tions, Mr. Maskelyne apprehends he fhall be able to deduce the moon's horizontal parallax in the latitude of 13° 5′ 15′′, N. and thence by proportion, the equatorial parallax of the moon with great exa&inefs, which has never been done yet in so direc

a manner.

Art. LX. Remarks upon M. l'Abbé Barthelemy's Memoir on the Maltese Phoenician inscription. By John Swinton, B.D. F.R.S.

This truly learned and very entertaining article (together with. the Latin and English verfions of the above-mentioned Maltese infcription, which has fo well escaped the injuries of time) concludes the fifty-fourth volume of the Philofophical Trans actions.

From the several extracts we have given in this and the preceding Review, our readers, we apprehend, will but too plainly perceive that the greater part of the articles in these Tranfactions are filled with differtations upon very trißing, or at beft, uninteresting subjects. There are indeed fome few which justly deserve applause; but these are so thinly interspersed, that we could fincerely with the learned members of this illuftrious body would condescendo examine those papers which are de figned for public view, and fuffer fuch only to be inferted as could ftand the teft of their judgment. We should then have the pleasure of feeing the Philofophical Tranfactions of the Royal Society fhine forth with distinguished luftre in the future annals of literary fame.

V. The Spiritual and Temporal Liberty of Subjects in England, Addreffed to J. N. Efq; at Aix-la-Chapelle. In Two Parts. Part I. Of the fpiritual Liberty of Proteftants in England: Part II. Of the temporal Liberty of Subjects in England. By Anothony Ellys, D.D. late Lord Bishop of St. David's. 4te. Pr. 125. Whifton.

TH

HE late learned and candid bishop Ellys, author of the work now before us, having in his first volume (of which we have already given an account *) treated in a masterly manner on the fpiritual liberty of this country, proceeds, in the fecond, to confider the temporal liberty of English fubje&s; a matter, no doubt, of universal concern, and universal importance; and which the bishop hath accordingly handled with all the care and attention it deferves: fcarce any part of the hif tory, laws, and conftitution of England, neceffary towards elu cidating the fubject, hath efcaped him."

See Crit. Rev. vol. xvi. p. 81.

The

The work is divided into fix tracts.

The firft treats of the liberty of the fubject in judicial proceedings.

i

The fecond, of the right and manner of impofing taxes, and of the other privileges of parliament.

The third, of the means whereby the free constitutions of other nations have been impaired, while that of England hath been preferved and improved.

The fourth, of the antiquities of the commons in parlia

ment.

The fifth, of the royal prerogative, and the hereditary right to the crown,

The fixth and laft, of the dangers incident to the present eftablishment, and the profpect of its continuance.

These tracts are branched out into several fubordinate parts or sections, interspersed with many historical facts, judicious remarks, and political reflections, which do great honour to the author, and will afford the reader no small share both of enter tainment and instruction.

In fo large a work as that now before us, which treats of fo many points almost equally interefting, it is difficult to felect any particular paffage that may convey a proper idea of the writer's merit.-The following may, perhaps, fhew his political knowledge and judgment in the faireft light; we fhall, therefore, lay before our readers the fourth fection of the fecond tract, which treats

Of the Number of fmall Burghs which fend Members to Parliament, and the Means used to obviate that, and other Inconveniencies.

It is evident, (fays our author) that the houfe of commons is poffeffed of all, or at leaft of the most important, powers and privileges neceffary in a reprefentative of the people at large and, if there be yet fome disadvantages and defects remaining in our conftitution, perhaps they are not fo great as they may, at firft fight, be thought. Monfieur Rapin de Thoyras looked upon it to be a confiderable defect in our conftitution, that the matters to be treated of, in parliament, are not expreffed in the fummons, as king John promifed they should, and that the members of our house of commons have not inftructions about them from the people whom they reprefent; or, if any such inftructions be given to them, that they are at liberty not to obferve them. The matter of fact indeed is true: our members of parliament are not, by law, obliged either to confult those who have chofen them, nor to have any regard to their inftructions, farther then they them

A a 4

felves

felves judge them to be reafonable; for, though a man is -chofen by a particular county or burgh, he is, in law, reputed to ferve for the whole kingdom. But as thefe things could not be ordered otherwife, as the fate of our nation is at prefent, fo fome perfons are far from thinking, with Mr. Rapin, that thefe are circumstances of any disadvantage in our conftitution.

For 1ft, it would be impra&icable for the king to exprefs, -in his fummons, all the things that are to be treated in parliament; because any member of either houfe of parliament is at liberty to propofe, and afk leave of the houfe to bring in, any bill that he thinks proper, which he may keep fecret to himself till the time of parliament, though it really may be of great importance. In queen Elizabeth's time, a bill was propofed to limit the fucceffion of the crown; and, in Charles the -Second's time, a bill was proposed for taking from the crown the power of creating any more new peerages than a certain -number. Thefe, and many other bills of the utmost importance, have been, and may be, first propofed by private perfons moreover, they may have a defign to call to an account, or to impeach, minifters of state, &c.

adly, It would be often impolitic in the king to make public, before-hand, what laws, or other matters, he defigned to propofe. I mean fo as to fpecify what fupplies of money would be needful for the fervice of the next year; or what wars or alliances, he defigned to make; or several other matters of that nature becaule, by fo doing, he would give foreigners, his enemies, an opportunity to know, or guess at, his councils, foon enough to provide against and defeat them.

At the fame time, even fuppofing that the matters to be treated on were specified, the people would not be able to give fufficient or proper inftructions to their reprefentatives, as to matters of this nature; because, not knowing the circumstances of things abroad and at home, being neither acquainted with the defigns nor the difpofitions, nor the powers of foreign courts, they cannot judge truly of what measures are to be taken with regard to them. Nor would they be able to judge competently of feveral laws that might be proposed to be made, even with regard to our conftitution at home. Things of this fort depend frequently upon the knowing and balancing abundance of particulars, which can only be known to those who have the inspection, for inftance, of the cuftom-house accounts, the ftate of the imports and exports,, the produce of the feveral parts of the nation, the ftate of their manufactures, their dif ferent conditions, and the alterations likely to be in each as to popularity and wealth, the difpofitions of the people as to re

ligion and as to loyalty, their circumftances as to quartering and fubfifting of troops, and a great variety of other things, which must be exactly known and weighed, before any man could judge aright, whether a law for levying money, in this or that way; whether a law for allowing, encouraging, or forbidding this or that branch of traffic; whether a law for admitting any of the subjects to this or that privilege, religious or civil; whether a law for retrenching this or that branch of the prerogative of the crown, or adding to it in any other inftance; whether, I fay, any laws of thefe, or the like kinds, would be really expedient, and for the public welfare or not.

If the king was to declare, in his fummons to parliament, that he intended to propofe any things of this nature in parliament, it would be hardly poffible for perfons in the country. or even in London, tó judge rightly of the matter immediately the greatest natural fagacity or prudence, without having a due knowledge of circumftances, or proper materials on which to form a judgment, would be unable to do it aright. And not being capable of judging well for themselves, it is not poffible that they should duly inftruct their reprefentatives. If thefe fhould be obliged to conform to inftructions given upon fuch imperfect views of things, the public must neceffarily fuffer by it.

Whereas, on the other hand, by the reprefentatives being at liberty to follow their own judgment, in parliament, they have this great advantage, that by the right of the house of commons to demand any public papers, from, the offices of customs, excife, accounts, &c. relating to the state of the nation, and to apply to the king for others, and from the great light to be had by the mutual informations which fuch numbers of gentlemen, coming together from all parts of the nation, may give to each other; from the various views of things that may arife from their debates and reafonings, and examinations of evidence in the house, a member of good fenfe, integrity, and attention, may have very great advantages for forming his judgment, probably much otherwife than his conftituents would have done in the country, from their own knowledge of things only; and therefore it must be much for the advantage of the public, that he should be at liberty fo to do. It would be a great inconvenience if he fhould be confined to act according to their judgments, who have had but narrow and partial, or probably, in many cafes, falfe, views and accounts of things.

If members were under this obligation, there would be two i confequences, in particular, very likely to happen, ift, There might be, in feveral cafes, combinations between

fome

fome parts of the nation, for the advantage of their counties or parts of the kingdom, in preference to others. "The members who ferve for one part of the kingdom are frequently found in oppofition to the reprefentatives of another, for the fake only of particular interest in their own counties." The members of the west might fometimes be against those of the northern parts; or they both might be, as probably they would in cafe an alteration in the method of affeffing the landtax was propofed, in oppofition to the members of the midland counties. This difpofition has fometimes appeared, and probably would be much more, if the perfons who ferve for the burghs in those counties were tied down to follow the prejudices and partialities of their conftituents. Whereas, being at liberty to vote as they judge beft, they may be more easily drawn to take that course which is most for the general interest. of the whole..

2dly, An obligation upon the members to follow the inftructions of their conftituents, would give too much power into the hands of the lower claffes of people of this nation, who might not use it well; or, at least, it would encourage and foment fuch a democratical fpirit in them, as would, by degrees, weaken and deftroy the effential balance of power in our conftitution.

It was found, by experience, to be a great defect in moft of the republics, and popular states of antiquity, that they al lowed the people at large to have deliberative voices in matters of this nature. They were frequently influenced by their demagogues, and their own want of judgment, to very rafh and imprudent measures. Pericles indeed, flatteringly, told 'the Athenians, that each private perfon understood public af fairs very well; but experience thewed the contrary; and the moft judicious politicians, even of their own countrymen, complained of it. Polybius blames the Athenian and Theban governments; for that in them Ὄχλα χειρίζει τὰ ὅλα. The fame author obferves, that, at the time of the fecond Punic war, the conftitution of the republic of Carthage was impaired and corrupted for with them "plurimam populus fibi authoritatem vindicaverat, quæ apud Romanos, illibata penes fenatum, adhuc erat. Quo factum ut illic, populo de rebus omnibus confultante, hic, civium optimo quoque, Romani vicerint."

Tully obferves, that "Græcorum totæ refpublicæ fedentis concionis temeritate adminiftrantur. Itaque ut hanc Græciam, quæ jam diu fuis confiliis afflicta, eft omittam; illa vetus, quæ quondam opibus, imperio, gloriâ floruit, hoc uno malo concidit, libertate immoderatâ ac licentiâ concionum."