, no notice is taken of the eclectic philofophers, and no attempt is made to refute Dr. Gillies's affertions refpecting them. The points, indeed, which Mr. T. chiefly labours are two: first, to prove that Aristotle did not effentially differ from Plato in the doctrines of ideas, as Dr. Gillies fuppofes, "who has endeavoured to fhow that thofe fuppofed entities, called by the Pythagoreans numbers, and by the Platonifts ideas, and confidered by them. as eternal and immutable effences, the true caufes of the universe, have not any real fubflanti | affiftence in nature, 'but are merely fictions of fancy, created from the fleeting action of human thought, expreffed and embodied in language:" the fecond thing which engages the attempts of Mr. Taylor, is to evince the unfkilfulnefs of his opponent in Grecian literature.

On the first topic, we fhall not long detain the reader. We, for our parts, are decidedly of opinion, that Aristotle clearly faw the abfurdity of fuppofing univerfals or ideas, as they are called; to have a real exiftence, nay, we have the molt decifive evidence that he did fo. We have no lefs an authority than his own for pronouncing it. In the very chapter in which he treats of Pythagoric numbers, he more than once pronounces the opinion, that univerfals had any real fubfiftance, to be abfolutely untenable: he has

had been tranflated, embellished, and purified in the works of Plato. At the fame time, he is the only heathen philofopher that many Chriftian fathers, after lopping off certain redundancies, were inclined to admit within the pale of the church. But before he could be entitled to this benefit, Piato must have fubmitted to a dreadful moral circumcifion; and a decifive paffage in his Phædrus (p. 1218. edit. Ficin.), equally unremarked by his admirers and his detractors, will prove how far below the blamelefs purity of the gofpel are the high ft at ainments of human reafon, ever liable to be influenced by cuftom, inftitution, and the most abominable examples of the times."

"Leo Allatius de Georgiis apud Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. 1. x. p. 751."

expreffed

expreffed himself too, in terms fo precife and clear, that nothing less than a refolution to fupport the contrary, at all hazards, could have rendered it a matter of question. To produce two inftances only:

Ἔοικε γὰρ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ουσίαν είναι, ὁτιοῦν τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων. youέvav. Vol. 10. p. 126. Ed. Sylburg.

And again, Εκδε δὴ τούτων θεωροῦσι φανερὸν, ὅτι οὔδεν τῶν nadóλov inagɣóvlwv ovcía isì. Vol. 10. p. 127. Ed. ead*.

We may alfo add, an authority inferior only to that of Arif totle himself, in fupport of our decifion. Cicero, we prefume, understood the Greek language in general, and the writings of Ariftotle in particular, as well to the full as the learned Mr. Taylor, or the divine Proclus: and he unequivocally declares Ariftotle to have been a zealous opponent of the Platonic fyftem. "Ariftoteles primus fpecies quas paulo ante dixi, labefactavit; quos mirificè Plato erat amplexus." Acad. Quæft. Lib. 1. 55, 33. That the fpecies here fpoken of were the fame with the Platonic ideas, we learn from the fame writer. Mentem volebant rerum effe judicem. Solam cenfebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia fola cerneret id quod femper effet fimplex, & unius modi, & tale, quale esset; hanc illi ideam appellabant, jain à Platone ità nominatam : nos rectè fpeciem poffumus dicere." Acad. Quæft. 1. Lib. 30. and again in his Tufculan queftions, book 1. fect. 58.

Nihil enim ille (Plato) putat effe, quod oriatur et intereat, idque folum effe quod femper tale fit, qualem Ideam appellat ille, nos fpeciem." But as Mr. T. has difcovered that contraries can exift together at the fame time, and in the fame fubject, he may believe that Ariftotle both maintained and opposed the Platonic doctrine on this fubject. As to Cicero, he of courfe is a fool to Jamblicus and Porphyry; for he, good man, was never favoured with the influence of Mania, and was content with knowing what belonged to human

nature.

We might juftly excufe ourselves from offering a word further on this topic. But we are defirous of adding one fpecimen more of Mr. T.'s potent logic, to thofe with which we have lately gratified our readers f. Ariftotle muft have coincided with Plato, because, he has taught in his book of pofterior analytics, that univerfals for the purpose of demonftration are fuperior to particulars. Thanks to the genius of

*See alfo Buhle's differtation, de fcriptis acroamaticis et exotericis Ariftotelis.

R.

+ In our remarks on his Plato, Brit. Crit. vol. xxvii. p. 577

this gentleman for proving that we alfo, unknown to ourfelves, are of the fame opinion. For we too have always thought univerfals in demonftration preferable to particulars. We have always chofen to prove univerfally, that the interior angles in triangles are equal to two right ones, rather than fhow them to be fo in each individual fpecies: but we did not before know that we believed a triangle to exift, which is neither right angled, obtufe, nor acute. But from fuch folly and fuch nonfenfe, let us turn to that part of Mr. T.'s pamphlet, in which fomething like common fenfe is to be found; and let us confider the objections which he has brought against the tranflations of Dr. Gillies.

To any one lefs acquainted, than the ftudy of his works has lately made us, with the extreme vanity of Mr. T., it would appear aftonishing that one whofe tranflations exhibit, in almost every page, mistakes the most grofs and glaring, fhould have the face to talk about want of correctness in thofe of any other perfon. But we are aftonifhed at nothing which fuch a writer does. He is in love with his own fublime acquirements, and therefore blind to the extravagance of his folly. To come, however, to the purpofe. Dr. Gillies, in his Supplement, has tranflated the fourteenth chapter of the feventh book of Ariftotle's Metaphyfics; the beginning of which is as follows:

"With the fame abfurdities are thofe chargeable who regard ideas as fubftances and feparable fubftances; confidering the more general ideas as conftituting the lefs general, included under the fame common term." P. 10.

This Mr. T. pronounces rambling and incorrect; and informs us, that it fhould have been rendered as follows:

"From thefe very things, that which happens to those who affert that ideas are feparate effences, and who at the fame time make form to confift from genus and differences, is manifeft." P. 13.

Upon this we fhall content ourselves with obferving, that Mr. T.'s tranflation is unquestionably literal, and that Dr. Gillies has indulged himself in a tranflation that is perhaps, in the prefent inftance! too free and paraphraftic. But it does not by any means appear that he was ignorant of the Greek language. He is indeed juftified, in point of fact, in giving to the beginning of the fentence, the fenfe which he has done, because Ariftotle had demonftrated in the chapter immediately preceding the abfurdity of fuppofing the numbers of the Pythagoreans to be real effences. Mr. T. objects likewife to the fenfe given to xapisas: it means,

he

he fays, feparated, not feparable. But for this, we have his word only-feparable, we believe correct. What he has objected to in the fecond fentence is equally unfounded: indeed, his tranflation of the chapter is fo remote from the English idiom, that we were obliged to confult the Greek to difcover his meaning. Paffing over his remarks on the arrangement of the metaphyfics by Aldus and Du Val, we proceed to his comments on the Ethics of Aristotle, as tranflated by Dr. Gillies. Mr. T. has undertaken, it will be remembered, to unfold the unfaithfulness of the Dr.'s tranflation, and we will fee how this is done.

Πασα τεχνη και πασα μεθοδος, ομοίως δε πράξις και προαίρεσις αγαθού τινος εφιεσθαι δοκεί διο καλως απεφηνανίο τ' αγαθον, ου zarla Qilai*. This paffage Dr. G., it appears, has thus tranflated:

"Since every art and every kind of knowledge, as well as all the actions and deliberations of men, conftantly aim at fomething which they call good; good in general may be juftly defined, "that which all defire."

P. 31.

Upon this Mr. T. obferves, that usDodos means method, that poauperis is pre-election, and that inftead of good in general may be juftly defined that which all defire;' it fhould have been hence they well affert good to be that which all things defire. As if, forfooth, Dr. G. was ignorant that Sodos literally means method; and as if there was any difference in point of fenfe, between they well affert, good, &c. and good in general may be afferted. Mr. T. muk furely have been driven to extremities, when he refted the proof of his accufation on foundations fo unfubftantial. At p. 35, Mr. T. obferves, su yag Πλαίων ήπορει τουλο El are tranflated by Dr. G. Plato therefore doubted: no notice being taken of the compliment which Ariftotle pays to his venerable mafter. It ought to have been, continues he, Plato well doubted and inveftigated.' If, however, Mr. T. conceives that any compliment is paid to the manner in which Plato doubted, or inveftigated the fubject of his doubts, he is very much miftaken. The words mean, for it was not without reafon, that Plato entertained doubts, and entered into an inveftigation of the fubject.

εν

και

In the fame page, he tells us επει δ' εςιν η ευδαιμονια ψυχής ενέργεια τις και αρέτην τέλειαν does not mean, as Dr. G.

* We print without accents as quoting from Mr. T. who does not employ them. Rev.

Luppoles,

fuppofes, fince happiness refults from virtuous energies; but, fince felicity is a certain energy according to perfect virtue. And what pray is the mighty difference between virtuous energy, and an energy according to virtue? Mr. T., we fuppofe, at his table calls not for a glass of beer, but beer in aglafs. If he has nothing better to urge against his antagoniit, he had confulted his intéreft by being filent.

In p. 37, another heavy charge is brought against Dr. Gillies. It is no less than that of having tranflated diavontixas intellectual. What ought it to have been the student will enquire? Liften then with profound attention, and receive with gratitude, Mr. T.'s information: it fhould have been dianoctic. We are thankful for this intelligence, and we recommend tranflators in future to tranflate ipakuous not eyes, but ophthalms; un not the foul but pfyche; by which doubtlefs the English reader will be greatly edified.

Such are the exceptions which Mr. T. is pleafed to take against the first book of Dr. Gillies's Ethics. Their number is equal to their importance: and they come with good grace from a man who has given the most demonstrative proofs to the world, that he can fcarcely tranflate a single page, without expofing his fuperficial knowledge of a lan guage, in which he would willingly be thought a master.

But, let us fee what other errors he has difcovered in Dr. Gillies. That gentleman has rendered wayao yɛvwuɛda, how virtue may be beft attained. To this, Mr. T. objects, that a man may know this without being virtuous: it fhould have been tranflated, as he tells us, how we may become good. As if any man, who fhould read the paffage, could for a moment doubt whether this was not alfo the Dr's. meaning!

The next paffage on which this author has employed his criticifm, occurs near the end of the third chapter of the fecond book. Περι δε το χαλεπωτερον αει και τέχνη γιγνεται και αρείη, και γαρ το ευ βέλτιον εν τούίω. This, fays Mr. T., means Both art and virtue are always converfant with that which is more difficult, for in this there is a more excellent good.' Dr. G. renders it, "but the most difficult is beft fitted for fhowing the excellence of the performer. He is correct in doing fo, and the cenfure which Mr. T. has paffed, thows that he did not understand his author. The words literally mean but the well is better in that which is difficult: that is, the difficulty beft fhows the skill of the performer. '.

From this paffage, we pafs on with Mr. T. to the fourth chapter. Η ουδε επι των τεχνων ούλως έχει, ενδέχεται γας γραμματικον τι ποιησαι και από τέχης, και άλλου υποθεμένου. τότε ουν εναι γραμματικος εαν και γραμματικόν τι ποίηση και γραμματικώς,