Page images
PDF
EPUB

The essay concludes with some reflections on the spirit in which we ought to communicate and receive the results of inquiry. The following suggestions are calculated to quiet the apprehensions of one, who hesitates to publish what he regards as important discoveries, from a fear that he has been deceived himself, and may mislead others.

[ocr errors]

By communicating the result of his inquiries, he may possibly be instrumental in promulgating error; his views may wander widely from the truth, and he may lead many astray by the same illusive reasoning which has deceived his own mind. These are things, which, according to the constitution of man and the present state of society, cannot be avoided. Even in this case, nevertheless, he is doing good. His errors are such as have, with more or less distinctness, presented themselves to other minds as truths. To bring them openly forward, with the premises from which they are deduced and the train of reasoning by which they have established themselves as truths in his own understanding, is giving them the best chance of being refuted, and refuted in so full and luminous a manner, that their real character will be conspicuous to every future inquirer.' pp. 96, 97.

The second essay, 'On the Progress of Knowledge,' is in the form of a dialogue, an experiment in composition which we hope our author will not think it necessary to repeat. His views of the character and condition of mankind, as has been hinted before, are discouraging.

'I have said, and I repeat, that when we look back into the history of the human race we can scarcely help feeling ashamed that we belong to it. Man is an animal in a very slight degree rational by nature. It seems to require ages upon ages to bring the race to anything like a state of reason—a state where prejudice and passion are subordinate to the understanding, where man controls the blind impulse of the present by a view of the future, and distinctly perceives his relative position in the universe. It is certain that mankind have hitherto never reached such a state. Let any one look around him, and what does he observe? A few minds perhaps capable of raising themselves into the pure atmosphere of truth, of emancipating themselves from the domination of mere instinct, of expatiating through the moral and material world with full liberty of intellect, and of appreciating the exact relation in which they stand to the existences around them; but the majority-nine hundred 49

VOL. VI.-N. S. VOL. I. NO III.

and ninetynine in a thousand-the slaves of prejudice and the dupes of passion, inflicting misery upon themselves and others from gross ignorance of the real tendencies of action and the rational object of existence; shrinking from truth as from a spectre; frightened by imaginary terrors; incapable of pursuing more than one step of argument, yet pertinacious in their own infallibility; humbling themselves in the dust as unworthy to approach the God whom they tremble to think of, while they confess his unbounded benevolence, yet assuming their actions to be of such immense importance to him as to require the discipline of eternity at his hands. The meanness of men's reasoning powers in general is almost incredible. Locke, if I mistake not, terms a man who can advance two steps in reasoning a man of two syllogisms. There are few such to be found. The majority of mankind are men of one syllogism, or of less. The faculty of taking two steps in reasoning without assistance-leading strings-is rare; that of taking three belongs to one in an age. It stamps a man as the wonder of his day.'

pp. 114-116.

He admits the progressive improvement of society, but thinks it so slow, and so often interrupted, as to be scarcely perceptible. An exception is made in favor of physical science, though Priestley never could give up the doctrines of phlogiston; and in favor of Political Economy, though it was necessary that the cotemporaries of Adam Smith, should be succeeded by another generation, before his principles could prevail. 'No complex or very important truth,' says an able writer, 'was ever yet transferred in full developement from one mind to another. Truth of that kind is not a piece of furniture to be shifted; it is a seed which must be sown and pass through the several stages of growth.' We should remember, however, that men are not only learning every day, but learning how to learn; and that the progress of general information will be continually weakening the power of prejudice and bigotry, two of the greatest obstacles to the advancement of the mind.

There is much good sense and just feeling in the following remarks.

'A. My views have reference chiefly to the state of moral and political intelligence and feeling. I think, for my own part, that society is in a curious condition in these respects. It seems to be laboring with a thousand incongruous principles and opinions.

'N. I perfectly agree with you. When we examine the actual condition of society, we find amazing discrepancies in moral and political sentiment. We find even great contrariety in the same individual. He will be found perhaps, without being aware of it, maintaining two opinions, mutually repugnant and contradictory; one opinion probably the result of instillation by his preceptors, the other his own acquisition from reading or conversation. Now, not being in the habit of deducing a series of inferences, not being able to follow out any doctrine to its consequences, he is insensible to the contrariety existing between them, and perhaps would regard you with something like horror if you were to attempt to point it This is all very well, and cannot be avoided where, without much precision of ideas, there is anything like a determination of the general intellect to moral and political inquiries; where men's knowledge begins to outstrip their prejudices, and yet is not disentangled from them. The same causes however give rise to other moral phenomena, not quite so free from culpability.

out.

'A. To what do you allude?

'N. I allude to the concealment of opinions and feelings, to the insincerity, to the conventional simulation which abound in the present day. Every one must be struck with the discordance of tone between the sentiments of our literature, of our public debates, of our formal documents on the one hand, and those heard in private society and exhibited in the common habits of life on the other. The same individual who has been speaking to the popular prejudices of the day in public, will often let you see by a sneer or a jest, or at all events by the principles which regulate his daily conduct, that he has in reality been playing the actor and duping his audience. Hence our literature does not present us with the actual sentiments entertained. There is nothing like general sincerity in the profession of opinions. The intellect of the age is cowed.' pp. 160-162.

What he says on the study of old authors will not, perhaps, receive so unhesitating an assent from many of our readers.

'Much of it is an exhaustion of the strength to no purpose. This obsolete learning is well enough for minds of a secondary cast, but it only serves to hamper the man of original genius. It is unwise in such a one to enter very minutely into the history of the science to which he devotes himself,- —more especially at the outset. Let him perfectly master the present state of the science, and he will be prepared to push it farther while the vigour of his intellect remains unbroken; but if he previously at

tempt to embrace all that has been written on the subject, to make himself acquainted with all its exploded theories and obsolete doctrines, his mind will probably be too much entangled in their intricacies to make any original efforts; too wearied with tracing past achievements to carry the science to a farther degree of excellence.' p. 136.

We must conclude our extracts from this essay, by the following striking observations on the effect which the progress of the human mind, is likely to have on the religion of the world.

'The change in men's religious views will also probably be great. As mankind learn to reason more justly, they will see the absurdity of many of their tenets. They will discover more and more clearly, that instead of the wise and benevolent Author of the Universe, they have been worshipping an image in their own minds, endowed with similar imperfect faculties and passions to their own, nay, even invested with principles of action drawn from human nature in its rudest state. Men's concep

tion of the Deity can never go beyond, although it frequently falls short of their moral opinions. He who has a narrow, confused, and indistinct view of what is really wise and admirable in human qualities, cannot have a clear and comprehensive idea of God. Hence as moral knowledge advances, as mankind come more and more to fix their approbation on actions according to their actual desert, their conception of the Deity will become more refined, more elevated, and more worthy of its object. The proper way to exalt man's veneration of God is to teach him what is really just, benevolent, and magnanimous in his own race.' pp. 152, 153.

The third and last essay in the volume, is 'On the Fundamental Principles of all Evidence and Expectations.' It contains a brief exposition of the doctrine of causation, which Dr Brown has so ably and successfully established in his work on Cause and Effect. The author's aim is to state more explicitly than ever yet has been done, the bearing which this doctrine has on the disputed questions respecting evidence, and liberty, and necessity. He conceives that the admission of Dr Brown's views of uniform sequences, involves and implies the doctrine of philosophical necessity, but we suspect he will not find the controversy on that knotty point so easily put at rest. He also holds that no fact inconsistent with the doctrine that like causes in all cases produce like effects, can possibly be proved by human testimony. This perhaps is true, but he

ought to have conceded expressly, like Dr Brown, that the principle here advanced does not exclude the possibility of proving miracles by human testimony; because miracles, properly so called, do not conflict with the law abovementioned, but only suppose the introduction of a new and peculiar cause. Here, however, a great subject is opened before us, on which we cannot enter now; but we hope, in some future number, to give at length our views of the bearing which Dr Brown's speculations on this subject have on the question of miracles, and on the evidence by which the christian miracles are supported.

ART. X.-Natural Theology: or, Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, collected from the Appearances of Nature. By WILLIAM PALEY, D. D. Arch-Deacon of Carlisle. Illustrated by the Plates, and by a Selection from the Notes of James Paxton, Member of the Royal College of Surgeons, London, with Additional Notes, Original and Selected, for this Edition and a Vocabulary of Scientific Terms. Boston, Lincoln and Edmands. 1829. 12 mo. pp. 308.

THOUGH We have very recently given our opinion of Dr Paley's literary character, we cannot forbear to express our satisfaction at efforts which are likely to increase the circulation of his works. The practical bearing of all his writings, his felicity in selecting illustrations of his arguments, his sound judgment, and the candor, benevolence, and devotion, which he everywhere exhibits, have rendered his name deservedly dear to the christian community. His style may be considered as a model for its grace, simplicity, fluency, and perspicuity. His language is always the most appropriate, though no trace of art is apparent in the selection of his expressions. It is never affected or ambitious, and never oversteps 'the modesty of nature.' He never says anything merely for display. In the present age of scribbling, when we are so often offended with every form of bad taste, pretension, exaggeration, and extravagance, it is delightful to recur to an author who is contented to express himself well, without ever aiming to reason or to write better than he can.

« PreviousContinue »