which is neither abfolute nor fervile; for the obligation is limited, and the end is the common good. The doctor afcertains the precise sense of the words, civil fubjection and civil liberty; terms which are often used without any determinate meaning. The individuals, in a free state, are in civil fubjection; though the collective body of the whole fociety, is totally free from fuch fubjection: but in abfolute monarchies or ariftocracies, the collective body is in a state of fubjection to its conftitutional governors; because as far as the power of these governors extends, their act is binding upon the collective body, as well as upon the several members. If the legislative body confifts of a single person and of a select number of hereditary nobility, the conftitution will be mixed; but, the collective body of the civil fociety will be in fubjection; becaufe, in establishing the conftitution, this collective body obliged itself, as far as the purposes of focial union extend, to follow a judgment and will, which is not in its own keeping, but in the keeping of that particular part which composes the legislative body. By adding to these two parts of fuch a mixed legislative body, a third, confifting of reprefentatives chosen from time to time by the general body of the fociety, this general body, which is usually called the people, does not, indeed, referve to itself a full power of legiflation, but retains such an independant power as prevents its fubjection. Though it has not a power of making laws by its own judg ment and will, yet without its own judgment and will, fignified by its representatives, no laws will be binding upon it. The fame independence is vefted in the person of a king whe is a conftitutional part of the legislative body. He diftinguishes civil liberty into the liberty of the parts, and the liberty of the whole; that is, into the liberty of the feveral individuals who have united together, and compose the collective body of the society, and the liberty of this collective body itfelf. The firft implies a freedom from all, except civil fubjection; the other, a freedom from all subjection whatfoever. An abfolute monarchy puts an end to civil liberty, because the collective body is bound to act by a judgment and will which are not in its own keeping. An abfolute ariftocracy is alfo inconfiftent with the civil liberty of the whole, because because it places the whole body in a fubjection to a fmall number of men, who are only a part of that whole. A mixture of these two forms of government will be as inconsistent with the liberty of the whole; for, ftill the collective body will be in a state of fubjection, by being ruled according to a judgment and will, which are not in its own keeping, but in the keeping of a part. But, no conftitutional civil governors have any other right or moral power of reftraining the feveral members, than the collective body of the whole fociety has in a perfect democracy; and this is no other than what is derived from focial union. He fays, page 396, The precife notion of civil liberty, when we fpeak of the whole people confidered as one collective body, confifts in the freedom of this body from all fubjection whatfoever, or in its right of not being obliged by any judgment and will with which its own judgment and will do not concur. But this freedom of the collective body from all fubjection implies, that it has a right of acting as a distinct and constitutional part of the legislative, or that nothing can be done by the legislative without its concurrence. For fince the act of the legislative is binding upon the whole fociety; if the legislative could do any act without the concurrence of the general body of the people, this body would be in a state of fubjection. From hence it appears, that, when we speak of the people as one general or collective body, we may very properly fay, that the civil liberty of the people confifts in the right of acting as a distinct • part of the legislative: because the collective body, if it had not this right, would be in a state of civil fubjection; and a • ftate even of civil fubjection is inconfiftent with the civil liberty of fuch body. Doctor Rutherforth having confidered the nature of flaves, and whether the fociety has authority to protect them against their master, proceeds to enquire into the right of refiftance, which begins where civil subjection ceases. As this is a very interefting fubject to a British reader, we heartily recommend the differtation to the perufal of all those who wish well to the natural rights of mankind; and even to fuch as through folly, ignorance, or prejudice, contend for their own own flavery, in efpoufing the fervile doctrines of paffive obedience, and non-refiftance. Doctrines profeffed by the worst of all factions, a faction which, contrary to all others, acts and argues against its own emolument and prefervation. He exhibits a short view of the feveral ways in which the authority of the civil governors of a fociety fails, and the fubjection of the people ceases, namely when the governors abdicate; when they impose such commands as are inconsistent with the laws of nature and of God; and when they extend their power beyond the laws of the conftitution, by which their power is naturally limited. He obferves that the right or liberty of refiftance, which belongs to the people, is not properly a civil power, but a • natural right: it is not an authority, which civil union gives ❝ them it is only what remains of natural liberty exempted ⚫ from the obligations of civil union. The conftitutional civil 'governors are, by the fuppofition, invefted with the fupreme : power. But this power, fince it is only civil power, is li'mited in its own nature: it is limited by the ends and purposes of civil union. Beyond these limits therefore the na⚫tural rights or natural liberties of the people ftill fubfift, the civil governors have no power, and the people owe them no subjection. This right of the people may perhaps at first fight appear to be a civil power; because it seems to arife ' out of the social compact, or at least to depend upon this compact. But it no otherwise depends upon the focial compact, than as this compact does not extend to it. The fo⚫cial compact limits the civil power of the constitutional go'vernors to the purposes of civil union: and this limitation is the foundation of the peoples right to refift tyrannical 'power: not because it gives them any power, which nature had not given them; but because it leaves them in poffeffion ⚫ of their natural liberty. They had naturally a right of refifting injuries by force. As far as the ends of civil union ⚫ require this natural right to be given up or reftrained, so far ⚫ it is given up or restrained, either mediately or immediately, by civil union. But as far as thefe ends do not require this right to be given up, fo far it still fubfifts in a state of civil • fociety. He He proves, in opposition to Grotius, that the people have a right to resist civil governors who are in actual poffeffion of fupreme power. Supremacy of civil power does not imply, that they who are poffeffed of it, have a right to do whatever they please: for, though it is under no conftitutional restraints. from without; it is only civil power, and is therefore under a natural limitation from within. It is limited in its own nature to the ends and purposes of civil union. He takes great pains in explaining fome paffages in the epiftles of St. Peter, and St. Paul, which have been produced as arguments for paffive obedience and non-refiftance. He fhews that Paul meant no more than that the people fhould be obedient to the higher powers, which exercifed fuch fupremacy as was confiftent with the nature of civil union: and that Peter addreffed himself to flaves, when he faid; fervants, be subject to your masters 'with all fear, whether they are gentle or froward.' He demonftrates that no civil judge can have power to fix the point where the right of refistance begins: that though the people may judge whether the fupreme governors act contrary to their truft, they have no civil jurifdiction to judge in this cafe; it is fuch a right of judging as all mankind were poffeffed of in a state of natural liberty. In fhort, when the queftion is, whether the fupreme governors of a civil fociety have abused their truft by counteracting the ends of focial union; the cafe is of fuch a fort, that no civil judge is or can be provided for it. But it does not follow from hence that there is no judge at all: each of the parties are left to 'judge for themselves, as if they were ftill in a state of nature. Both parties are accountable to God, if they judge wrong⚫ly and act upon this judgment: but neither of them is bound 'to submit to the judgment of the other. It is a groundless fuggeftion, that a right of resistance in 'the people will occafion treason and rebellion; or that it will 'weaken the authority of civil government, and will render the office of thofe, who are invefted with it, precarious and 'unfafe, even though they adminifter it with the nicest pru'dence and with all due regard to the common benefit. The 'right of refiftance will indeed render the general notion of • rebellion less extenfive in its application to particular facts. • All All ufe of force against such persons, as are invested with fupreme power, would come under the notion of rebellion, if the people had no right of this fort whereas, if they have fuch a right, the ufe of force to repel tyrannical and unfocial oppreffion, when it cannot be removed by any other means, must have some other name given to it. So that however true it may be, that in consequence of this right of refiftance, fupreme governors will be liable of right to ⚫ fome external checks, arifing out of the law of nature, to which they would otherwise not be liable; yet it cannot properly be faid to expose them to rebellion. But the great ftrefs of the prefent question is, not what name the use of force to repel unsocial and tyrannical oppreffion is to be called by, but what effect it will have upon the general fecurity of those, who are appointed to govern a commonwealth, and upon the authority, which is neceffary to be kept up, in order to enable them to discharge their truft with benefit to the public. Now the fecurity of civil governors depends partly upon the confciences of their fubjects, and partly upon the natural ftrength and influence, which they have in their hands. The ties of confcience procure them obedience and fubmiffion upon à principle of duty: and the strength and influence, which go along with their office, procure the like obedience and fubmiffion from fuch," as would difregard their duty, if it was not enforced by compulfion. They will have this latter fecurity to guard their 'perfons, and to fupport their authority, whether the people have a right of refistance or not. And in fact there is more ⚫ danger of their making an undue ufe of their ftrength and influence, to fupport themselves, when they do wrong, than of their wanting a fufficient fecurity against any attempts of faction, when they do right: it is more likely, that they fhould have it in their power to compel the people to fubmit to unfocial oppreffion; than that they fhould be in danger, of being hurt by rebellion, under the pretence of a right of refiftance. But this ftrength and influence is not their only fecurity; for as long as they pay a due regard to the common good, the principle of confcience will procure them * focial obedience and fubmiffion, and will fupport their authoVOL. II. Novem. 1756.` X tity |