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We hope his Pruffian Majesty has duly considered the following argument : If a nation at war has any right at all to • seize upon any neutral towns, and to put garrisons into thein to
prevent them from falling into the enemy's hands, this right * can arise from nothing but the extreme danger, which it
would be in, if the eneiny fhould get poffeffion of them, and
the plain evidence, that the enemy has a desigu to seize them, 6 and would otherwise succeed in such a design. And even • this right of necessity is subject to many restrictions. When ! we seize a town upon this pretence, we can only take the 6 cuítody of it, and have no right to any jurisdiction over it:
because whatever the custody of the town may be, the juris. • diction over it cannot be necessary for our security. What+ ever damages the nation, to which the town belongs, may * suffer either upon account of our having the custody of it, or
by our means, whilft it is in our hands, we are obliged to * make reparation for them. And as soon as the necefsity, with • which we were pressed, is over, we are obliged to withdraw
our garrison, and to give up the place into the hands of the * nation to which it belongs. But thelė are not the only re
strictions of this right: there is another, which renders it so s precarious in the exercise, as to be little better than no right s at all. We cannot be justified even by ncceffity in fcizing • it, if the neutral state to which it belongs, is presied by an
equal necessity. And since this state may reasonably apprehend itfelf to be in danger of being treated by the enemy as ! an acceflary to our act of frizing the town, it has an equitsable claim to judge of its own ncceflity: and consequently • our clain of necesity can scarce take place consistently with * justice, unless we have first obtained the content of the ttate.'
Then be proceeds to consider the privileges of amballadors, which, far from being founded on any positive law, are the refult of a compact, and immediately derived from the tacit confent of the nation which receives them in this character. While an amballador resides in the territory of a foreig!ı nation, he is considered as a member of his own; he must be empted from the jurisdiction of that territory, in the same manner as he would be exempted from it if he had been at home: because, if the nation where he refides claims any jurisdiction X 4
over him, it treats him as one of its own members, and not as a member of the nation from which he comes. When he commits any crimne therefore, he cannot be punished for it by the nation where he resides : it is bound to treat him in all respects as if he was resident in his own country. He must be proceeded against by a complaint to his own nation, which will make itselfa party in his crime, if it refuses either to punish him by its own authority, or to deliver him up to be punished by the offended nation. But if an ambassador should raise and head an insurrection, or should otherwise make use of open force, it is no breach of the law of nations to oppose him by force, even though he should be killed in the quarrel. The attendants and effects of amballadors have the same privilege that they themselves enjoy, because they are not subject to our jurisdiction : for the same reason an ambassador's effects cannot be seized for the payment of debts which he may have contracted. The method of recovering what he owes, is by an application to the ftate to which he belongs, and by making reprisals upon that ftate, if justice is denied.
In his disquisition into the nature of treaties, conventions, and leagues, we find many curious particulars, and among the seft, the following paragraph : · When a truce is by agree'ment to continue froin some one certain day till another cer
tain day, it may be a question, whether both these days are • included in it, if the compact does not say in express words, • whether they are to be reckoned inclusively or exclusively. • Grotius allows, that the day, which is fixed for the ending of • the trúce, is to be reckoned inclusively. This day is indeed o the limit of the time: but the limits of natural things may be • of two forts; they may either be parts of the thing, as the skin, which is a part of the human body is likewise the limit
of the body; or else they may be diiferent from the thing it• self, and no part of it, as a river, which is the limit of a 6 field or of a meadow, is no part of the field or meadow. But • it is most natural to reckon the limit of a thing as a part of 'the thing itself. He contends however, that the day, from • which the truce is to begin, is not to be reckoned inclusively; • because the word -- froin— is disjunctive and not copulative; • this word in its usual sense separates the day, which is firit
mentioned, from the rest, and does not join it to them. One I would rather think that this first day is the limit of the truce
at one end, as the last day is the limit of it at the other end;
and consequently that there is the same reason for reckoning the : first day, that there is for reckoning the last day, as a part of
time, which is included in the truce. Certainly the common ? use of the word — from is no objection against this way of reckoning: for when we say from head to foot, the head
zs well as the foot is included within the reckoning.”
In the tenth and last chapter, Dr. Rutherforth treats of the changes that are made in states, and in their civil conftitutions. These in all states are established by a compact between the governing part of the state and the body of the people. While the obligation of this compact continues, neither party can of right change the constitution; because the law of nature binds each of them to observe their compact. The obligation, however, may cease three ways: first, they may release one another by mutual consent. Secondly, if at any time there is no governing part in being, the obligation will be void; because there can be no compact, or no obligation of the compact, where there is only one party. Thirdly, a wilful and notorious violation of the compact on the side of the governors, will discharge the people from their obligation. Upon any of these events, the people, or body, of the society, will be at liberty, as they were originally, to establish any form of government that they please.
In speaking of simply hereditary succession, he says, if thera, are no males, the eldest among the females will stand first in the succession ; because that person who has the advantage of age, is presumed to be of inore perfect judgment than the rest, and confequently more fit for the bufiness of government: or if all of them are too young for this important business at the prefent timc, yet the eldest will be sooner qualified than the others. If one of the females should be older than any of the males, the preference will be given to the latter, on account of his fex, because the advantage of sex is perpetual ; whereas the advantage of age is only temporary. The preference given to the male fex, is founded upon a presumption that males are generally better qualified than females, to defend the society in fimes of war, and contrive schemes for its benefit in times of
We are afraid that some female wits and amazotts of the present age, will not subscribe to this decision, againlt which they will produce their Semiramis, their Candace, their 'Thaleftris, Zenobia, queen Bess, Christina, Anne, of pious me-mory, and many other heroines of ancient and modern fame.
In distinguishing fimple from lineal fuceession, and demonAtrating the change of conftitution by violation of compact, Re obferves : “ We cannot indeed say, that the péople in absolute • monarchies have any conftitutional part of the fovereign * power. But in all forms of civil government they have a + right to be free from all unsocial subjection: so that tyranny * or unfocial oppreffion, though it cannot in an absolute monarchy be called an invasion of the peoples part of the love
reign power, will be an invasion of a natural right, which is < reserved to them in the constitutional compact. Thus tyran
ny or unfocial oppreffion, even in defpotic forms of government, will be a breach of this compact, and will discharge
the people from the obligation of it, if they think proper to * be discharged.' • A ftate may cease in four different ways, first, if all the members of it, are destroyed by inundation, earthquake, or the fword : secondly, if all the members of it are enslaved : if they are so dispersed that they can neither be directed by a common understanding, nor act jointly with a common force, for the purposes of civil union : fourthly, if it is subjected as a province to another state.
In treating of the reparation of damages done to a country by its enemies, he corrects Mr. Locke, who estimates these damages at five years value of the land, without putting any value upon the gold and silver, live stock, and manufactured goods : and in speaking of the right of corrquest, he makes the following observations with which the treatise concludes:
Upon the whole, though private despotism may arise imme
diately out of damage done or out of punishment inflicted, « without the consent of the individual, who is brought into a state of Navery; yet civil despotisin or sovereign power over a ftate cannot be produced by the fame causes without the confont of the collective body of the state. For the feveral parts or members of a state, are kept together only by a
compact, in which none; besides themselves are parties. And • fince a right to obtain reparation, where a state has done da• mage, or to inflict punishment, where it has committed a • crime, does not make the perfon, who has this right, whe
ther it is an individual person or the collective person of another state, a party in that compact ; his right to obtain reparation or to inflict punishment cannot produce a right to infift, that this compact Thall be obferved, and that the mem
bers of such an artificial body thall continue to be united. • They are at liberty, notwithstanding his right, to release one • another from their social compact by mutual consent: and when they have fo released one another, the notion of
civil despotism becomes unintelligible; because the state will * then have ceafed to exist.
We cannot enough commend the care, candour, and accuracy, with which the learned author of this performance has investigated every part of his subject. He has refuted the erroneous conjectures of Grotius, Puffendorf and Locke, in many particulars, with equal judgment and power of reason, and stands forth a noble champion for human freedom. We could have wished however, that he had illustrated his arguments with real facts deduced from history, which would have more agreeably allured the attention of the reader, and made the Itronger impression upon the memory.
ART. III. Four pieces, containing a full vindication of his Prus
fan Majesty's conduct in the present juncture. 4to. Price 3 s. Owen.
HE first of these is a memorial presented to their High
Pruffian majesty's minister at the Hague, in answer to the memorial of the Saxon resident of the 29th of September.
In the second we find the king of Prussia's answer to the imperial decree of commillion at the diet of Ratisbon; and to that of the aulic council of the empire, The third is a memorial ina vindication of his Pruffian Maje