We hope his Pruffian Majefty has duly confidered the following argument: If a nation at war has any right at all to • feize upon any neutral towns, and to put garrifons into them to ' prevent them from falling into the enemy's hands, this right can arife from nothing but the extreme danger, which it would be in, if the enemy fhould get poffeffion of them, and the plain evidence, that the enemy has a defign to feize them, and would otherwife fucceed in fuch a defign. And even this right of neceffity is fubject to many reftrictions. When we feize a town upon this pretence, we can only take the cuftody of it, and have no right to any jurifdiction over it: ⚫ because whatever the cuftody of the town may be, the juris ⚫diction over it cannot be necessary for our fecurity. Whatever damages the nation, to which the town belongs, may fuffer either upon account of our having the cuftody of it, or by our means, whilft it is in our hands, we are obliged to ⚫ make reparation for them. And as foon as the neceffity, with which we were preffed, is over, we are obliged to withdraw 'our garrison, and to give up the place into the hands of the

nation to which it belongs. But these are not the only re'ftrictions of this right: there is another, which renders it fo * precarious in the exercise, as to be little better than no right at all. We cannot be juftified even by neceffity in feizing it, if the neutral ftate to which it belongs, is prefied by an ⚫ equal neceffity. And fince this ftate may reafonably apprehend itfelf to be in danger of being treated by the enemy as an acceflary to our act of feizing the town, it has an equitable claim to judge of its own neceflity: and confequently our claim of necefiity can fearce take place confiftently with juftice, unless we have first obtained the confent of the flate.'

Then he proceeds to confider the privileges of ambaffadors, which, far from being founded on any pofitive law, are the refult of a compact, and immediately derived from the tacit confent of the nation which receives them in this character. While an ambalador refides in the territory of a foreign nation, he is confidered as a member of his own; he must be exempted from the jurifdiction of that territory, in the fame manner as he would be exempted from it if he had been at home? becaufe, if the nation where he refides claims any jurifdiction X 4

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over him, it treats him as one of its own members, and not as a member of the nation from which he comes. When he commits any crime therefore, he cannot be punished for it by the nation where he refides: it is bound to treat him in all refpects as if he was refident in his own country. He must be proceeded against by a complaint to his own nation, which will make itself a party in his crime, if it refuses either to punish him by its own authority, or to deliver him up to be punished by the offended nation. But if an ambaffador fhould raife and head an infurrection, or fhould otherwise make use of open force, it is no breach of the law of nations to oppofe him by force, even though he fhould be killed in the quarrel. The attendants and effects of ambafladors have the fame privilege that they themfelves enjoy, because they are not subject to our jurisdiction : for the fame reafon an ambaffador's effects cannot be feized for the payment of debts which he may have contracted. The method of recovering what he owes, is by an application to the ftate to which he belongs, and by making reprifals upon that ftate, if juftice is denied.

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In his difquifition into the nature of treaties, conventions, and leagues, we find many curious particulars, and among the reft, the following paragraph: When a truce is by agree'ment to continue from fome one certain day till another certain day, it may be a queftion, whether both thefe days are included in it, if the compact does not fay in exprefs words, whether they are to be reckoned inclufively or exclufively. • Grotius allows, that the day, which is fixed for the ending of the truce, is to be reckoned inclufively. This day is indeed the limit of the time: but the limits of natural things may be of two forts; they may either be parts of the thing, as the fkin, which is a part of the human body is likewise the limit of the body; or elfe they may be different from the thing itfelf, and no part of it, as a river, which is the limit of a <field or of a meadow, is no part of the field or meadow. But it is moft natural to reckon the limit of a thing as a part of the thing itself. He contends however, that the day, from ⚫ which the truce is to begin, is not to be reckoned inclusively; because the word-from-is disjunctive and not copulative; this word in its ufual fenfe feparates the day, which is firit

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mentioned, from the reft, and does not join it to them. One would rather think that this firft day is the limit of the truce at one end, as the laft day is the limit of it at the other end; • and confequently that there is the fame reason for reckoning the first day, that there is for reckoning the last day, as a part of time, which is included in the truce. Certainly the common ufe of the word-from- is no objection against this way of reckoning for when we fay from head to foot, the head as well as the foot is included within the reckoning.'

In the tenth and laft chapter, Dr. Rutherforth treats of the changes that are made in ftates, and in their civil conftitutions. These in all states are established by a compact between the governing part of the state and the body of the people. While the obligation of this compact continues, neither party can of right change the conftitution; because the law of nature binds each of them to obferve their compact. The obligation, however, may cease three ways: first, they may release one another by mutual confent. Secondly, if at any time there is no governing part in being, the obligation will be void; because there can be no compact, or no obligation of the compact, where there is only one party. Thirdly, a wilful and notorious violation of the compact on the fide of the governors, will discharge the people from their obligation. Upon any of these events, the people, or body of the fociety, will be at liberty, as they were originally, to eftablish any form of government that they please.

In fpeaking of fimply hereditary fucceffion, he fays, if there are no males, the eldeft among the females will ftand first in the fucceffion; becaufe that perfon who has the advantage of age, is prefumed to be of more perfect judgment than the reft, and confequently more fit for the business of government: or if all of them are too young for this important business at the prefent time, yet the eldeft will be fooner qualified than the others. If one of the females fhould be older than any of the males, the preference will be given to the latter, on account of his fex, becaufe the advantage of fex is perpetual; whereas the advantage of age is only temporary. The preference given to the male fex, is founded upon a prefumption that males are generally better qualified than females, to defend the fociety in times of war, and contrive fchemes for its benefit in times of

peace.

peace. We are afraid that fome female wits and amazons of the present age, will not subscribe to this decifion, against which they will produce their Semiramis, their Candace, their Thaleftris, Zenobia, queen Befs, Christina, Anne, of pious memory, and many other heroines of ancient and modern fame.

In diftinguishing fimple from lineal fucceffion, and demonAtrating the change of conftitution by violation of compact, he obferves: We cannot indeed fay, that the people in abfolute monarchies have any conftitutional part of the fovereign power. But in all forms of civil government they have a right to be free from all unsocial subjection: so that tyranny or unfocial oppreffion, though it cannot in an absolute monarchy be called an invafion of the peoples part of the fovereign power, will be an invafion of a natural right, which is <<referved to them in the conftitutional compact. Thus tyranny or unfocial oppreffion, even in defpotic forms of government, will be a breach of this compact, and will discharge the people from the obligation of it, if they think proper to be discharged.'

A ftate may cease in four different ways, firft, if all the members of it, are destroyed by inundation, earthquake, or the fword: fecondly, if all the members of it are enslaved: if they are so dispersed that they can neither be directed by a common understanding, nor act jointly with a common force, for the purposes of civil union: fourthly, if it is fubjected as a pro

vince to another state.

In treating of the reparation of damages done to a country by its enemies, he corrects Mr. Locke, who eftimates thefe damages at five years value of the land, without putting any value upon the gold and filver, live ftock, and manufactured goods and in fpeaking of the right of conqueft, he makes the following obfervations with which the treatife concludes: Upon the whole, though private defpotifm may arife immediately out of damage done or out of punishment inflicted, without the confent of the individual, who is brought into a ftate of flavery; yet civil defpotifin or fovereign power over a ftate cannot be produced by the fame caufes without the 'confent of the collective body of the ftate. For the feveral parts or members of a ftate, are kept together only by a

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* compact, in which none befides themselves are parties. And • fince a right to obtain reparation, where a state has done da mage, or to inflict punishment, where it has committed a crime, does not make the perfon, who has this right, whe⚫ther it is an individual perfon or the collective person of ano ther ftate, a party in that compact; his right to obtain repa⚫ration or to inflict punishment cannot produce a right to infift, that this compact fhall be obferved, and that the mem"bers of fuch an artificial body fhall continue to be united. They are at liberty, notwithstanding his right, to release one another from their focial compact by mutual confent: and when they have fo releafed one another, the notion of • civil defpotifm becomes unintelligible; because the state will ⚫ then have ceafed to exist.

We cannot enough commend the care, candour, and accuracy, with which the learned author of this performance has inveftigated every part of his fubject. He has refuted the erroneous conjectures of Grotius, Puffendorf and Locke, in ma ny particulars, with equal judgment and power of reafon, and ftands forth a noble champion for human freedom. We could have wished however, that he had illuftrated his arguments with real facts deduced from hiftory, which would have more agreeably allured the attention of the reader, and made the ftronger impreffion upon the memory.

ART. III. Four pieces, containing a full vindication of his Pruffjan Majefty's conduct in the prefent juncture. 4to. Price 3 s. Owen.

HE firft of thefe is a memorial prefented to their High Mightineffes the States General, by M. de Hellen, his Pruffian majefty's minifter at the Hague, in answer to the memorial of the Saxon refident of the 29th of September.

In the fecond we find the king of Pruffia's anfwer to the

imperial decree of commiffion at the diet of Ratisbon; and to

that of the aulic council of the empire,

The third is a memorial in vindication of his Pruffian Majefty's