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• it, after it is made. But our right in respect of the marriage contract is not a right of full liberty; the law of God has not left us free, when we bind ourselves by this contract, to make it either temporary and precarious, or perpetual and conftant; we are at liberty on the one hand to bind ourselves by a perpetual contract, or not to bind ourselves at all ; but <if we chufe to make ourselves parties in this contract, we • are not at liberty on the other hand, but are obliged by the • law of God, to make it a perpetual one.

We cannot therefore oblige ourselves to the contrary by the social compact; and consequently, when we consent to a marriage

contract, we cannot be understood to confent, that it shall • be perpetual, upon condition of its not being rescinded

afterwards. This condition takes place only in respect of such rights to bind ourselves, as are subjected to the civil legislator by the focial compact: whereas the right to bind our

felves by a perpetual marriage-contract, if we bind ourselves • by any marriage-contract at all, could not be thus subjected to the civil legislator, consistently with our obligation to obey the law of God.'

In considering changes made in the succession of princes, he asserts, . If the king in possession, and the body of the fot

ciety, concur in changing the law of succession; there is no • natural reason, why such a concurrent act should not be valid. For the notion of a fundamental law of


civil con• ftitution does not consist in its being unalterable by any hu

man power whatsoever, but in its being unalterable by the con• stitutional legislative body, where this body is only a part of

the whole society. If there is any doubt, whether such a * concurrent act can of right limit or alter the succession; this « doubt must arise from a supposition, that the successors, be• fore they come into possession, have acquired a right to fuc

ceed, which cannot without their consent be naturally taken

from them. But it is evident, that if they who would have succeeded, supposing the law had continued as it was, are ' yet unborn, they can have no right at all: and consequently • no injury is done them, if the succession should, before they are born, be so limited or altered by the concurrent act of the king and the people, as to exclude them. The difficulty will be somewhat greater, if the successors are in beVOL. II. R


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• ing at the time, when this alteration is made. But there • are two ways, in which we may explain this difficulty. In the• first place, the supposed right of the successors is only an ex• pectancy during the life of the present successor : this ex*pectancy is supported by nothing but the law; it cannot

become a right, in the proper sense of the word, till it is "accepted : and as long as the present poffeffor lives, there

can be no acceptance on the part of the successor. If there<fore the law, which supported the expectancy, is changed,

before the demise of the present poffeffor; this expectancy « can never become a right at all. Or otherwise. The suc• ceflors must be considered either as parts of the legislative, ' or as parts of the collective, body of the society. But • during the life of the present poffeflor, the supposition here

made, that he alone is the legislative body, excludes them « from being considered as parts of this body. And if they are considered only as parts of the collective body, the general act of the society concludes them, whether they im- mediately and directly consent to such act or not.'

The seventh chapter turns on interpretation—the way to ascertain our claims, as they arise from promises, contracts, or wills, and our obligations, as they arise from instituted laws, to collect the meaning and intention of the promiser, contractor, teftator, or law-maker, from some outward signs or marks : and the collecting of a man's intention from such signs or marks is called interpretation. This, he divides into three forts, according to the different means it makes use of for obtaining its end.

*These three sorts of interpretation (says he) are literal, rational, and mixed. Where we collect the intention of the speaker (or the writer from his words only, as they lie before us, this is literal interpretation. Where his words do not

express his intention perfectly, but either exceed it or fall « fort of it; so that we are to collect it from probable or rational conjectures only, this is rational interpretation. * And where his words, though they do express his intention,

when they are rightly understood, are in themselves of doubt'ful meaning, and we are forced to have recourse to the like con"jectures to find out in what fenfe he used them; this fort of • interpretation is mixed, it is partly literal and partly rational ;

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we collect the intention of the speaker or the writer from his words indeed, but not without the help of other conjectures.'

He observes, that the literal and grammatical performance of a contract is not always a due performance of it; and yet that very contract is to be understood according to the literal and grammatical sense of the words in which it is expressed. For example,

• The Locrians ( says he ) coming into the extreme parts of Calabria, found the Sicilians in possession of it. But the Sicilians, being alarmed at their unexpected arrival, made a league with them, in these words—That the Locrians would preserve amity with them, and would allow them to enjoy that

country in common with themselves, as long as they should tread upon this earth and have these heads upon their • shoulders. The Locrians, when they came to swear to this

contract, had first put earth in their shoes, and had privately fastened upon their shoulders heads of garlick. And as • soon as they had taken the oath, they threw the earth out

of their shoes and the heads of garlick from their shoulders; " and upon the first opportunity drove the Sicilians out of the country. In common, use the literal and grammatical sense of these expressions—As long as we tread upon this earth,

, and as long as we wear these heads upon our shoulders• are equivalent to our saying—as long as we live. The Locrians might indeed call theirs a literal and grammatical

sense, but it is such a literal and grammatical sense as common 'usage knows nothing of. When Temures had articled with the garrison of Sebastia, that no blood should be shed; he ordered all the prisoners to be buried alive. He might say, that

he kept to the letter and to the grammar of his articles ; for • though he took away the lives of the prisoners he did not shed < their blood. But- not to shed their blood ; -when che words are understood according to such a literal and gramma

tical sense, as common usage has given them; does not bare· ly mean—not to kill them by letting out their blood; it means—not to kill them at all in any manner whatsoever.'

The author has handled this subject of interpretation at large with great perspicuity, and illustrated his arguments with a variety of entertaining examples. [To be continued.]

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ART. IV. The CADET. A Military Treatise. By an Officer.

8vo Pr. 55. Johnston.
Vis consilii expers mole ruit suâ-HORACE.

T army,

HIS small treatise in octavo dedicated to the Duke of
Cumberland, and inscribed to the officers of the

army, comprehends a collection of military maxims from the practice of the most approved officers, adapted to the different branches of discipline, and the various emergencies of actual fervice; and these quotations are illustrated and explained by the author of this treatise, whose remarks seem to be the effect of judgment, reflection, study and experience.

After having in the first chapter demonstrated the necessity of preserving uninterrupted discipline among the troops, in peace as well as in war, he treats of the exercise, and recommends the practice of all the mancuvres of a campaign, even in times of tranquillity; to form experiments and execute the different movements of marches, countermarches, attacks, retreats; as well as to employ the soldiers in mending roads, bridges, and causeways, and in other works of public utility.

He enjoins silence as a necessary part of discipline, which prevents clamour, confufion, and oftentimes a pannic like that which seized a Roman army in Ifria, commanded by Aulus Manlius, which was thrown into confusion and rout by the outcries of a single soldier.

He enumerates the inconveniencies that arise from mistaken. good' nature in the officers who overlook a relaxation of dif. cipline, and other faults in the soldiery ; from a want of know-, ledge in billetting troops among dispersed villages; from the carelessness of the soldiers in appearing undressed on the parade when the general beats, and from their straggling from the ranks in marching. Then he considers court-martials, with the nature of punishment, to be varied according to the dife. ferent degrees of delinquency; and justly finds fault with most of the punishments now in use among the foot regiments; such as confinement in a guard-house or black hole, which subjects the criminal to rheumatisms, pleurifies, and other dirorders, soils his regimentals, and renders him familiar with dirt and nastinels; the wooden horse and cat of nine tails,

which may be of mischievous consequence to some parts of his body, and even endanger life. On this subject of exercise, he observes, that many of our evolutions are unnecessary in action; and some altogether impracticable.

• The principal objects of the manual exercise (says he) are these, viz. To • inform the soldier how to load in the most expeditious

way; 2dly, To keep up his fire or make his discharge, as

occasion lball offer ; 3dly, To accustom him never to fire • without command, or taking a proper aim, so as not to throw • away his ammunition without doing execution, which • frequently happens to troops who are not trained in this . manner; 4thly, To make him fire at a mark against a * wall, or target, that he might know what progress he makes: • This expence is very small, yet necessary, and all else of little confequence.'

Puysegur judiciously observes, that “ as engagements may " happen in all kinds of places, the Romans not only exercised 56 their soldiers in the open plain, but in defilès, narrow “ streights, and passes, in which it would be difficult to march < and preserve their order ; that being obliged to fight in such

places, they might by this habitude be less exposed to confu- fion, which the novelty might occasion.”

The fixth chapter contains a scheme of exercise invented by the author, on the supposition of the enemy's being in front, which for the sake of our military readers we shall infert as a curious piece of discipline. In the firft place, when

the officers appointed to command platoons, are ordered to their posts, the supernumeraries should be in the rear; every • one attach'd to a particular platoon at the opposite angle to • the officer commanding it; one ferjeant on the angle in • the rear of the officer commanding the platoon, another

on the angle in the front of the supernumerary, the major . and orderly drums in the rear ; pioneers making the reserve s for the colours. Secondly, the manæuvre of the regiment • might be regulated by a drum placed at a distance in the • front, and fupposed to belong to the enemy, from whose • different beats (under the orders of the reviewing general)

the regiment may oppose the proper disposition, viz. After o the manual exercise is over and the officers called to the

• front,

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