Of the State of a Controversy.

THE ancients observing, that the principal question or point of dispute, in all controversies, might be referred to some particular head, reduced those heads to a certain number; that both the nature of the question might by that means be better known, and the arguments suited to it be discovered with greater ease. And these heads they call States.

By the State of a Controversy then we are to understand the principal point in dispute between contending parties, upon the proof of which the whole cause or controversy depends. We find it expressed by several other names in ancient writers: as, The constitution of the cause, The general head, and The chief question. And as this is the principal thing to be attended to in every such discourse, so it is what first requires the consideration of the speaker, and should be well fixed and digested in his mind before he proceeds to look for arguments proper to support it. For what can be more absurd than for a person to attempt the proof of any thing before he has well settled in his own mind a clear and distinct notion what the thing is which he would endeavour to prove? Quintilian describes it to be, That kind of question which arises from the first conflict of causes. In judicial cases it immediately follows upon the charge of the plaintiff, and plea of the defendant. Our common law expresses it by one word, namely, the Issue; which interpreters explain, by describing it to be, That point of matter depending in suit, whereupon the parties join, and put their cause to the trial. Examples will further help to illustrate this, and

render it more evident. In the cause of Milo, the charge of the Clodian party is, Milo killed Clodius. Milo's plea or defence, I killed him, but justly. Hence arises this grand question, or state of the cause: Whether it was lawful for Milo to kill Clodius? And that Clodius was lawfully killed by Milo, is what Cicero in his defence of Milo principally endeavours to prove. This is the main subject of that fine and beautiful oration. The whole of his discourse is to be considered as centring at last in this one point. Whatever different matters are occasionally mentioned, will, if closely attended to, be found to have been introduced some way or other, the better to support and carry on this design. Now in such cases, where the fact is not denied, but something is offered in its defence, the state of the cause is taken from the defendant's plea, who is obliged to make it good. As in the instance here given, the chief point in dispute was the lawfulness of Milo's action, which it was Cicero's business to demon. strate. But when the defendant denies the fact, the state of the cause arises from the accusation; the proof of which then lies upon the plaintiff, and not, as in the former case, upon the defendant. So in the cause of Roscius, the charge made against him is, That he killed his father. But he denies the fact. The grand question therefore to be argued is: Whether or not he killed his father? The proof of this lay upon the accusers. And Cicero's design in the defence of him is to show, that they had not made good their charge. But it sometimes happens, that the defendant neither absolutely denies the fact nor attempts to justify it; but only endeavours to qualify it, by denying that it is a crime

of that nature, or deserves that name by which it is expressed in the charge. We have an example of this proposed by Cicero: A person is accused of sacrilege, for taking a thing that was sacred, out of a private house. He owns the fact, but denies it to be sacrilege; since it was commited in a private house, and not in a temple. Hence this question arises: Whether to take a sacred thing out of a private house is to be deemed sacrilege, or only simple theft? It lies upon the accuser to prove, what the other denies; and, therefore, the state of the cause is here also, as well as in the preceding case, taken from the endictment.

But besides the principal question, there are other subordinate questions, which follow upon it in the course of a dispute, and should be carefully distinguished from it: particularly that which arises from the reason or argument which is brought in proof of the principal question. For the principal question itself proves nothing, but is the thing to be proved, and becomes at last the conclusion of the discourse. Thus in the cause of Milo, his argument is; I killed Clodius justly, because he assassinated me. Unless the Clodian party be supposed to deny this, they give up their cause. therefore this subordinate question follows: Whether Clodius assassinated Milo? Now Cicero spends much time in the proof of this, as the hinge on which the first question, and consequently the whole cause, depended. For if this was once made to appear, the lawfulness of Milo's killing Clodius, which was the grand question or thing to be proved, might be inferred, as an allowed consequence from it. This will be evident, by throwing Milo's argument, as used by Cicero, into the form of a syllogism:

Hence

An assassinator is lawfully killed :
Clodius was an assassinator:

Therefore he was lawfully killed by Milo,
whom he assassinated.

If the minor proposition of this syllogism was granted, no one would deny the conclusion: for the Roman law allowed of self-defence. But as Cicero was very sensible this would not be admitted, so he takes much pains to bring the court into the belief of it. Now where the argument brought in defence of the second question is contested, or the orator supposes that it may be so, and therefore supports that with another argument, this occasions a third question consequent upon the former; and in like manner he may proceed to a fourth. But be they more or fewer, they are to be considered but as one chain of subordinate questions dependent upon the first. And though each of them has its particular state, yet none of these is what rhetoricians call The State of the Cause, which is to be understood only of the principal question. And if, as it frequently happens, the first or principal question is itself directly proved from more than one argument, this makes no other difference, but that all of these arguments, so far as they are followed by others to support them, become a distinct series of subordinate questions, all dependent upon the first. As when Cicero endeavours to prove, that Roscius did not kill his father from two reasons or arguments ;-because he had neither any cause to move him to such a barbarous action, nor any opportunity for it.

Moreover, besides these subordinate questions, there are also incidental ones often introduced, which have some reference to the princi

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pal question, and contribute towards the proof of it, though they are not necessarily connected with it, or dependent upon it. And each of these also has its State, though different from that of the Cause. For every question, or point of controversy, must be stated, before it can be made the subject of disputation. And it is for this reason that every new argument advanced by an orator is called a question, because it is considered as a fresh matter of controversy. In Cicero's defence of Milo we meet with several of this sort of questions, occasioned by some aspersions which had been thrown out by the Clodian party to the prejudice of Milo. That he was unworthy to see the light who owned he had killed a man. For Milo before his trial had openly confessed he killed Clodius. So likewise, That the senate had declared the killing of Clodius was an illegal action. And further, That Pompey, by making a new law to settle the manner of Milo's trial, had given his judgment against Milo. Now to each of these Cicero replies, before he proceeds to the principal question. And therefore, though the question, in which the state of a controversy consists, is said by Quintilian to arise from the first conflict of causes, yet we find by this instance of Cicero, that it is not always the first question in order upon which the orator treats.

But it sometimes happens, that the same cause or controversy contains in it more than one state. Thus in judical causes every distinct charge occasions a new state. All Cicero's orations against Verres relate to one cause, founded upon a law of the Romans against unjust exactions made by their governors of provinces upon the inhabitants; but as that prosecu