is the arrogance with which that writer affumes the appellation of a great naturalift. He fays the author of the CRITI CAL REVIEW, in conferring upon him the title of the great natural, robbed him of a fyllable which would have made it naturalift; in other words, perverted his true title, which was that of the great naturalift. Now will any man fay, that Dr. Parfons would leave modefty fo far on the left hand, as to demand fuch a title. No. If he had even investigated all the fhells that were gathered by the army of Caligula, we will venture to fay, he would not have fo publickly claimed fuch a fuperb epithet, as would raise him above an Alexander, or a Pompey, as far as philofophy foars above the art of war. Nor would Dr. Parfons have given fuch ftrange reasons for proving, that the theft of a fyllable was a petty larceny between friends. "You have (fays he) stole a fyllable from me, which, between "friends, is a petty-larceny, and very indecent, as well as un"juft; because you have loft all claim to it yourself, and can "have no manner of business with it: but, as it stands, it is 66 your own without doubt, and it would be fhameful to take "it from you." We have ftole, it seems, the syllable ist, which fyllable it, is between friends a petty-larceny-is't indeed? then the fyllable must stand indited of the petty-larceny: it is not only a petty-larceny, but likewife indecent and unjuft. Why is the fyllable if indecent and unjuft? because we have lost all claim to it ourselves, and can have no manner of business with it. If it be indecent and unjuft, heaven forbid that we should have any business with it! But, how we came to have a particular claim in the fyllable ist, and then to lose that claim; and in what manner it became a petty-larceny by our lofing it, are myfteries of iniquity which we wish this dif guifed writer would unravel.

Dr. Parfons would not have allowed himself to be furprised in fuch an inconfiftency, as that of faying in one paragraph, that the CRITICAL REVIEWERS were condemned in every company for their paffionate way of writing, and afterwards affirming, that fhould they put a stop to that way of writing, their finances might be affected. He would have had more urbanity than to reflect upon the finances of thofe whom he does not know; and better bred than to apply the terms hunting and unkennelling to any perfons who maintain the characters of gentlemen. However this obfcure writer may have trespassed against the laws of common decency in this respect, every perfon concerned in the CRITICAL REVIEW has humanity enough to call at his garret and relieve him in his Diftrefs, fhould he want their affistance; or if he chufes to come a hunting to their kennel, he will find a horfe-whip ready prepared.

pared. Before he claims their good offices, however, he must firft manifeft figns of real penitence for the injury he has done the learned Dr. Parfons, with whom we are ready to concur in punishing this impoftor, or in profecuting the publishers of the paper, in which the letter was inferted. If fuch attempts pass with impunity, no man's character is fafe. It is from a tenderness to Dr. Parfons that we have taken fuch pains to detect this confpiracy; on our own account we should have taken no notice of fuch a frivolous antagonist.

THE authors of the CRITICAL REVIEW having been in

formed, by letters and otherwise, that fome gentlemen of tafte and learning are difpofed to communicate their obfervations occafionally, on new performances, could they be certain that the fame articles are not already difcuffed by the Proprietors and Undertakers of the REVIEW; all those who may be inclined to correspond with the Society in this manner, are defired to fignify, by letter to the publisher, the particular books they intend to confider.

HE authors of the CRITICAL REVIEW take this op

Tportunity of thanking the gentleman, who was kind

enough in a letter dated August 17, to point out fome inaccuracies which had crept into the Number for July. They had corrected the error relating to Bower's letters before they received A. M's intimation, and as the last number was already complete, they could not 'till now, conveniently acknowledge their obligation to their unknown correfpondent.

They likewife own themselves indebted to the candour of D. 2. for his remarks on the account which is given in their laft number, of the fourth letter to the people of England. They confefs the words relating to L-d L-n may bear another interpretation than that which they have put upon them; but, confidering the peculiar virulence of the author, his ridiculous enmity to the natives of North Britain, and the palpable defign of the work, which was to kindle the animofity of the nation against all thofe who are employed under the Gt, the CRITICAL REVIEWERS thought they had a right to underftand it, as a malicious sarcasm against that nobleman.

ERRATUM in the last number.

Page 25. for great natural, (peaking of Dr. Parfons) read great naturalift.

THE

CRITICAL REVIEW.

For the Month of October, 1756.

ARTICLE I

An Efay on the Origin of Human Knowledge. Being a SuppleEssay ment to Mr. Locke's Effay on the Human Understanding.. Tranflated from the French of the Abbè de Condillac, Mem, ber of the Royal Academy of Berlin. By Mr. Nugent. 8vo. Pr. 5 s. Nourse.

THE

HE author having premised that, in his opinion, we may reafon in metaphyficks and morals with as great exactness as in geometry, (which is a point that will admit of fome difpute) proceeds to inform us, that his purpose is to reduce to a single principle whatever relates to the human understanding. What this fingle principle is, our philofopher's own words will best explain.

The ideas (fays he) are connected with the figns, and it is only by this means, as I fhall prove, they are connected with each other. Hence it is, that after touching upon the ⚫ materials of our knowledge, the distinction of the foul and body, and the different fenfations, I have been obliged, in * order more fully to explain my principle, not only to follow the workings of the mind through all their gradations, but likewise to enquire in what manner we have contracted the ⚫ habit of figns of every kind, and what use we ought to make ⚫ of them.

In order to execute this undertaking, I have traced things as high as poffible. On the one hand I have afcended to perception, because it is the firft operation we obferve in the VOL. II, mind;

mind; and I have fhewn how, and in what order it

⚫ duces every other operation of which we can acquire the act and habit. On the one hand, I have begun with the language of action: here the reader will fee how it has produced every art proper to exprefs our thoughts; fuch as gefture, dancing, fpeech, declamation, arbitrary marks for ' words or things, pantomimes, mufic, poetry, eloquence, 'writing, and the different characters of language. This 'hiftory of language will disclose the circumftances in which the figns were invented, will fhew the true meaning of them, will help to prevent the abuse they may be turned to, and, ̈ in my opinion, will remove all doubt concerning the origin

' of our ideas.

At length after laying open the progreffion of mental operations, as well as that of language, I have attempted 'to point out the means by which we may avoid falling into error, and to fhew the order we ought to follow, either in endeavouring to make discoveries, or inftructing others con'cerning those we have already made.'

Such is the general plan of this Effay, which is divided into two parts, the firft of which treats of the materials of our knowledge, and particularly of the operations of the mind. The fecond, of language and method. In the first part our author confiders the manner in which our ideas are acquired, fome proceeding immediately from the fenfes, and others owing to experience, which increase in proportion as we become capable of reflecting. He then proceeds to the analyfis and origin of the operations of the mind, perception, confcioufnefs, attention, and reminifcence: where he obferves, that the impreffions made on the foul are always attended with a consciousnefs of them, and that there are perceptions in the mind which we do not remember even the very moment after their impreflion; which leads us naturally to account for a thing which every man hath experienced, namely, the furprizing rapidity with which time feems now and then to have clapfed. This appearance is owing to our having forgot the most confiderable part of the perceptions that have fucceeded each other within our minds. Locke has fhewn that we form an idea of the fucceffion of time, merely by the 6 • fuc

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fucceffion of our thoughts. Now all perceptions, the moment they are forgotten, are just as if they had never existed. Their fucceffion must therefore be struck out of our measure of duration. Confequently a very confiderable fucceffion of hours, for example, must seem to us to have paffed away like so many moments.

Imagination, contemplation, and memory, with the manner in which they are form'd by the attention, are then treated at large by Mr. Condillac, who feems to have been at no little pains to make himself a complete mafter of the subject, as will fufficiently appear from the following extracts which we have selected from our author, as containing fome opinions and obfervations peculiar to himself.

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The power of connecting our ideas (fays he) has its in'conveniences, as well as advantages. In order to render this more obvious, I will fuppofe two men, one who never 'could connect his ideas; the other who connects them with fuch eafe and force, that he is no longer able to feparate them. The firft would have neither imagination nor memory, nor confequently any of the operations which these produce: he would be abfolutely incapable of reflexion; nay, he would be quite an idiot. The fecond would have 'too great a memory, and too lively an imagination; an excefs which would be productive of almost the fame effect, ' as an intire privation of both. He would hardly have the ufe of reflexion, he would be a madman. The moft heterogeneous ideas being ftrongly connected in his mind, for no other reafon but because they prefented themfelves together; he would judge them to be naturally connected, and ⚫ would range them after one another, as juft confequences.

.

• Betwixt those two extremes we might fuppofe a medium, • in which neither too great a share of imagination, and me< mory, fhould prejudice the folidity of the understanding, nor too small a portion deprive it of its amufements. Perhaps this medium is fo very difficult to find, that men of ⚫ the greatest genius have only come near it. According as dif<ferent minds deviate from it, and tend towards the oppofite extremes, they have qualities more or lefs incompatible, because they must participate more or lefs of the extremes, which • abso

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