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them extraordinary respect; consecrat- | upon their belief of the soul's immortaliing temples and altars; making vows, ty. In fine, the consent of the old world and dedicating gifts; celebrating festivals; paying tithes (that very determinate part) of the fruits of the earth, of the spoils in war, of the gains in trade, by way of acknowledgment and thankfulness to the Donor and Disposer of all things in which, and the like opinions and performances (which it would be a long business particularly to insist on), men's general concurrence doth fairly argue, that their religion did peculiarly result from one simple institution common to mankind.

To these we might adjoin divers civil customs, wherein most nations did, from this cause probably, conspire: for instance, their counting by decades, or stoping at ten in their numerical computations; which Aristotle says, all men, both Barbarians and Greeks, did use, noting, that so common an agreement could not arise from chance, but from nature; but it is much more plausible to assign its rise to tradition. Their having every where anciently the same number of letters, and the same names (or little varied) of them. Their dividing time into weeks (or systems of seven days;) of which practice to have been general there be many plain testimonies. Their beginning the voμegov (or account of the daily revolution of the heavens) from the night, grounded probably upon the report that night did precede day; as Hesiod phraseth it, that night did beget day. Their general abhorrence of incestuous copulations; of which there is indeed some ground in nature, but none, I suppose, so very clear or discernible as might serve alone to produce such a consent; yea, perhaps, if one consider it, the whole business concerning matrimony will seem drawn from the head we discourse of. Their great care of funerals, and decently interring the dead; which Cicero' indeed deduces as a consequence

in all moral notions of moment doth (to my sense) much imply the same thing; which notions, although natural reason well used might suggest to all men, yet men, it seems, were never so generally disposed to reason well, as thereby alone to discern and approve unanimously the same truths; especially truths of this nature; which many men are apt to dislike (as repugnant to their desires), and consequently not ready to believe; which yet might easily by education be infused into their minds, and, by virtue of the prejudice thereby begot (assisted by plausible reason and popular consent), be preserved and rooted in them.

Now these (with divers more, perhaps, which they who are curiously inquisitive might observe) common persuasions (whether concerning matters of universal truth, or of particular facts) and those common usages having little or nothing of foundation apparent in man's nature, or in the clear reason of the thing, no prevailing appetite or inclination of man's soul prompting to them, no occasion commonly incident to human affairs being apt to suggest them, (at least divers of them; there being indeed rather an aptitude in men to disapprove and resist them, as cross to their dispositions), we cannot reasonably deduce them from any other cause than such as we have assigned, men's being, as St. Paul speaks, made of one blood, and receiving, as their nature, so their principles of opinion and practice, from the same common parents.

To confirm which discourse, and to prevent further objections against it, we may consider, that however, perhaps, among some very barbarous nations, this principal tradition (together with others mentioned, attending thereon) may have been almost worn out by time and men's stupid negligence; that however, also, among some people affecting semblances

* Πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ Βάρβαροι καὶ Ἕλληνες εἰς | of singular wisdom, as among the Greeks, τὰ δέκα καταριθμοῦσι—οὐ γὰρ δὲ ἀπὸ τύχης γε αὐτὸ ποιοῦντες φαίνονται, καὶ ἀεὶ τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων | the matter thereof might fall under ques. vók áñò rúxns, áðλà prixóv.-Arist. Probl. xv. 3. † Νυκτός δ' αὖτ' αιθήρ τε καὶ ἡμέρη ἐξεγένοντο. Hesiod. Theog.

dies natales, et mensium, et annorum initia sic observant, ut noctem dies subsequatur.-Cas. de Gal. 1. 6.

) In Læl.

tion, and some might doubt thereof, others contradict and deny it; yet most ancient histories (particularly that of Moses, far most ancient of all, and therefore, even secluding its special and more sacred authority, of all most credible) do

resembling other living creatures, and other things consequent upon, or agreeable to, these sayings; from which things if we separate that only which was first delivered, that they deemed the Gods the first being, we may suppose what they said divinely spoken. And it is according to probability, all art and philosophy being, as might possibly, often invented and lost again, that even these opinions of them have as relics been preserved until now: the opinion, then, of our fathers, and that which came from the first men, is only thus far manifest to us.

attest them to have been, in substance, | public commodity: hence they speak of universally received, running with a the Gods, as having a human shape, or strong and clear current among the eastern people (the Chaldeans, Phoenicians, and Egyptians ;) who, that they were the most ancient inhabiters of the earth, from whom the rest of mankind was propagated, the antiquity of empires among them, the first use of letters, the rise of arts, the greater progress in all kinds of civil culture (which things argue a longer continuance in one place and state), beside express records of story and visible monuments of things performed among them, do sufficiently declare; whose consent, therefore, doth in reason, so far as serves our purpose, involve the consent of all mankind; and doth confirm those notions to have flowed from the clear spring of our first parents their instruction.

Thus did the philosopher, with a sagacity worthy so great a man, discern, that through that coarser ore, consisting in great part of dross, and feculency (taken from the fondness or fraud of human invention, or from diabolical suggestion), a pure vein of truth did run, drawn from the source of primitive tradition; from which being supposed, we do infer, what he acknowledges divinely said, that there doth exist one first being or substance, incomprehensibly excellent in all perfection. The like observations and judgments might be produced out of divers other

It is also true, I must confess, that these original traditions (concerning the being and providence of God), as must necessarily happen, not only by the malice of evil spirits, but from man's natural infirmity and proneness to change, even to the worse (as also from men's aptness to mistake, from rude ignorance, from wantonness of fancy, from craftiness in promoting designs of ambition and cove-wise men (Plato, Cicero, and the like), tousness, by introducing novelties, and who acknowledge and urge this common from such like causes), did soon begin to tradition as a good argument of the truths be adulterated by many corrupt mixtures, we maintain, as to the substance of them; did by degrees degenerate exceedingly yet scruple not to dissent from and to into various shapes of superstition, false- reprehend the vulgar errors and bad cushood, and futility. Yet even so was Ju-toms which had crept in and became andaism depraved by the Scribes; and nexed to them. But let thus much sufChristianity itself hath been strange-fice for this whole argument; being the ly debased by a long course of ignorant and bad times; yet who can doubt but both these were derived from one pure instruction; that of Moses, this of Christ our Lord? That it might so fare with the primitive traditions of religion, is evident; that it really did so, we have even the judgment and assertion of Aristotle himself, in those remarkable words of his to this purpose: There were saith he) things conveyed traditionally by the primitive and ancient men, and left in a fabulous dress to their posterity; that there are these Gods, and that Divinity maintains (or encompasses) all nature : but other things were to these fictitiously superinduced for persuasion of the vulgar sort, and for the use of laws and

last of those I intend to use for the proof of that fundamental point, which is the root of all religion and piety.

I have produced several arguments to

* Παραδέδοται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παλαιῶν, ἐν μύθου σχήματι καταλελειμμένα τοῖς ὕστερον, ὅτι

θεοί τέ εἰσιν οὗτοι, καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φυσιν. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ἤδη προσήχθαι πρὸς τὴν πειθὰ τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ

συμφέρον χρήσιν. ἀνθρωποειδεῖς τε γὰρ τούτους, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὁμοίους τισὶ λέγουσι, καὶ τούτοις ἕτερα ἀκόλουθα, καὶ πυραπλήσια τοῖς εἰρημένοις· ὧν εἴ φόντο τὰς πρώτας ουσίας εἶναι, θείως ἂν εἰρῆσθαι τις χωρίσας αὐτὸ λάβοι μόνον τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτι θεοὺς νομίσεις. καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς πολλάκις εὑρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἑκάστης καὶ τέχνης, καὶ φιλοσοφίας, καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένον· καὶ ταύτας τὰς δόξας ἐκείνων, οἷον λείψα να περισεσώσθαι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν· ἡ μὲν οὖν πάτριος δόξα, καὶ ἡ παρὰ τῶν πρώτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν φανεpà póvov.-Arist. Metaphys. xii. 8.

and indefectibility; his immense omnipresence, his spirituality; his justice and veracity; his Sovereign Majesty and authority; with the like connected to those (for I cannot prosecute all the Divine perfections, according to that multiplicity of distinction which our manner of conceit and expression is wont to assign.)

contains them; as the orderly march of an army shows it managed by one conduct; as the uniformity of a house, or of a town, declares it contrived by one architect.

that purpose (or rather several kinds of thing, or that of Tertullian, The suargument, each containing many subor-preme great thing,t do include or imply; dinate ones), most proper, I conceive, namely, his unity first: then his eternity and apt to have a general efficacy upon men's mind's, in begetting and confirming a belief thereof. Each of them have indeed, to my seeming, even singly taken, a force irresistible; and the greatest in its kind, that any such conclusion, not immediately apparent to sense, is capable of. The existence of any one cause in natural philosophy, is not there demon- The uniformity, concord, and perfect strable by effects in any proportion so harmony which appear in the constitution many or various, so conspicuous or cer- and conservation of things; their conspirtain. No question can be determined by ing to one end, their continuing in the an authority so ample and comprehensive, same order and course, do plainly deso express and peremptory. No doctrine clare the unity of God; even as the lastcan to its confirmation allege so general, ing peace of a commonwealth (composed so constant, so uniform a tradition. No of persons different in affections and humatter of fact can be assured by testimo-mour) argues one law, that regulates and nies so many in number, so various in kind, so weighty in quality, as those upon which this conclusion doth stand. And if we join together all these, in themselves so considerable and powerful forces, how can we be able to resist them? how can we dare to doubt of that, which they conspire to infer? When, I say, to the universal harmony of nature the common voice of nations doth yield its consent; when with the ordinary course of things, so many extraordinary accidents do concur in vote; when that which so many reasons prove, continual tradition also teaches; what can the result be, but firm persuasion in every wise and honest heart of the proposition so confirmed? except we can suppose, that by a fatal conspiracy all the appearances in nature, and all the generations of men, the highest reason, and the greatest authority imaginable, have combined to deceive us. In the precedent Discourses I have endeavoured to prove the existence of God, by arguments, which do indeed more immediately evince those three principal attributes, wisdom, power, and goodness incomprehensible, but which also consequentially declare all other the attributes commonly esteemed ingredients of that notion, which answers to the name of Η μακαρία φύσις· ἡ ἄφθονος ἀγαθότης· τὸ ἀγαπη God (absolutely put, and without any ad- τὸν πᾶσι τοῖς λόγου μετειληφόσι τὸ πολυπόθητον κάλjunct limiting and diminishing it;) all λος· ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν ὄντων· ἡ πηγὴ τῆς ζωῆς· τὸ νοερὸν those attributes, which Aristotle's defini-sanpoeiros copia.-Bas Hexaem. Xoy. a. † Ύψιστος, μέγιστος, κράτιστος. tion, The eternal most excellent living Major popularitas generis humani-etiam

And hereto also the common suffrage of mankind doth in a manner agree: for, however that they worshipped a multitude of inferior deities, yet that there was one Supreme God, Author and Governor of the rest, and of all things beside, transcending in power and wisdom, and all kind of perfection, was evidently the common opinion; whom therefore we see the poets (the best interpreters of the popular opinions) do style the Father of gods and men; The King of the gods; the most high, most great, most excellent, &c. The greater popularity (as Tertullian speaks) of mankind, even when idolatry obscured the sense of Divine providence, did however appropriate the name of God especially to one, in their usual expressions; being wont to say, If God grant; and, What pleases God; and, I commend it to God. And if the

Φαμὲν δὲ τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι ζῶον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον. Arist. Metaph. xii. 7.

Summum magnum, et forma, et ratione, et vi, et potestate.-Tert, adv. Marc i. 3.

vulgar had in some measure this conceit, | sunt Dii, quam apud nos tot angeli, tolthe wiser sort appear to have had more que beati. So much for God's unity. clear and full apprehensions and persua- As to his eternity: if God made all sions concerning it: Plato refers the mak- things, he could not receive being from ing of the world to one whom he calls another; and he who made this world, Πατέρα καὶ Ποιητὴν (The Father and what reason can there be to suppose him Maker of the universe.) Aristotle, when to be from another? Nor can any thing he hath occasion to speak of God, doth receive a being from itself, or from mere usually speak in the singular; so do oth- nothing spring up into being; therefore er philosophers, as the Stoics, in their fa- the Maker of the world must be eternal. mous precept Deum sequi (to follow God, Something, of necessity, must be eterthat is, to acquiesce in, or submit to, Di-nal, otherwise nothing could have been vine providence.) Sometime they do ex- at all; other things show themselves to pressly signify this to be their opinion: have proceeded from the wisdom, power, There are many popular gods (said An- and goodness of One; whence that One tisthenes), but one natural one sis dis eternal; and so all nations have conὢν πολυωνυμός ἐστι· Being really one sented that God is. (saith the author de Mundo) he hath many names; according to the several affections he discovers, and the operations he exerts with whom Seneca thus agrees: So often as you please, you may diversely name the Author of things: there may be so many appellations of him, as there be gifts or offices and operations: him our people fancy to be father Bacchus, and Hercules, and Mercury; call him also Nature, Fate, Fortune: all these are but names of the same God, variously using his power. If they ever speak of Gods plurally, they are to be understood to speak with the like opinion of them, as we of angels, that is, of invisible, intelligent powers, created by the supreme God, dependent of him, subject to him; Mars. Ficinus's caution concerning Plato being applicable to the rest-etrate all things, operating insensibly and sed ne turbet quæso Deorum numerus, quem non turbat numerus angelorum. Nihil enim plus apud Platonem tot pos

*

tanta idololatria dominationem obumbrante. seorsum tamen illum, quasi proprio nomine Deum perhibent; et Deum Deorum; et si Deus dederit; et quod Deo placet ; et Deo commendo-Tertull. adv. Marc. i. 10.

* Quoties voles, tibi licet aliter hunc aucto

That he is immortal and immutable, doth also follow plainly: for he not depending for his being, or any thing thereto belonging, upon any other thing, neither can he depend for his continuance or conservation; having power superior to all things, as having conferred on them whatever of power, they have, nothing can oppose him, or make any prevalent impression upon him, so as to destroy or alter any thing in him.

Also, from his making, his upholding, his governing all things, is consequent, that he was ever, and is every where: where his power is, there his hand is; for every action with effect requires a conjunction of the agent and patient; nothing can act upon what is distant. That with his presence and power he doth pen

imperceptibly, doth argue the spirituality of his being; and that he doth not consist of such matter (so extended, so divisible) as those things do, which we by sense perceive.

His overreaching wisdom implies him uncapable of being deceived; and his overbearing power signifies that he doth not need to deceive; and his transcendrem rerum nostrarum compellare: tot appelia-ceive: the like we may say of doing ent goodness proves him unwilling to detiones ejus esse possunt, quot munera; hunc et Liberum patrem, et Herculem, ac Mercurium nostri putant; sie hune Naturam voca, Fatum, Fortunam; omnia ejusdem Dei nomina sunt varie utentis sua potestate.-Sen. de Be

nef. iv. 7.

See that most remarkable saying of Sophocles, (apud Grot. in Excerpt. page 149,) els rais dλnocíalow, cis totiv eos, &c.-Mars. Fic. in Arg. lib. x. de Leg.

Cic. 1, de N. D. 1 Arist. de Mund. cap. 7.

wrong; whence are consequent his perfect veracity and justice.

Lastly, the excellency of his nature, the eminency of his wisdom and power, the abundance of his goodness; as also, his having given being, then preserving it to all things, do infer his rightful title to supreme dominion; and accordingly, that all love, all obedience, all praise and

veneration, are due to him; according | ly give over or forbear working; that he to the devout acknowledgment of those withdrew his care, and tied up, as it blessed elders: Thou art worthy, O were, his own hands by a resolution not Lord, to receive the glory and honour and power (or authority), because thou hast made all things; and for thy will they are and were created.

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I Believe in God.

SERMON IX.

THE BEING OF GOD PROVED FROM SU

PERNATURAL EFFECTS.

JOHN v. 17.—But Jesus answered them, My Father hitherto worketh, and I work.

WHEN at first by the Divine power this visible system of things was consummated and settled in that course wherein it now stands, it is said that God rested from all his work which he had made: the plain meaning of which saying is, that God had so framed all the parts of nature, and several kinds of things, and disposed them into such an order, and inserted into them such principles of action, that thereafter (without more than ordinary conservation or concourse from him) things generally should continue in their being, station, and course, without any great change, for ever; that is, for so long as God had determined, or till their due period was run through:* (He established them, as the Psalmist speaks, for ever and ever; he made a decree, that shall not pass: His word was set tled in the heavens, and his faithfulness unto all generations: they continue this day according to his ordinances: He made a covenant with day and night, and appointed the ordinances of heaven and earth:) thus God rested and ceased from his work of creation. But it is not said, nor intended, that God did absolute

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to intermeddle more with any thing, but to enjoy a kind of Epicurean ease and ungasta. No: his wisdom hath so ordered things, that there should be need and reason of his acting continually; that there should be frequent occasion of va riously displaying his glorious attributes; of exercising his power, of demonstrating his goodness.* Indeed, as to beings merely natural and unintelligent, there were no need of his doing more; for they are all thoroughly his obedient servants, and exactly fulfil his word; never straggling from the station in which he placed them; never transgressing the rule that he prescribed them: but he hath also made other beings, by nature uncapable of such uniformity and settlement; very free, and therefore very mutable; to the well governing of whom, therefore, a continual intention and activity is requisite. For the use and benefit of which beings, as a great part of nature was designed and made by God, so it was not unmeet, that for their sake he should sometime alter the course of nature, and cross or check the stream of things. The fuller and clearer illustration of his glory, the showing that all things do not pass on in a fatal tract; the confirming that he made nature, because he can command and control it; the demonstration of his especial care over and love toward men, in suspending or thwarting his own established laws and decrees, as it were, for their sake; the exciting men the more to mind God, and impressing on them a respect toward him; the begetting faith in him, and hope in his providence, are fair accounts, for which God sometimes should perform (even in a manner notorious and remarkable to us) actions extraordinary. And that God doeth so, we learn in the words I read from the mouth of truth itself; whose affirmation (for persuading the incredulous) I intend to second with particular instances, attested to by reasona

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