We must quote, with a slight omission or two, the splendid passage which he introduces in concluding the eighth book of partitions.

"Thus have I concluded this portion of learning touching civil knowledge, and with civil knowledge have concluded human philosophy; and with human philosophy, philosophy in general and being now at some pause, looking back into that I have passed through, this writing seemeth to me, si nunquam fallit imago, as far as a man can judge of his own work, not much better than that noise or sound which musicians make while they are in tuning their instruments, which is nothing pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why the music is sweeter afterwards. So have I been content to tune the instruments of the Muses, that they may play that have better hands. And surely when I set before me the condition of these times, in which learning hath made her third visitation or circuit in all the qualities thereof; as the excellency and vivacity of the wits of this age; the noble helps and lights which we have by the travails of ancient writers; the art of printing, which communicateth books to men of all fortunes; the openness of the world by navigation, which hath disclosed multitudes of experiments, and a mass of natural history; the leisure wherewith these times abound, not employing men so generally in civil business, as the states of Græcia did in respect of their popularity, and the state of Rome in respect of the greatness of their monarchy; the consumption of all that ever can be said in controversies of religion, which have so much. diverted men from other sciences; and the inseparable propriety of time, which is ever more and more to disclose truth;-I cannot but be raised to this persuasion, that this third period of time will far surpass that of the Græcian and Roman learning: only if men will know their own strength and their own weakness both, and take one from the other, light of invention, not fire of contradiction; and esteem of the inquisition of truth as of an enterprise, and not as of a quality or ornament; and employ wit and magnificence to things of worth and excellency, and not to things vulgar, and of popular estimation. As for my labours, let men reprehend them, so they observe and weigh them. For the appeal is lawful, though it may be it shall not be needful, from the first cogitations of men to their second, and from the nearer times to the times farther off."

The ninth and last book relates to the division of inspired theology," the sabbath and port of all men's labours and peregrinations," which he leaves to divines; and only discusses its three appendices the doctrine of the right use of reason in theology; the degrees of unity in the city of God; and lastly the emanations of the Scriptures, the unadulterated first flowings of Bible truth, or a short and judicious collection of notes and observations upon particular texts of holy writ.

Between the De Augmentis and Novum Organum, is placed the Novus Orbis Scientiarum, sive desiderata, containing a list or recapitulation of the deficiencies of knowledge, "noted" in the eight last books of the former work; which embrace its two main divisions of memory and reason, or history and philosophy.

The author had thus "made as it were a small globe of the intellectual world:" and we have no such survey extant. It was no small mastery of knowledge to obtain a general acquaintance with the state of contemporary learning; but our author appears to have been intimately acquainted with the principles of the sciences, although not with their endless ramifications into particulars. His acquisitions extending almost to all that there was to acquire, it will be seen that he observed carefully and pointed out clearly, wherein, upon their own grounds, they were deficient, "either as not constantly occupate or not well converted by the labour of man." Their position being retrograde, or moving in a wrong direction, the necessity of "advancement" is universally felt through their whole mass or globe. The man that could so thoroughly acquaint himself with such themes, and in such simple but lofty terms inform others of the results of his reflections,-who could exhibit with equal sagacity and accuracy, these many and great desiderata, and kindle his various sub

jects into a blaze of hopeful glory, "by power capacious and serene," was the man to supply the "one thing" they all lacked, by realizing his own anticipations, and making the very conquest he predicted.

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Sequitur," therefore, says the reporter himself, "secunda pars INSTAURATIONIS quæ artem ipsam interpretandi naturam, et verioris adoperationis intellectus, exhibit: neque eam ipsam tamen in corpore tractatus justi; sed tantum digestam per summas, in aphorismos."

We now come to the second, and by far the most important, part of the Great Instauration, which he entitles, probably after Aristotle's Organon, the Novum Organum Scientiarum, or a new method of studying the sciences. It is the philosophy of the instrument, the philosophy of science itself, or the universal philosophical machine. The Cogitata et Visa, written many years previously, was the rough draft of this great conception, but this is the result of, apparently, the most arduous of his labours. The preface is unostentatious but pregnant. He first glances at the state of ancient philosophy. Condemning at the onset the two opposite errors which had hitherto prevented a just acquaintance with nature; the one being that of magisterially pronouncing on her operations, as if we had done every thing, and knew all that could be known, which of course stops further inquiry, and quenches the spirit of discovery; the other being that of the sceptical philosophers, who maintain that nothing can be known. After preferring the middle course of the more ancient Greeks, who, "inter pronunciandi jactantiam et acatalepsiæ desperationem," though they complained of the difficulty of inquisition, and the darkness of things, still kept on; he objects to them, that even they, though bent upon discovery rather than disputation, did not appear to have applied a sufficient rule in their inquiries, but placed all things in subtlety of thought and fluctuation of the mind. We then have the design of the work before us, which he describes as more easily explained than executed, "for it is that we may establish a scale of certainty, that we may defend the sense by a kind of reduction, though generally rejecting that work of the mind that is merely subsequent on sense; still that we may open and defend a new and certain way from the perception of the senses themselves." The art of logic intended thus much, but it came too late as a remedy after the mind was possessed by customs, and polluted by idols, which it rather fixed than corrected. He therefore sees no other remedy than the beginning anew the whole work of the mind, and from the very first never to leave it to itself, but keep it under perpetual regulation; "ac res, veluti per machinas, conficiatus." The mind needs its instruments as well as the body, and what the assistance of mechanical powers is to the one, a right method of employing its faculties is to the other. The upshot of the whole matter is thus strikingly illustrated and set forth. "Truly if men had set about mechanical works, with their bare hands, unassisted with instruments, as they have ventured to set about intellectual works almost with the naked powers of the mind, they would have found themselves able to have effected very little, even though they combined their forces. If some large obelisk were to be raised, would it not seem a kind of madness for men to set about it with their naked hands? And would it not be greater madness still to increase the numbers of such naked labourers, in confidence of effecting the thing? And were it not a farther step in lunacy, to pick out the weaker bodied, and use only the robust and strong; as if that would certainly do? But if not content with this, recourse should be had to anointing the limbs, according to the art of the ancient wrestlers; and then all begin afresh; would not this be raving with reason? Yet this is but like the wild and fruitless procedure of mankind in intellectual matters, whilst they expect great things from multitude and consent, or the excellence and penetration of capacity; or strengthen as it were the sinews of the mind with logic. And yet, for all this bustle and struggle, men still continue to work with their naked understandings. At the same time it is evident, that in every great work, which the hand of man performs, the strength

of each person cannot be increased; nor that of all be made to act at once, without the use of instruments and machines."

He considers it fortunate that his design does not interfere with the ancients, whose honours remain undisturbed, as he does not proceed in their way, but in one altogether new and untried, and unknown to them; nor was he bent upon disturbing the received system of philosophy, which might for him continue to cherish disputes, and embellish speech, as his would not be useful for such ends; not being very obvious, or flattering to pre-notions, or taking with the vulgar, otherwise than by utility and effects. Therefore he wished that there should be two fountains or dispensations of doctrines-two friendly tribes of philosophers; in short, one method of cultivating and another of discovering the sciences. After wishing success to those who find the former more agreeable, he appeals in noble style to the true sons of science to join with him. "If any one has it at heart, not only to receive the things hitherto discovered, but to advance still farther; and not to conquer an adversary by disputation, but to conquer nature by works; not neatly to raise probable conjectures, but certainly and demonstratively to know; let him attach himself to us,—that leaving the entrance of nature which infinite numbers have trod, we may at length pass into her inner courts." He concludes with a natural request enough for a fair hearing, as the piece had been re-written by him no less than twelve times, in so many years, until, out of the Cogitata et Visa, it was brought to its present degree of perfection; and wishes that, when the subject was mastered, the method tried, experience consulted, and ill habits corrected, they who have thus begun to be themselves, would use their judgment on his work.

The Novum Organum consists of two books, of which the first is intended to prepare the mind for the reception and use of the instruments and instructions contained in the second; which delivers, or professes to deliver, the art of working with this new machine in the interpretation of nature.

The first book consists of one hundred and thirty aphorisms, concerning “the interpretation of nature, and the dominion of man." This form of writing in aphorisms was considered to possess some advantages over the common method; which looks more plausible and continuous, but is often a mere deceptive colouring thrown over a few empty and futile particulars. "The writing in aphorisms," we are told in the Advancement of Learning, "hath many excellent virtues, whereto the writing in method doth not approach. For, first, it trieth the writer whether he be superficial or solid: for aphorisms, except they should be ridiculous, cannot be made but of the pith and heart of sciences; for discourse by illustration is cut off; recitals of examples are cut off; discourse of connexion and order is cut off; so there remaineth nothing to fill the aphorisms, but some good quantity of observation: and therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt to write aphorisms, but he that is sound and grounded. Secondly, methods are more fit to win consent or belief, but less fit to point to action; for they carry a kind of demonstration in orb or circle, one part illuminating another, and therefore satisfactory. But particulars being dispersed do best agree with dispersed directions. And lastly, aphorisms, representing a knowledge broken, do invite man to inquire further; whereas methods, carrying the show of a total, do secure men as if they were at farthest."

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The first of these aphorisms, is the fundamental principle of the inductive philosophy. Man, the servant and interpreter of nature, can only understand and act in proportion as he observes, or contemplates, the order of nature; more he can neither know nor do." From neglecting observation and experiment to an incredible extent, the logic and physics of Bacon's time were in a most deplorable condition; in that condition, in short, which he has so faithfully pointed out in the former work. This aphorism has redeemed the sciences, and wrought that wondrous change in the aspect of things which he predicted.

"The rest of all the mischief in the sciences is this; that falsely magnifying and

admiring the powers of the mind, we seek not its real helps." (Aph. 9.) Men had forgotten that they were the ministers of nature, which far exceeds the subtlety of the sense and understanding; and he affirms that the vulgar induction was inefficient to discover works, and the vulgar logic insufficient to discover sciences.

That mode of rising directly from sense and particulars, to the most general axioms, he calls "the anticipation of nature,” as being a rash and hasty thing; but the other mode of raising axioms from sense and particulars, by a continued and gradual ascent, till it arrives at last to the most general axioms, which was the true but untried way, he calls "the interpretation of nature." In order to avoid the former, and employ the latter, a restoration was to be begun from the very foundation and leaving the ancients in possession of their honours, he points out a new path, and prepares the mind for the reception of the method which he proposed: "the leading men to particulars, their sense and order; and they were to prevail upon themselves to forsake their notions for a time, and begin their acquaintance with things."

:

"Our method has some resemblance with that of the sceptics at the entrance, but differs widely from it, and becomes opposite to it, in the end. They simply assert that nothing is knowable, and we say, that much cannot be known of nature in the common way; but then they destroy the authority of the sense and understanding, whereas we supply them both with helps." (Aph. 37.)

No part of Bacon's works is more valuable than his exact and sagacious exposition of the general, or rather natural, sources of error. He calls these prejudices by the expressive name of idols, the false objects of false worship, vain, delusive, and dangerous. These idols he divides into four kinds-idols of the tribe, idols of the den, idols of the market, idols of the theatre; and so comprehensive is this classification, that the enumeration will be found to include the principal causes which obstruct the discovery or reception of natural or moral truth in all cases. They almost constitute the Pantheon into which the soul of man has been degraded ; and our author may claim the honour of being the first to restore and purify the living temple. They are discussed in 24 aphorisms, and before particularizing the several kinds, the reader is informed in the 40th, that the proper remedy for removing and driving out the idols, is the raising of notions and axioms by legitimate induction. Yet he was of opinion that the indication of them was the more necessary, as they would again rise up and grow troublesome after the reformation of science.

1. The idols of the tribe are common to the whole race of mankind, and have their foundation in human nature: "For it is a false assertion that the human sense is the measure of things; since all perceptions, both of sense and mind, are with relation to man, and not with relation to the universe. But the human understanding is like an unequal mirror to the rays of things; which combining its own figure with the figures of the objects it represents, distorts and perverts them."

2. The idols of the den or cave are identified with the peculiar character of the individual: "The idols of every man in particular; for besides the general waywardness of human nature, we every one of us have our own peculiar den or cavern, which refracts or breaks the light of nature; either because every man has his respective temper, education, acquaintance, course of reading, and authorities he most respects; or because of the differences of impressions, as they may be made on a mind that is preoccupied and prepossessed, or on one that is calm and unbiassed; so that the human spirit according to its disposition in individuals, is a thing fluctuating, disorderly, and almost accidental. Whence Heraclitus well observes, that men seek the sciences in their lesser worlds, and not in the great and common one.” He speaks in another place of this kind of idol as every man's particular demon, or seducing familiar; and again, compares every man's mind to a glass, with its surface differently cut, so as differently to receive, and reflect, and refract the rays of light that fall upon it.

3. Idols of the forum have their rise from the compact, or association of mankind ; which depends upon language. "For men associate by discourse; but words are imposed according to the capacity of the vulgar: whence a false and improper imposition of words strangely possesses the understanding. Nor do the definitions and explanations, wherewith men of learning, in some cases, preserve and vindicate themselves, any way repair the injury; for words absolutely force the understanding, put all things in confusion, and lead men away to idle controversies and subtleties without number."

4. The idols of the theatre are the deceptions, perversions, and prejudices, which take their rise from the different tenets of philosophers, and the perverted laws of demonstration. And these are so denominated, "because all the philosophies that have been hitherto invented or received, are but as so many stage-plays, written or acted; as having shown. nothing but fictitious and theatrical worlds. Nor is this said only of the ancient or present sects and philosophies; for numberless other fables, of the like kind, may be still invented and dressed up, since quite different errors will proceed from almost the same common causes."

We have no space for observation on the author's profound comments on these various prejudices; he is a complete iconoclast; and if the reader would wish to see all these divisions more fully illustrated, we must refer him to Professor Playfair's Preliminary Dissertation.

“All these idols," says Bacon, "are solemnly and for ever to be renounced, and the understanding must be thoroughly cleared and purged of them; for the kingdom of man, which is founded in the sciences, cannot be entered otherwise than the kingdom of God; that is, in the condition of a little child." In order that the understanding may be the more disposed to cleanse itself, and put away its idols, he thinks proper to diverge into some particular confutation of false systems of philosophy. He notices, (1.) The sects and sorts of these theories, which he divides into three general kinds, sophistical, empirical, and superstitious. (2.) The false colours thereof, or the signs or characteristics of false systems; whether taken from their origins, their fruits, their progress, the confessions of their own authors, or from consent. (3.) The causes of so great an infelicity, or of errors in philosophies; and, (4.) The causes of so lasting and general a consent in error; which bring us to the ninety-third aphorism; where he proposes to "inquire into the grounds of hope," for the further advancement of philosophy and the sciences; and there follows a chain of arguments, for establishing a solid foundation of hope for the success of genuine philosophy in future. He has thus endeavoured to remove despair, (which is the principal cause of the slow progress of the sciences,) and finishes what he had to offer concerning the signs and causes of error. He enumerates the three kinds of confutations, by which he hoped to pull down the old structure: viz. 1. the confutation of the natural reason, when left to itself; 2. the confutation of the manner of demonstrations; 3. the confutation of the received theories, or prevailing philosophies and doctrines. "It would, therefore,” (he says, in Aphorism 115,) "be time to proceed to our rule and art of interpreting nature, did not something lie in the way, that requires to be removed. For we proposed by an introductory set of aphorisms to prepare the mind, to receive what is to follow; and having now levelled and polished the mirror, it remains that we set it in a right position, or, as it were, with a benevolent aspect to the things we shall further propose. For in every new undertaking, not only the being strongly prepossessed with an inveterate opinion, but also a false notion or expectation of what is to follow, proves sufficient to give a prejudice. We must, therefore, next endeavour to establish a just and true opinion of the thing we intend, though this opinion be only temporary, and of use but till the thing itself is well understood."

The remainder therefore, of this first part, (from Aphorism 116 to 130,) is occupied with the idea of the new method of interpreting nature, as the final preparation to the inductive