"In the first volume are explained the rights and obligations of mankind, confidered as individuals..

He begins with the definition of a law, from Grotius z diftinguishes between laws and permiffions; obferves that laws are divided into natural and voluntary; explains the cause of moral obligation, by which we are bound to practise piety towards God, juftice and benevolence in respect of mankind, and chastity and temperance with refpect to ourselves. Thefe caufes are, first, the general defire of happiness; fecondly, the fear of evil; and, thirdly, the belief of future existence, howfoever supported, whether by reason or revelation..

Then he confiders voluntary laws, either divine or human 3 thus divine voluntary laws are fuch rules as we are obliged to obferve by the immediate command of God. He fhews, that some of the precepts of the Mofait law were local, and could not be obferved in any place but Jerufalem; and then he eftablishes this criterion: Since all fuch actions as are good in * themselves, in the sense already explained, are called virtues ; ⚫ and all fuch, as are bad in themfelves, are called vices; we may fay in general, that all virtues are moral duties, and all * vices are moral crimes; or that virtue and vice are the matter * either of the law of nature, or of God's moral law, which en 'joins the former, and forbids the latter. But fuch actions, ' as are indifferent in themselves, fuch as in their own nature ⚫ are neither virtuous nor vicious, are the proper matter of God's pofitive law; they become duties, when he commands ⚫ them, or crimes, when he forbids them.'

Now the experience and the nature of mankind, may difcover this natural difference between good and bad actions, or be tween virtue and vice; and consequently it is poffible for mankind, by the ufe of their reafon, to trace out the rules of moral duty; not that he would exclude revelation, which facilitates the progress of the human understanding.

In the 11th fection he tells us from Grotius, that, human ⚫ voluntary laws are of three forts; either the civil law, or a law ⚫ of less extent which is not derived from the civil power, or a law * of greater extent than the civil law. The civil law is a rule ' established by the civil power, to which the fubjects of any nation, who are under the authority of its civil power, are VOL. II. obliged

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obliged to conform their behaviour. By the civil power we mean that power which governs what in latin is called civitas, in english a state, a nation or a civil community. And by a nation · or civil community, we mean a complete or perfect fociety of men, who are in poffeffion of their perfonal liberties, and have ⚫ united themselves into one body for the purposes of securing their rights, and of promoting a common intereft. The name civil law is now almost appropriated to the civil law of the Roman empire; as this has long been called fo by way of eminence, whenever we speak of the civil law, we are fuppofed to mean this. But whenever I have occasion to speak of this law, I 'fhall call it the common law, and fhall use the words civil law, in the most extenfive fenfe, for the law of the land in each par ⚫ticular nation or country, that is, for the law which the civil 'power in that nation or country has established.

Human voluntary laws, which are of lefs extent than the civil law, and are different from it, as not being derived from the fame power, are the rules which any one, who has authority over others, different from civil authority, prescribes to those whom he has a right to command. Such are the rules which the mafter of a family prefcribes to his children, or to his fervants. The obligation of this fort of laws does not extend fo far as the obligation of civil laws; for the former extends only to the family, of which the father or the mafter is the head; the latter generally extends to all the members of the civil community. Or if in any inftances the obligation of the civil law seems to be confined within narrower limits; yet even in these instances we may plainly diftinguish it from the law, that we are now fpeaking of; if we only attend to the authority from whence the law is derived. Thus military law, < tho' it is confined to the army, is to be reckoned a part of the civil law, becaufe it is derived from the civil power. The particular laws of any body corporate, which is but a part of the civil community, differs from the civil law only as a part differs from the whole; because the power, which fuch a body corporate has to make laws for itself, is granted to it by the civil government.

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The law of nations is a law of greater extent than the civil law, and is not derived from the civil power. By the law of nations, we mean fuch rules as nations or civil focieties are ⚫ obliged to obferve in their intercourfe with one another. There are feveral points relating both to civil laws, and to the law of nations, which want to be explained. But our business in this z chapter was only to give the reader a general notion of laws, ⚫ to fhew him the feveral forts into which laws may be divided; • and to bring him acquainted with the general matter of the law of nature. Such points as relate to civil laws, or to the law of nations, fhall be explained in their proper place.'

In the fecond chapter he fettles the meaning of the word right, in its different acceptations. He demonstrates, that it fometimes means a quality in actions; but commonly, a a quality in perfons. Then he makes a proper diftinction between rights that are perfect, and rights that are imperfect. Our right is perfect, when we can carry it into execution without breaking in upon the rights of other men; but it is imperfect, if the rights of other men ftand in the way of it, so that we cannot carry it into execution without breaking in upon them. Obligation and right are correlatives.' Where any perfon has a right, fome one or more perfons are under obligation, which correfponds to that right: and, on the contrary, where any perfon is under an obligation, fome other perfon or perfons have a right which correfponds to that obligation.

He obferves, that as justice confifts in doing no harm to others, all the precepts of justice are negative, and confe quently of the perfect fort; but as kindness and favour con fift in doing good, the precepts of benevolence are affirma tive, and upon that account the obligations to fuch duties imperfect. He goes on to explain the maxims of natural law, which are often injudiciously applied: he points out those actions that are void: he divides rights into natural and adventitious, alienable and unalienable; and diftinguishes between things that are corporeal, and things that are incorporeal.

In the third chapter he treats of the nature of property, which is an exclufive right of things, impowering the proprietor to exchange, give, or throw them away. He con

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cludes,

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cludes, that all things originally belonged to all mankind in common; and that the exclufive right of property was introduced by fome act of man. He fays, that in a community of goods, a right to use them fupplies the place of property; but he enumerates the inconveniences that attend a community of goods, which inconveniencies are remedied by property; and, by a very ingenious conjecture, fuppofes Jubal to have been the inventor of poffeffion. Suppofing the reasons for introducing this expedient to have been rightly affigned, (fays be, p. 45.) we should look for the origin of property amongst them, whofe wants were the greateft, who were moft fcantily provided for, and who were leaft likely to practife the duties of benevolence and equity towards one another. All these circumftances concur in the pofterity of Cain. Their anceftor had killed his brother; and his < fears, left the reft of mankind fhould punish this crime upon him and his pofterity, induced him and his family to unite themselves together, and to build a city for their defence. By living in fociety, their manners were polished; and a refined way of living was introduced amongst them. This feems to be evident; because we find, that they were the inventors of arts and fciences, both of fuch as are useful, and of fuch as adminifter to pleasure. Tubal Cain was the inftructor of every artificer in brass and iron; and Jubal was the father of all fuch as handle the harp and organ. This family had separated themfelves from the reft of mankind, and were fhut up together within a narrow diftrict: where, if there had been but a few of them, and they had been contented with coarse fare and ordinary cloathing, they would have found it difficult enough to fupply themfelves. But the difficulty was rendered greater, not only by their elegance and luxury, but by the conftant increase of their numbers. We have no reason to imagine, that this family had any great fense of duty it is much more likely, that, as they lived with a bad parent, the influence of his example had in<difpofed them to obferve the rules of equity and benevo⚫lence in their behaviour towards one another. Here there

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<fore we are to look for the beginning of property, or of an "exclufive right to things. And the facred hiftorian informs us accordingly, that "Jabal was the father or inventor of "poffeffion." Yet property could not be introduced confiftently with juftice, unless by the common confent; and this compact is called divifion or in confequence of a man's having taken and kept poffeffion without moleftation, and fuch a tacit agreement is called occupancy.

Our author, in explaining the introduction of property, differs in opinion from Mr. Locke, who fays, that labour exercised on things moveable and immoveable, invests the labourer with the exclufive property of the faid things." Dr. Rutherforth has, we apprehend, fully demonftrated the fallacy of Mr. Locke's reasoning on this subject, and plainly proves, that, fuppofing the labour of him who cultivates the land to be worth ninety-nine parts in a hundred of the whole value of the land, after it is cultivated, all that could be due to the labourer would be no more than the produce of his own labour: the ninety-nine parts which "belong to him would not swallow up the hundredth part,

to which he had originally no exclufive right.' Even making a thing does not convey a right to the maker, unless the materials were his own. He divides acquifitions of property into original and derivative: the first begins the property of things that were common; but derivative acquifitions are fuch as convey the property of things from one perfon to another. Then he diftinguishes general property from particular property and fhews how far property is loft by dereliction or extinction of the proprietors.

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The fourth chapter treats of the limitations of property, in refpect of continuance, ufe, and disposal, arifing from the proprietor, or some other perfon; in refpect to fervices, which are divided into personal and real. The principal personal service is ufufruct; which takes place only in goods that may be used without being confumed, fuch as lands, houses, flaves, horses, books, &. Real fervices are certain advantages which one man has over the estate of another. Such as the right of letting his house rest on another's wall; of receiving dropping water; conveying

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