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«Give me thy hand then (I faid) thou generous girl. You make me the happiest of men, and in return I swear by that ‘one, supreme, tremendous power I adore, that I will be
true and faithful to thee, till death diffolves the sacred obliga• tion. · Twice do I swear by the great spirit, in whose dread
presence I am, with your right hand now locked fast in mine, 6 across this table, and call on him as witness to our vows,
that neither time, nor chance, nor aught but death's inevi• table hand, shall e'er divide our loves. Miss Melmoth said, Amen.
• Early the next morning, the third of August, we rid to Eggleston, where we breakfasted, and proceeded from thence 'to Mr. Fleming's house, up Stanemore hills, where we arrived
at nine o'clock in the evening, and had beds there that night. • My friend Tom and his brother Jemmy, were gone to a fair';
but the eldest brother, the franciscan fryer, was at home, 6 and entertained us very
well. We took him with us very early the next day to Orton Lodge, which we reached at eight • in the evening, and found the house and garden in good or• der. My friend, Mr, Fleming, had done every thing possible, to make it a convenient and comfortable place. He had 'made near the lodge two little rooms for servants, and had
put a bed in the green-house in the garden for a friend. He • had likewise sent there a couple of cows, some sheep and • lambs, ducks and geese, cocks and hens, and every necessary " he thought we might want there. Good Tom Fleming ! « There never was a better man, or a kinder friend, to his « small power.
“We had likewise fish in abundance, in the waters at the • foot of our hills, and goats and kids, and plenty of wild • fowl. Few things were wanting that reason could desire ; * and for us, who thought that happiness, that is, pleasure " and repose, did not precariously depend on what others think,
or fay, or do ; but folidly consisted in what we ourselves • did feel, and relish, and enjoy, there could not be a more • delightful station discovered on this globe.
• To conclude the best things that Orton Lodge afforded, were ordered to the fire, and before they were brought on the table, the man of God throw the fillet or ribband over
our hands, according to the Romih manner, and pronounced the nuptial benediction on us: Husband and wife we fat down to supper.
(Thus did the stars preside with friendly rays,
Bleft in a wife, a friend, and books, alone ; « To this mad world, and all its plagues unknown; • The smooth-pac'd hours did sweetly pass away, * And happy nights still clos'd each happy day. We will not trouble our readers with any more extracts from Mr. Büncle's very surprising performance, but conclude this article with a character of him, drawn up in his own choice words and phrases, as they occur in various parts of his work.
Mr. John Buncle, then, the lepid ruralis, is, without all perada venture, the most doleful jumble of miscellany thoughts, replications, and hairing saring diábolism that was ever posited in the senfory of a man's head; and whatever oplnion he may entertain of his motivé power, unless this theologèr will turni reform, he must continue the most fcelerate of all authors; because though he may be considered by his own sodality, as a thinking bloom, and militates strongly with churchism ; yet as writing is a province which, in spite of his ngаchical language, he was never chalked out for, he cannot possibly rise even to a half-merit, and consequently his lot, as a writer as well as á man, will prove but a swarthy one.
Art. III. INSTITUTES of NATUR AL LAW.
By T. Rutherforth, D. D. F: R.S. Vol. II. 7 s. Thurlbourn.
H E second volume begins with an inquiry into societies
in general, where all the members are equal. Having explained the reasons for which the minority ought to submit to the majority in the determinations of a society, he very justly observes that in the trial of a criminal, when votes are equal, the prisoner is not acquitted; as Grotius fays, because in such a case the milder opinion ought to prevail; but, be cause, when the judges are equally divided, there is nothing done, the person being tried, but not found guilty ; therefore he is acquitted of course. He observes that in some cases, where there is an equality of voices, the favourable opinion is. rejected : for example, in the university of Cambridge, if a. person petitions, the fenate for a degree, and the house should be equally divided, the petition is rejected. He had no degree when he petitioned, and as an equality of votes does nothing, he continues in the same state. He demonstrates what natural, majority is, and how it is to be reckoned; considers the natuie of voting in a joint stock company, where the proprietors have different Thares, and, ascertains the right of voting by proxy.
The second chapter treats of the nature and origin of civil society. Having defined civil society and described the motives which lead men to form such focieties, he proceeds to describe the manner in which they are formed. He observes that the claim of civil society, upon the individuals that compose it, cannot be reconciled with the natural rights of mankind, unless each individual has, either by express or tacit, by explicit or implicit consent, parted with such rights : this claim therefore can extènd no farther than such individual had a power of binding himself, or of alienating his liberty. Now each individual who joins himself to any civil society, is under a prior obligation to observe the laws of nature, and to make them the rule of his conduct towards all mankind : and as he has not the liberty of transgressing those laws, he cannot alienate a liberty which he never had : and confequently he cannot give the society a right to require him to transgress them.This being the case, the individuals of any society are not
bound to obey the orders of the society, in doing any thing, · that may injure mankind. The soldiers therefore, of a prince
who goes to war without just caufe, if they are confcious of the injustice of the quarrel, are, by the law of natural equity, bound to reject the order of their sovereign.
The next enumerates the occasions of forming civil societies; and proves by reason and experience, that they generally subfist by pact and agreement, without any natural or any di
vine right of preheminence vested in any particular member of the community.-We recommend this part to the perusal of those who are advocates for the jus divinum regum.
In the fixth and seventh fections, he enquires how men become members of civil focieties ; and whether or not a ber has a right to leave the society, without the consent of the public.--Among the cases stated by the doctor, we wish he had taken into consideration, that of an individual of fuperior talents, who finding himself depressed by faction, or neglected from ignorance and indifference, in the society of which he is a member, withdraws himfelf into another country where his genius and ability meet with due encouragemient. We with Dr. Rutherforth had declared how far fuch a perfon has a right to withdraw himself, after having in vain offered his services to the public.
The subject of the third chapter is civil power considered as legislative and executive. He affirms that the consent or agreement of mankind, by which they form themselves into societies, muft necessarily be the principle from whence civil power is derived. By the legislative power, laws are made, altered and repealed; penalties are enacted, and taxes imposed : but the legislative power has no right to take the whole, or any part of the property of individuals caụfelessly and arbitrarily. The preservation of each man's property, is one of the ends which he proposed to ilimself in entering into civil society: and it is absurd to suppose he would give up the whole of his property for the sake of preserving it.
Having observed that executive power is either internal, when it is exercised upon objects within the society ; external, when it is exercised on objects out of the society, that is, in protecting the society from external injuries ; or mixed, as in the function of magistrates, who exercise both occasionally ; he explains prerogative in this manner : • If we continue to speak 6 of the legislative and executive power in the abstract ; 'it
will be difficult to explain rightly, what is meant by prero.gative. It cannot properly be called discretionary executive
power; because the executive power in the nature of the thing ! is not discretionary in any part : wherever it acts at discretion, this privilege, unless it arises from the neceffity of the case,
$ as in the heat of military action, comes from the legislative - either by original establishment, or by long ufage and cuf
tom, or by occasional permission. We shall be better able e to understand what prerogative is, if we speak of the legisla& tive and executive power, not in the abstract, but as lodged 4 or entrusted by the state in the hands of some one or more
persons. Where the person, so entrusted with the executive * power, is left by the legislative to act in any instances, at • his own discretion, to direct by his own understanding the
public force, which is naturally under the direction of the public understanding, such a discretionary power in him is called prerogative, Thus in penal cases, if the legislative • forbids the public force to be put in motion for the punish'ment of any action, till the fact itself is proved to the pub! lic understanding in such a manner as the law appoints, and
then will not suffer this force to be used but under the conduct of the law, so as to inflict only the legal penalty ; thus • far there is no prerogative or no discretionary power in him,
who is entrusted with the executive. But then if the legif• lative, instead of reserving to itself the right of judging, ( whether such legal punishment is to be suspended, or whether : the criminal is to be wholly pardoned, leaves it to him to
pardon or not, as he thinks proper, such a discretionary ! power entrusted with him is called prerogative. In cases of • external jurisdiction ; if the society makes war or peace, as
he thinks convenient, if it is bound by such leagues or con4 ventions, as he engages it in; if its military force, when 4 appointed and established, is under his command, and is to
act as he directs; these are instances of a discretionary pow. ter: and where the person entrusted with the executive has ! such a discretionary power, it is called prerogative. If he, & who is entrusted with the executive, has a discretionary power of calling the public together to act in its legislative capacity, or of calling the representatives of the public together, where it acts in this capacity by its representatives; or if it is & left to him to appoint the time and place of its meeting ; this,
though it is not properly any branch of executive power, yet if it is so entrusted with him, who has the executive pow! er, will come under the notion of prerogative. But should