cess, and from the direct contemplation of the truth sought,all show that the mind was made for knowledge. Besides which, it will be found that the mind is ever systematizing the knowledge acquired, and reducing it to unity, so as to make it more securely its own.

8. The creation of a second human mind, endowed with the power of expressing itself through the medium of speech, greatly increased the means of knowledge. By this arrangement, the horizon of external nature was indefinitely extended and enriched, for, in addition to the wide range of the material creation, the individual mind is now supposed to enjoy access to the wider region and the richer phenomena of another mind. The desire of man for knowledge, then, if no other reason, prepares us to expect that he will be found desirous of communion with other minds. Accordingly, society is desired, as soon as ever the mind can form a conception of it; desired, as if it were essential to the diversity, enlargement, and completion of one's own being. The Creator himself pronounced solitude to be undesirable, gave a companion to man, and promised the indefinite multiplication of the species.

9. But will not a certain amount of power furnish the means of gratifying all the other desires, and of thus answering the end of existence? Accordingly, man is made capable of enjoying power for its own sake, and of desiring all that contributes to it. Dominion over animate and inanimate nature is his birthright, and he finds and imparts a measure of happiness and improvement in the exercise of it. The desire of property, associated with the feeling of right in it, and over it, is an inherent and essential part of our nature. Equally inherent and indestructible is the desire of superiority, for, as we shall hereafter see, whether he who attains the object of his desire intentionally exercises it as an instrument of power or not, it invests him with a transforming influence, over all those by whom it is recognized.

10. Still further would the end of his being appear to be answered, if he act in a manner worthy of the esteem and approbation of others. Creation is made to be appreciated; the human mind forms the most important part of creation; but he can understand and appreciate the mind of another, only in proportion as he communes and sympathizes with it. To disregard it, or to be insensible to it, would be, in effect, to lose a world of knowledge, influence, and enjoyment: to appreciate it, and to act consistently with that appreciation, is to make that

world, to a great extent, his own. Hence, man is found susceptible of the desire of approbation, even before he is capable of understanding, and when he is not considering, its practical effects. Many of the deeds by which he diffuses happiness around him, are traceable to this source. The hour which saw the "woman take of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and give also to her husband with her and he did eat," beheld an illustration of this desire, and perhaps, indeed, of all the desires we have specified; reminding us, that the desires in themselves are destitute of a moral character; for, in order to their morality they must be placed in alliance with a principle which we have not as yet considered; so that much which passes for morality is merely the result of instinctive emotion.

11. (2.) Impartative. That besides being susceptible of desires relative to everything apparently conducive to his own well-being, he will be found capable of being moved by, or affected towards other objects in a manner conducive to their well-being. This is implied in the general proposition; for, if other beings are susceptible of desires as well as himself, and if everything has ends of its own, subordinate to the great End, as well as himself, these desires and ends form a part of the phenomena by which he is to be suitably affected. The same is implied in his being capable of desiring the good will of others; for this supposes an identity of nature, or, at least, so great a measure of identity, as that he knows what will secure their good will; and therefore, that he will respect their desires in order to it. It is implied also in his desire of personal wellbeing; for the continuance and well-being of other things are essential to it. And the same is presupposed by the great End which everything is designed to promote; for how could that be attained, except by the continuance in well-being, or by the conditional restoration, of all the means necessary to it? We are only saying, then, that the being who is to appreciate the means of Divine manifestation, may be expected to be affected towards them, in a manner tending, not to their destruction, but to their continuance and employment; and consistently with the fact that he himself is a part, and only a part, of the great system of means.

12. Now as the individual man is instinctively desirous of continued existence, he carries about with him a memorial that other beings have the same instinctive desire; and as the implantation of the desire in his own breast presupposes that

every object without him will be found to respect and correspond with that desire, the existence of the same desire in others equally presupposes that everything which is external to them, and therefore including himself, will also respect, and be moved in a manner corresponding with their desires. Now this is the basis of the sentiment of Justice. And this feeling of respect for the desires of others relating to whatever may be essential to their existence, is found to be an original part of human nature. With the question of the derangement or perversion of this or of any other part of our nature, by sin, we have not as yet to do. It is sufficient for us, at present, to find that there is implanted in man a sentiment which prompts him, without reference to anything except the impulsive emotion itself, conditionally to respect the desires of others.

13. As his own desire of activity implies scope and freedom, as far as others are concerned, for its exercise, the same desire in them implies, as far as he is concerned, similar scope and liberty. Accordingly, he is originally predisposed to concede it, and to derive pleasure from the contemplation of it.

14. The correlate to the desire of obtaining knowledge is a disposition to impart it. The desire, without the corresponding disposition, would be a contradiction, and a source of misery. But the constitution of things is open to no such an impeachment. The communicative disposition is found to be quite as strong as the appropriating desire. And even he who might appear to be acquiring knowledge under the influence of no such an incentive, will be commonly found to be already enjoying, by anticipation, the moment when he shall be imparting it, and holding converse with other minds.

15. The correlate to the desire of society is a disposition to seek associates. By the former, man would have others come to him; by the latter, he is equally prompted to go to them. The former alone, not meeting with any response from without, would leave mankind in a state of individual isolation, each desiring that which there was no disposition in the others to grant. The latter alone would, as by a centripetal force, blend all the race into a single mass, and thus make the existence of distinct communities impossible. Now the disposition to associate is evinced by man in every stage of life, and thus he is constitutionally prepared to meet and gratify the corresponding desire of society existing in others. The various modifications of this disposition account partly for the various kinds of attachments or affection existing in society.

16. The desire of power co-exists with a disposition to conditional concession and subordination. Indeed the presence of such a disposition in the individual is presupposed in the bare existence of society. Even the co-existence of matter implies a law of physical subordination. And, that society could not exist without an analogous law is evident; for if every member were unconditionally independent of every other, each would be separate, as well as distinct, from all. Mutual improvement would in that case be impossible; for where there is no susceptibility of being moved by a superior power, there can be no change. But man possesses this susceptibility; evinces a predisposition to fall into an order with others; instinctively aims to augment his own individual power by conditionally surrendering a portion of it to be combined with a higher power, and thus to find a unity in plurality, to combine individual distinctness with social identity.

17. The desire of esteem co-exists with a disposition to approve whatever appears to be estimable in others. Beautifully is the correspondence of these susceptibilities displayed in the fact that the emotion itself is, in each instance, the special object contemplated, and is all that is sought after. Let one party evince a desire for the esteem of another, though it be expressed only by a look, unaccompanied by a single act, and let the other only look approval in return, and the object of each is gained. The desire of esteem on the one side may be expressed by an act which, apart from that evident desire, would have excited displeasure; and the approving emotion, on the other, may be similarly expressed; but, in each case, the motive is felt to be everything. The communion which has taken place between the parties is a communion of emotions, and these have a language, and a precious value, peculiar to themselves.

18. (3.) Arrestive. As man is introduced into a system indefinitely vast, and as his knowledge will consequently ever fall far within the circle of its objects, he will be frequently meeting, both as an individual and as a race, with what is new and unexpected. It may be anticipated, then, that he will be endowed with cautionary and arresting susceptibilities answering to such situations. Accordingly, he is found capable of the emotions of surprise, astonishment, wonder, admiration, awe. Many of the objects, indeed, which awaken these emotions, when they come to be known, excite the additional emotions of desire, gratitude, and fear. And hence the wisdom of that Di

vine arrangement by which, in the presence of strange objects, or in novel circumstances, we are led to pause and to examine, when heedlessly to have advanced might have been fatal. The appearance of anything new, may be regarded as exciting surprise. When not only the object or occurrence itself is novel, but also the circumstances which have led to it are unexpected, the mind is astonished. When both the object or event and the circumstances admit of no explanation, the mind is left in a state of wonder. The beautiful awakens admiration; and the sublime inspires awe. The consideration of the latter two emotions properly belongs to another class, to which reference will presently be made. They are adverted to here, on account of their tendency to arrest the attention, and to awaken reflection. The same objects, indeed, may not uniformly excite the emotions of admiration and awe; but as often as these emotions are excited, even by the same objects, one of their characteristics is the arresting nature of the feeling which they include. Now, by the emotions specified, the mind is engaged to a further consideration of the objects exciting them; and thus the intellect purveys for the emotions, and the emotions react and provide subjects of study for the intellect; the mind and the feelings influence each other.

19. (4.) Perfective. The system to which man belongs is not only indefinitely vast, it is progressive, and he himself is an intelligent part of it. Accordingly, the mere susceptibility of improvement and progress, when perceived, has a tendency to awaken in his breast an emotion of complacency involving a disposition to encourage and promote it. Still more is the perception of supposed excellence and happiness calculated to excite the feeling. In the absence of every disturbing cause, the mere look of gladness in another, falls like sunshine on his own breast. His heart is an instrument containing a chord for every note which happiness knows. And its every true response to the touch of things without, falls in with the music of the spheresis either a note of grief over something otherwise than it should be, or of pleasure in instinctive anticipation of the final chorus.

20. Akin to this class, and tending to the same refining and ennobling results, are the emotions of beauty and sublimity; emotions which both presuppose the perfect and the infinite, and tend to prepare the mind for them. But is the beautiful objective or subjective; is it a quality inhering in the object we admire, or is it the reflection of the admiring mind, the