learned by outward observation, while those of mind are learned only by consciousness. "These two regions lie entirely without each other, so much so, that there is not a single fact known by consciousness which we could ever have learned by observation, and not a single fact known by observation of which we are ever conscious. A sensation, for example, is known simply by consciousness; the material conditions of it, as seen in the organ and the nervous system, simply by observation. No one could ever see a sensation, or be conscious of the organic action; accordingly, the one fact belongs to psychology, the other to physiology." "Now the broad line of distinction between the two sciences here apparent, is the essential distinction between subject and object. And hence it is that physiology itself as a science presupposes, and is indebted for its scientific form to, that conscious subject whose nature forbids it to be observed. Let the physiologist write down only what he sees, and he will find himself in possession merely of an assemblage of facts or objects, without any internal relation or bond of union. Surely the power which classifies these separate materials, and unites them all into a single fact, is not itself connatural with the materials.

18. (2.) The phenomena which observation brings to light are only instruments and organs, while consciousness reveals a force or cause. The only conception which I have of cause or power, I derive primarily from the exercise of my own will in moving some part of my body. In accomplishing such a movement, I am conscious (as stated in a previous chapter) of more than a mere sequence, of volition and personal effort, and of an event as the result of the causal effort. And having thus gained our notion of causality from the consciousness of our own personal effort, we transfer the notion to all the changes observable in matter. These changes or effects necessarily presuppose the cause which produces them. When, therefore, the material physiologist affirms that he has the same proof that the brain secretes thought as he has that the liver secretes bile, and that the stomach digests food, we have not only to remind him of the threefold reply to this assumption already given, we have now to add, in direct opposition to his statement, that the liver does not secrete, nor the stomach digest, any more than the eye sees, or the hand feels. To suppose that they do, is to confound condition with cause, the instrument with the force which employs

"Morell's Hist. of Modern Philosophy," Vol. I. 406.

it. Organization is not the cause of life, but only its instrument, for life precedes it. The hand is not the cause of its own motions, but only the organ of that spiritual force, the will; and as an organized body is only the instrument of the living principle which employs it, and the movement of the hand manifests the cause or power by which it is moved, so the action of the stomach, the mere place and organ of digestion, manifests a cause, of which digestion is the effect.

The only difference in the two cases is, that in the movement of my hand I am conscious of being myself the cause, while in digestion and all those physical processes which proceed irrespectively of my consciousness and will, the pervading activity of the great Sustaining will is presupposed. Wherever there is movement there is power. When, therefore, the materialist affirms that thought results solely from the movement of the brain, he evades or overlooks the great question at issue, What moves the brain? The movement itself is not power, but the effect of it. Gravitation itself is not power or force, but only the law, according to which the Moving Force is pleased to regulate the movements of matter; and hence it supposes, even in the eye of science, a primary impulse, at least. It is the aim of enlightened science to push its inquiries, in its several departments, until it has reached the point which touches, or is impressed by, that Prime spiritual force. It is the office of enlightened piety to acknowledge and adore that Force as a pervading Presence. In the voluntary movements of man's own material frame, consciousness gives him the proof of a spiritual power of his own adequate to produce them; and in all the processes of nature by which he is surrounded — instinctive, animate, and inanimate reason gives him a Divine cause which pervades, as it once originated, the whole.

We

19. (3.) All material properties and processes give us the idea of space, but nothing that we know of the properties and affections of the mind sustain any such spacial relations. speak of matter as extended and divisible; or as endowed with certain properties of attraction and repulsion, as occupying certain portions of space, and capable of moving in it, so that its parts thereby assume different relative positions and configurations. And this description is as applicable to organized matter as it is to unorganized, and therefore, to the brain; and hence we can speak of its form, its parts, its color, weight, and consistence. And if it should be proved to be a galvanic battery, we may be able to point the course which the subtle process

takes, and the chemical changes which it produces. But mind is the negation of all this, and resists every effort to be brought within the terms of such a description. To speak of the configuration of a hope, or of the infinite divisibility of a thought, of the angle of a doubt, or of the easterly direction of a fear, is felt to be utterly absurd. And the only satisfactory manner of accounting for this sense of absurdity is the conclusion that thought and feeling are not material products; that mind is, in a material sense, unconditioned by space. "But neither can you speak of the top or bottom of a moving power, or of the vital principle." Admitted, we reply, and for the reason previously assigned, that these are properties of Mind. They are effects. Matter is only employed by the Producing cause as the means of their manifestation. And this remark includes a reply to the further objection sometimes ruged by the materialist, that as mind is related to matter, it is capable, like matter, of being localized, and may, therefore, partake of the same nature. But this, again, is to assume the very point in dispute, by comparing a subjective relation with a material object. Like the vital principle, mind is related to matter; but who can conceive of the top or bottom of a relation? It will be time enough to consider further the subject of the localization of mind when philosophy has determined the nature of the relation of the Creating mind to matter, or even when physiology has discovered the relation of life to organization.

20. (4.) The material phrenologist can present us only with a plurality of cerebral organs; but how does such multiplicity of parts consist with that unity and individuality of self of which every man is conscious?* If something in common to

* "But (says the materialist) a planaria from our ponds may be cut into ten pieces, and each become a perfect animal; does he then acquire ten minds, or personalities?" On the one hand, the spiritualist cannot be reasonably expected to admit a mere physiological curiosity as a grave set-off against a great fact of human consciousness; nor, on the other, is the materialist, it is presumed, prepared to admit the alternative to which his use of the fact would seem to conduct him—namely, that in the planaria, both mind, and the means of mind, are vastly superior to the same in man, for the planarian method of mental multiplication (be mind what it may) is a distinction to which man cannot pretend. Doubtless the truth is, that mind, in the planaria, is such as barely suffices for instinctive animal motion; and that it has no intelligent consciousness of identity about which any question can be justly raised. To speak of personality in such a connection is an abuse of language. And to attempt to argue from the mere power of instinctive emotion in a polype to the profoundest depths of man's consciousness, is no compliment to reason. Even life is

all the organs is supposed to unite them into one being, that unitive something is the very power in dispute; especially, too, as that is the only power which makes itself to be felt, or of which we are conscious. Or if the materialist, repudiating the theory of a plurality of organs, regards the entire brain as a single organ, of which thought is the function, the same question returns in a slightly altered form what can that power be which, withholding the property of thought from every separate particle of the brain, imparts it to the whole; and which, notwithstanding the greatest diversity among the sensations themselves, imparts unity to the whole? The only reply which satisfies the consciousness is, that the power sought for is that spiritual substance which I call myself, which cannot be numerically divided, nor be resolved into physical parts, and by which alone we gain the idea of perfect unity.

21. (5.) Still stronger does the demand for this spiritual principle become when the constant change of the particles, of which the brain is composed, is contrasted with that feeling of personal identity of which we never cease to be conscious. It is no adequate reply to say, that "all the properties of the body remain the same through life," nor to say, that "if the face is marked with small-pox, the pits remain throughout life." For the question relates, not to the indestructibility either of properties or of form, but to identity of substance. A true analogy is wanting. If it be said, further, that the particles which are passing away communicate to those by which they are succeeded, the impressions which external objects originally made on themselves, it should be sufficient to reply, that this is a process entirely unknown, both to physiology and to consciousness. But the very hypothesis itself calls back, and leaves unanswered, the ever-recurring difficulty, what that principle, unknown to physiology, can be, which is said to endow the departing particles with this mysterious power. An appeal to reason assures us that the identical and indivisible oneness which we feel, as it is utterly foreign to matter, must be an attribute of a different substance. And consciousness, the only appropriate, and the ultimate authority here, affirms the decision, giving us to feel that the substance, which is I, will remain the same in the whole circuit of my being; and that it is this feeling of personal identity which makes me capable of rising to the conception of the essentially Immutable.

not, in the same sense, divisible by ten in man. How is it divisible in the worm? for it is a principle distinct from organization, and precedes it.

22. (6.) Contrary to all our experience of what we know to be a material instrumentality, there is a power within us unconscious and incapable of fatigue. Certain exercises of the mind, such as continuous thought and emotion, induce exhaustion and weariness, for in these it employs an organization which requires rest. But the individual will is perfectly insusceptible of fatigue. In its volitions, the mind asserts its proper spirituality. As far as material help is concerned, the will acts from itself. It discloses the fact, that in itself the mind is an energy, and the source of untiring energy. It soon exhausts the muscular system placed at its disposal, but only suspends its purposes while its wearied servant sleeps, to weary it out again in the execution of them when it awakes. Often it forbids thought, that the body may repose. And often it is impatient at the repose necessary, indignant that its servant should be so unlike itself. Obviously, this easily tired servant cannot be the cause of the untiring intelligent will. The will and it have, beyond a certain point, separate natures, pleasures, and ends; and hence the indomitable will not unfrequently compels it to undergo privation and pain in its service, and even offers it up as a sacrifice.

23. (7.) Man's expectation of immortality comes indirectly in confirmation of the spirituality of the soul. Its immateriality, indeed, cannot be deduced directly from its immortality, except on the untenable supposition that spirit is inherently and absolutely indestructible. That the human spirit is naturally indestructible, as "the Father of spirits" has chosen to constitute it, we have already expressed our conviction. But we also believe that the spiritual nature might have been mortal, and the material, and therefore the animal, immortal, had it so pleased the Creating will. If, however, the doctrine of the soul's immortality be first accepted on independent grounds, it will surely be allowed that the idea of a spiritual principle, as the heir of that immortality, better accords with our views of such a state, than that of any mere material organization. Here. too, is boundless scope for that personal identity which we have found to be one of the exponents of a spiritual substance. And here the ideas of accountability and of future retribution find a congenial place- phenomena which seem inexplicable on the supposition of an assemblage of mere material properties, for they imply, not only a deep consciousness of dependent existence, but also a nature kindred with that of the Infinite Spirit, and the possibility, if not the prospect, of