in the mind; and they are, as I have already remarked, in them*selves, not only simple beyond the possibility of division, or definition, but in their nature transitory and perishable, and so completely unlike to any thing corporeal, that neither themselves, or any thing similar to them, can for a moment be supposed to exist in body. The qualities, on the contrary, which we consider as the exciting causes of our sensations, and which, from the change in the state of our minds, and the perceptions which usually follow it, we are led to refer to the objects that surround us, and to consider as existing in them only, are of a nature completely different from that of the sensations. Such qualities we cannot by any exertion, even of imagination, suppose capable of existing any where but in matter. They have nothing in common with any affection or quality of mind, with which we are made ac quainted by consciousness, the only evidence of any authority in this affair. They are not, like the sensations by which they are suggested, simple and fugitive: on the contrary, they are equally real and permanent, whether perceived by us or not; and would be so, were there even no sensitive being to perceive them at all. And, besides, many of these qualities are by no means so simple, that they cannot be easily and accurately defined, and mutually compared with one another. Obvious, however, as this matter seems to be, it did not please Locke and his followers to consider and state it in this light. Such a view of the subject was too easy and simple for a complex philosophy.. Big with the importance of their notable discovery, they proceeded to state, that a distinction exists between the different properties of matter; some of which, such as solidity, extension, figure, &c. they affirmed, were pictures or resemblances of their corresponding ideas, or sensations in the mind, and which, both the vulgar and philosophers had at all times, in consequence of this resemblance, considered as certainly existing in matter; whilst there were other properties, such as heat, cold, odours, tastes, sounds, and colours, of which their sensations were so far from being pictures, that they had no sort of resemblance to them, and which, accordingly, could exist no where but in the mind; although the vulgar, at all times, and philosophers before the days of Des Cartes and Locke, considered them as real qualities, and like the others, existing in matter. To the former class, which they called primary qualities, they allowed an external existence in bodies; but to the latter, which they denominated secondary qualities, they allowed no existence independent of their being felt or perceived; that is, no existence separate from, or external to the mind. This distinction, for which, in justice to Locke and to the cause of truth, it must be confessed, there is some foundation in the dif. G 3 ferent ferent natures of these two classes of qualities, although this did not strike Locke and his followers in its full and true light, com. pleted the foundation of that formidable scepticism concerning the non-existence of matter and of mind, which was taught by Berkeley and by Hume. The object, however, and the views of both these excellent philosophers were very different. So much so, indeed, that we find an ample apology for the good Bishop's mistakes, in his own writings and in the well-known purity of his intentions; whilst neither Hume himself, or his most partial admirers, can administer any sort of palliation for his conduct and views in this affair. And feeble, indeed, as the foundation of this sceptical system surely is, it is much to be regretted, that the coin of such an unauthorised philosophy should have such an extensive and accredited circulation, as to pass current, even with an acute and eloquent philosopher of our own times, who, with a lusty quarto, brings up the rear of this very formidable scèptical array; in which, after having destroyed the whole world of matter, and pronounced its funeral oration, he promises us, that, in his next volume, he will erect a more goodly and lasting fabric on its site. But after all, it is probable that it will fare with his~ works as with those of his, sceptical predecessors; or, as it does: with the projector in Horace," Qui diruit, ædificat, mutat quadrata rotundis ;" and that the mighty labour of his hands is destined shortly to give way to some fairy fabric, as shadowy and perishable as itself, and "to leave no trace behind †.” But, although sceptical magicians of this kind do, from time to time, rise up among us, and attempt, with much ingenuity, aided by the charms and spells of a seducing eloquence, to cast about us the disastroys dream of a baseless and sceptical philosophy, yet we are not so liable to be imposed upon by this artful and fascinating philosophic slight of hand, as of old, now, that we have been, for some time, accustomed to please ourselves with more homely philosophic entertainments, where the dishes are more substantial, though perhaps not altogether so savoury to a vi tiated The Right Honourable William Drummond, author of "Academicat Questions."Of the contents of this work I shall probably take some notice in some future Numbers of this REFLECTOR. I cannot help observing here, as Bayle remarkeď long since,— that philosophy might be compared to certain powders, so very corrosive, that having consumed the proud and spongy flesh of a wound, they would corrode® even the quick and sound flesh, rot the bones, and penetrate to the very mar row. Philosophy is proper at first to confute errors; but, if she will not be stopped there, she attacks Truth herself; and when she has her full scope, she generally goes so far that she loses herself, and knows not where to stop.' —I shall make no commentary upon this passage at present, but simply ask, with Warton, what would Bayle have said, if he had seen the uses to which philosophy has been applied in the present times? tiated taste, or, in their cookery, so seemly to the eye, as those of more luxurious Greece and Rome; and at which the food, because part of it has been planted by our own hands, and watered by the sweat of our own brows, in our native soil, is not less agreeable than it would, had it been the spontaneous, or rather the forced production of some luxurious foreign clime. But, however it may fare with scepticism elsewhere, it is certain that among us, at least in our own times, it has made but few proselytes, and those too not of the thinking and the good, but of the unthinking, the bad, and the superficial. So just is the remark of Socrates, and his advice, as versified by Pope, "A little learning is a dangerous thing; “ Drink deep, or taste not the Pierean spring.” Be this matter, however, as it may, it does not appear that in our times the cause of a legitimate and sober philosophy has so many dangers to apprehend from the side of a rational and learned scepticism, as it has from a presumptuous, half-witted, and superficial materialism *. The modern rage for the study of mechanical philosophy, but more particularly of geology, mineralogy, and chemistry, and the shameful ignorance of most of those, who at present apply to the study of medicine, and obtain but a very superficial view, even of the more gross and palpable doctrines of physiology, have of late generally given such a preponderance to the philosophy of matter, that, like a great mountain, it intercepts the view of our semi-philosophers, and effectually prevents them from the slightest glimpse at the beautiful and fertile plains of mind, in the vale beyond it. Nor is it very wonderful that such persons should have a very partial esteem for the knife, the furnace, and the mortar, since their studies require more the labour of hands than of brains. How consonant are their views with those of the Poet! "Farewell, for clearer ken design'd, What * A late elegant writer thinks on this subject as I do :-" The general distaste which has existed of late years in this country," says Mr. Drummond, "for all speculative and metaphysical reasoning, is thought by some well meaning persons to be our best defence against the delusive systems of false philosophers. I suspect that these good people much deceive themselves. The attentive observer cannot bave failed to remark the increasing numbers of those who are professed adherents to materialism, and who loudly join in the silly clamour which mistaken zeal has raised against philosophy."-Among others, I think that Mr. Drummond, in this last sentence, had eye upon Knox, the Essayist, whom his prejudices have led to unwarrantable censures on mental philosophy. his What regions part the world of soul, Or whence thy streams Opinion roll."-Collins. Equally hostile to both these extremes, and attached to tlie cause of a more rational and modest philosophy, some writers have prosecuted for many years, and still continue to do s so, the too much neglected study of mind, in another road.-From the errors and mistakes of the ancients they have learned a better lesson than that of thinking, that the cause of science is to be advanced, as some have thought, by an undeviating adherence to authority and to antiquity. They have been taught to. set upon them a juster value than has been done by some of their early and latest followers. They have learned to respect and venerate their discoveries and their worth; whilst they look upon their. mistakes, numerous indeed as they are, and upon the errors that disfigure their writings, in the light of defects, not so much in themselves, as in the nature and circumstances of the times in which they lived; and consider them but as little spots, which are sometimes seen on the most beautiful skin, or as like unto the passing cloud, which intercepts for a moment the light of the sun, though it durst not approach the face of the luminary. It can hardly be supposed, that men who think, thus with respect to the ancients, and who can respect the learned scepticismi of a few eminent moderns, whilst they think charitably even of the experimental insignificancy of some of their own cotemporary materialists, will set too high a value upon the authority and venerable names of Des Cartes, Malebranche, and Locke; although they will be allowed to admire the vigour of that arm that gave the last blow to the scholastic and charlatan sophistries of the ontological philosophy; and accordingly we find that the system of Des Cartes and Locke, with all its great and undoubted merits, has already given way, and that their great pretended discovery, relative to the non-existence of secondary qualities, after serving as a basis for the sceptical philosophy, has in the course of time laid also the foundation for its overthrow.-Berkeley, upon the. principles of the ideal system, proved with all the accuracy of demonstration, that the primary qualities, notwithstanding the opinion of Locke, were as unlike their sensations, as the secondary, and by the same mode of reasoning, which Locke used, could not be supposed to have any real existence; whilst the doctrine was followed up by Hume, and applied with equal suc cess, on the received principles of the ideal system, to shew the non-existence of mind *. .Such "The confusion and perplexity of scepticism have, in a great measure,, arisen from employing the word idea, sometimes in its proper sense, to signify a mental image, or vision, and at others to signify perception, remembrance,. notion, * Such was the state of mental science when the consequences deduced from the system of Locke induced Dr. Reid to reject the ideal theory altogether, and to set about erecting a more simple and solid fabric in its place.In the execution of this plan his first excursion was into the province of the senses, where he attacked, not only with solid sense, but also with pointed humour, and ridicule, the doctrine, that there was no heat in the fire, no smell in the rose, no colour in the rainbow, no sound in the harp-* sichord, and exposed the nothingness of this fancied discovery, by shewing, that the followers of the ideal system departed from the established use of language, as they employed the words, heat, smell, sound, taste, and colour, to signify only sensations of mind, whilst they were always, or more frequently, used in common life, to express an unknown quality in bodies, by which our sensations are excited. It has been sometimes maintained, I know,, that the merit of a discoverer, which Dr. Reid claims to himself [See a Letter to Dr. Gregory, printed in Mr. Stewart's life of Dr Reid] particularly in detecting the fallacy of the theory of ideas and rejecting it, has been granted to him with very little justice; since it is affirm ed, that the doctrine, which. makes ideas distinct and separate from the mind, was given up long before by the most eminent philosophers. Locke, in a passage where he treats of retention and memory, says expressly, that having an idea of a thing is nothing but having a perception of it. In the Physica of Hobbes, there is a passage in which he affirms, that the phantasma (species or idea) is nothing different from the actus sensionis. And Des Cartes, in his Principia, is still more explicit; and his account of the doctrine of Perception is the same with that of Reid him . * self. In opposition to these, numberless instances may be cited ... from notion, knowledge, and almost every other operation, or result of operation, of which the mind is capable. Of motion, for instance, in a particular ob ject, we have a perception when we see, or feel it move, and a remembrance afterwards. But of the motion of the earth, either in its axis or in its orbit, we have neither perception or remembrance, but only a notion, acquired by comparative deductions from other perceptions; while of motion in general we have no particular perception, remembrance, or notion; but only gene ral knowledge, collected and abstracted from all. But we have no idea of either, if by idea be meant a mental image or resemblance: but nevertheless, to infer from this, that we have no adequate perception, remembrance, no• tion, or knowledge, either of motion or of body, is as adverse to philoso phy as to common sense; there being no more reason why a notion should resemblé a perception, a perception a sensation,—or a sensation its external cause, than that an exertion should resemble an arm, an arm a lever,—or a lever a weight; nor is it less absurd to make the want of resemblance be tween the cause, the means, and the end, a ground for doubting the reality of either in the one case than in the other,”—An Inquiry into the Principles. of Taste, by Mr. Knight, ́ |