Of the third case we have also an example in Cicero, who tells us, that, in making a league between the Romans and Samnites, a certain young nobleman was ordered by the Roman general to hold the swine (designed for a sacrifice); but the senate afterwards disapproving the terms, and delivering up their general to the Samnites, it was moved, whether this young man ought not likewise to be given up. Those who were for it, might say, that to allege the command of another is not a sufficient plea for doing an ill action. And this is what the Roman law now expressly declares. But in answer to that it might be re plied; that it was his duty to obey the command of his general, who was answerable for his own orders, and not those who were obliged to execute them; and therefore to give up this young nobleman, would be to punish one person for the fault of another.

Lastly, a fact is sometimes rather excused than defended, by pleading that it was not done designedly, or with any ill intent. This is called concession, and contains two parts, apology and intreaty. The former represents the matter as the effect of inadvertency, chance, or necessity. Aristotle gives us an example of inadvertency or imprudence in a woman at Athens, who gave a young man a love potion, which killed him; for which she was tried, but acquitted. Though afterwards this was made criminal by the Roman law. The case of Adrastus, as related by Herodotus, is an instance of chance; who being intrusted by Croesus with the care of his son, as they were hunting, killed him accidentally with a javelin which he threw at a boar. It is necessity, when a person excuses his making a default from stress of weather, sickness, or the like. Thus Cicero pleaded his illness, contracted by

the fatigue of a long journey, as an excuse for not appearing in the senate upon the summons of Mark Antony; who threatened to oblige him to it by pulling his house down. But what the defendant here attributes to inadvertency, chance, or necessity, the opposite party will attribute to design, negligence, or some other culpable reason; and represent it as a matter injurious to the public to introduce such precedents; and also produce instances, if that can be done, where the like excuses have not been admitted. On the other hand, the defendant will insist on his innocence, and show the hardship and severity of judging men's actions rather by the event than from the intention: that such a procedure makes no difference between the innocent and the guilty, but must necessarily involve many honest men in ruin and destruction, discourage all virtuous and generous designs, and turn greatly to the prejudice of human society. He will also consider the instances alleged by the accuser, and show the difference between them and his own case. And, lastly, he will have recourse to intreaty, or a submissive address to the equity and clemency of the court or party offended, for pardon; as Cicero has done in his oration to Cæsar, in favour of Ligarius.

These instances are sufficient to show the nature of the arguments suited to judicial discourses, which are deduced from a variety of the general topics.

Of the Character and Address of an Orator.

HAVING in several discourses considered and explained the first part of invention, which furnishes the orator with such arguments as are

necessary for the proof of his subject, I am next to show what are the proper means to conciliate the minds of his hearers, to gain their affection, and to recommend both himself and what he says to their good opinion and esteem.

For the parts of invention are commonly thus distinguished; that the first respects the subject of the discourse, the second the speaker, and the third the hearers. Now the second of these, which is what I am at present to explain, is by Quintilian called a propriety of manners. And in order to express this, it is necessary, as he tells us, that every thing appear easy and natural, and the disposition of the speaker be discovered by his words. We may form an easy conception of this from the conduct of such persons who are most nearly concerned in each other's welfare. As when relations or friends converse together upon any affairs of importance, the temper and disposition of the speaker plainly shows itself by his words and manner of address. And what nature here directs to without colouring or disguise, the orator is to endeavour to perform by his art. Though, indeed, if what a person says be inconsistent with his usual conduct and behaviour at other times, he cannot expect it should gain much credit, or make any deep impression upon his hearers: which may be one reason why the ancient rhetoricians make it so necessary a qualification in an orator, that he be a good man; since he should always be consistent with himself, and, as we say, talk in character. And therefore it is highly requisite, that he should not only gain the skill of assuming those qualities, which the nature and circumstances of his discourse require him to express, but, likewise, that he should use his utmost endeavours to get the real habits implanted

in his mind for as by this means they will be always expressed with greater ease and facility, so, by appearing constantly in the course of his life, they will have more weight and influence upon particular occasions.

Now there are four qualities more especially suited to the character of an orator, which should always appear in his discourses, in order to render what he says acceptable to his hearers ; and these are, wisdom, integrity, benevolence, and modesty.

Wisdom is necessary, because we easily give into the opinion of those whom we esteem wiser and more knowing than ourselves. Knowledge is very agreeable and pleasant to all, but few make very great improvements in it. Such, therefore, who either cannot or do not care to give themselves the trouble of examining into things themselves, must take up with the representation of others; and it is an ease to them to hear the opinion of persons whom they esteem wiser than themselves. No one loves to be deceived; and such who are fearful of being misled, are pleased to meet with a person in whose wisdom, as they think, they can safely trust. The character of wisdom, therefore, is of great service to an orator, since the greater part of mankind are swayed by authority rather than arguments.

But this of itself is not sufficient, unless the opinion of integrity be joined with it. Nay, so far from it, that the greater knowledge and understanding a man is supposed to have, unless he likewise have the character of an honest man, he is often the more suspected. For knowledge without honesty is generally thought to dispose a person, as well as qualify him, to deceive. Quintilian, in treating upon narration, has a very

remarkable passage to this purpose, which I shall here transcribe. I must not omit, says he, how much the authority of the speaker gives credit to what he relates, which is to be gained principally by his life, and partly from his manner of speaking. And what Quintilian observes here with respect to narration, the best writers all recommend as necessary through the whole conduct of an orator.

And to both these qualities the appearance of kindness and benevolence should likewise be added. For though a person have the reputation of wisdom and honesty, yet if we apprehend he is either not well affected to us, or at least regardless of our interest, we are in many cases apt to be jealous of him. Mankind are naturally swayed by their affections, and much influenced through love or friendship, and therefore nothing has a greater tendency to induce persons to credit what is said than intimations of affection and kindness. The best orators have been always sensible what great influence the expressions of kindness and benevolence have upon the minds of others, to induce them to believe the truth of what they say; and therefore they frequently endeavour to impress them with the opinion of it. Thus Demosthenes begins his celebrated oration for Ctesiphon: It is my hearty prayer, says he, to all the deities, that this my defence may be received by you with the same affection which I have always expressed for you and your city. And it is a very fine image of it, which we have in Cicero, where, in order to influence the judges in favour of Milo, he introduces him speaking thus, as became a brave man, and a patriot, even upon the supposition he should be condemned by them: I bid my fellowcitizens adieu; may they continue flourishing and