and particularly in those regular and equable motions carried on in the heavens, the parts of which, from their perfect fimilarity to each other, are correct measures of the continuous and fucceffive quantity called fime, with which they are conceived to co-exist. Time therefore may be defined the perceived number of fucceffive movements; for as number afcertains the greater or leffer quantity of things numbered, fo time afcertains the greater or leffer quantity of motion performed. An inftant is not a part, but the boundary of time; whofe elements are the perceptible intervals bounded by inftants. If body, therefore, had a beginning, fo must space, motion, and time, which are conceived merely as affections of body, or of each other. If body cannot be fuppofed infinitely extended, without fuppofing a contradiction, (for what quantity can actually exift of which the magnitude cannot be afcertained and expreffed?) fo neither can any of its properties; and therefore motion cannot be infinite; nor time, which is conceived folely as the measure of motion, a mere fiction of the fancy, poffeffing no real existence independently of us and our thoughts. The very effence of infinity, again, confifts in privation; it is a word denoting not a conception, but the negation of all conception; fo that the errors committed on this subject by the ancients, aud repeated by fome modern philofophers, and even fome modern mathematicians, proceed from their realizing a non-entity, and affigning a positive archetype, or what they call an idea, to a word, which is merely a fign that no fuch archetype or idea exifts. Body and space cannot be conceived as infinite either in greatness or littleness; and although its adjunct of motion or time is imagined to be fo conceived, this arifes from a mere illufion of the fancy, which, not retaining the parts of time first taken, continually adds new parts, but without increafing the whole; fince the former parts are continually annihilated, as the latter are created. To realife infinity muft, in all our reafonings, neceffarily lead to abfurdity; thus, to give our author's example, to fuppofe an infinite progreffion of caufes in making and arranging the world, is the fame thing as fuppofing it made or arranged without any cause at all.' Vol. I. p. 119.

The following confiderations, as applied to the proof of the existence of God, cannot be too well known.

Energy, then, as the word denotes, is always faid in reference to action; and that is faid to exist in energy, which executes its peculiar work, or performs its peculiar function.. The state of energy is the most perfect ftate of exiftence in which any object can be exhibited; as a master thinks he has perfected his scholar when he fhews him performing fkilfully the proper work of the art in which he was inftructed. Though energy always implies action, yet all actions are not energies. The actions of building, carving, healing, learning, refpectively terminate in a house, a ftatue, health, and science. But the actions of thought, of life, and of happinefs, (which is a kind of life,) have not any natural limit, bus

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may proceed eternally revolving on themselves, perfect without addition, complete in every inftant. That things effentially different 'may be diftinguished by different names, Ariftotle calls limited actions, motions; the unlimited, energies; obferving, that in the scale of being there is a continual afcent from mere powers and ca pacities to motions or imperfect energies, properly fo called, because terminating in nothing more excellent than themselves. Thofe operations, which terminate in a certain work, are only perfect in the work or production in which they are fixed and concentrated; as painting in the picture, building in the edifice. But energies not terminating in any work or production, are complete and perfect in themselves. The former belong in a certain sense to the work in which they are embodied; the latter can belong only to the energifing principle, which, when unceasingly active, as the firft efficient cause was proved neceffarily to be, is fimple, unmixed, and pure energy.

On fuch a principle as this, eternally and substantially active, both the heavens and the earth depend. He is the fpring of motion, the fountain of life, the fource of order and of beauty. All our obfervations and all our reasonings lead us irresistibly to this conclufion; for in all the motions or changes of body or matter, there must always be one part acted upon as well as another that acts, otherwise no action, and therefore no motion, could poffibly take place. But when we feparate this acting part from the inert mass with which it is united, the fame reasoning will still apply to it; it cannot be self-moved wholly, and the part which gives the impulse must always be different from that which receives it. By our divifions and fubdivifions without end, we shall therefore never come nearer to a solution than at first setting out, but shall always be compelled to confider matter as fomething fit to be moved, changed, or acted upon, but conftantly deriving its motion, change, or activity from fome foreign caufe. The prime mover, then, is neceffarily immaterial; and therefore indivifible, immoveable, impaffive, and invariable; ever actuating this vifible system, as is plain from the phænomena, according to the beft principles both of intellection and volition, which exactly coincide, when traced up to Deity, their ultimate fource. The phænomena of the universe are not unconnected and epifodical, like an ill-written tragedy; but all of them regulated and adjusted with confummate harmony. The Divinity, who comprehends and directs the whole, is not himself divifible in parts, nor comprehenfible by magnitude, fince all magnitude may be measured; and what finite magnitude can exert infinite power? He ever is what he is, exifting in energy before time began, fince time is only an affection of motion, of which God is the author. That kind of life which the best and happiest of men lead occafionally, in the unobstructed exercise of their highest powers, belongs eternally to God in a degree that should

excite admiration in proportion as it furpaffes comprehenfion." Vol. i. P. P. 133.

We now proceed to a confideration of the Ethics and the Politics, of which Dr. Gillies has given a tranflation. The former treatise is as various in its topics as copious in its illuftration, and as connected in its parts as any that can be named on the fame fubject, even the admirable work of Cicero not excepted, though it has not the fame methodical trammels, or fo many formalities of divifion and fubdivifion. Every book is preceded by an introduction, containing a fort of fyllabus of the general argument, with fuch appofite remarks as are calculated to illuftrate the refpective fubjects. As fpecimens of the Stagirite's morality, we offer the following extracts. On the pofition, that our habits are voluntary, he argues thus:

Ends are, then, the objects of volition; and the means of attaining them are the objects of deliberation and preference; which, being converfant only about fuch things as are in our own power, the virtues immediately proceeding from them muft alfo be in our own power, and voluntary, as well as the contrary vices. The poet's fentiment therefore is but partially true:

"None chooses wretchednefs, or fpurns delight."

'The latter claufe cannot be disputed; but the former must be denied, otherwise we must reject the doctrine juft established, that man is the author of his own actions; and that those things, whofe principles or caufes are in ourselves, are alfo in our own power. Yet these truths are attefted by common fenfe and universal experience. Criminal actions are punished by law, when not committed either through compulfion or ignorance; in which cafes they are pardoned, as not proceeding from ourselves. Praife-worthy actions, on the other hand, are encouraged and honoured; that as men are deterred from vice by the dread of punifliment, they may be excited to virtue by the hope of reward. But were not our con

duct voluntary, fuch perfuafives to virtue would be useless and abfurd; and there would be no more fenfe in exhorting a man to his duty, than in perfuading him not to feel cold or heat, thirst or hunger. Crimes committed through ignorance are only excufable when the ignorance is involuntary; for when the cause of it lies in ourfelves, it is then justly punishable; as in that ancient law which inflicts a double penalty on crimes done in drunkenness. The ignorance of thofe laws, which all may know if they will, does not excuse the breach of them; and neglect is not pardonable, where attention ought to be bestowed. But perhaps we are incapable of attention. This however is our own fault; fince the incapacity. has been contracted by our continual careleffhefs; as the evils of injustice and intemperance are contracted by the daily commiffion of iniquity, and the daily indulgence in voluptuoufnefs. For fuch as our actions are, fuch muft our habits become; a truth conCRIT. REV. VOL. XXIV. Sept. 1798. E

firmed by fuch univerfal experience, that to be ignorant of it betrays the groffeft ftupidity. It is plain therefore that our vices ate voluntary; fince we voluntarily do thofe things which we know muft produce them. But does it depend merely on our own wills to correct and reform our bad habits? It certainly does not; neither does it depend on the will of a patient, who has despised the advice of his phyfician to recover that health which is loft by his own profligacy. When we have thrown a stone, we cannot reftrain its flight; but it depended entirely on ourselves, whether we fhould throw it or not. The villain and the voluptuary are therefore voluntarily fuch; because the cause of their turpitude lies folely in themselves. Not only the vices of the mind, but even the imperfections of the body, are just subjects for reproach, when they are not natural, but produced through our own indolence or neglect. We pity blindness, lameness, or deformity, when they proceed from caufes independent on thofe afflicted with them; but they are juft objects of reproach, when contracted through drunkenness or any other fpecies of debauchery; and, in the fame manner, all vices and imperfections are blameable which originate in ourfelves.' Vol. i. r. 206.

In contrasting the facetiousness of a gentleman with the coarseness and illiberality of a buffoon, Ariftotle fhows, that, as the teacher of exterior manners, he could have rivaled a late courtly peer on his favourite fubjects.

As life requires repofe from ferious employment, and this repofe may be enlivened by amusement, there feems to be a virtue relative to the intercourse of men in their hours of relaxation and merriment, regulating both the matter and the manner of their converfation. The ftrain of this converfation may be inore auftere or more ludicrous than it ought, or may flow in that happy medium which is alone confiftent with propriety. He who feeks to raise laughter on all occafions indifcriminately, without regard to decency, or to the pain inflicted on the object of his ridicule, is a low and contemptible buffoon: he who is himself totally incapable of exciting mirth, and who is fo far from relishing, that he is highly offended with the innocent jefts of others, indicates a roughness and favageness of character, unbending hardness, and unsocial aufterity; whereas true facetioufnefs confifts in graceful flexibility of mind and manners, which can affume all fhapes, and which becomes all; for as the habits of the body are known by its motions, fo are those of the mind. An immoderate propenity to ridicule being a more prominent and more confpicuous quality than the contrary extreme of fullen and ruftic gravity, and the greater part of mankind being inclined to delight in merriment, without anxioufly examining whether it originates in a pure and proper fource; buffoonery often paffes for facetioufnefs, although there be the greatest difference between the coarseness of the one and the elegance of the

other; for in cetioufnefs, which is the middle and proper habits an eafy pliancy of humour is adorned with a graceful dexterity which skilfully avoids whatever is indecent and illiberal; never debafing the delicate gaiety congenial to the character of well educated citizens, by the fmalleft approximation to the vile raillery of profligates and flaves. The progrefs of letters and civility has a powerful influence on the refinement of wit and humour; witness the difference between the ancient and modern comedy. In the former, the most shameful reproaches, expreffed in the coarseft language, formed a principal fource of the public entertainment; in the latter, the audience are taught chiefly to relish the faint infinua tion, and the delicate hint: with refpect to beauty and gracefulness, the two styles of writing are marked by the ftrongest differences.' Vol. i. P. 250.

In the Politics, a work which comprises the most important fubjects of government, laws, and political economy, Dr. Gillies is more profufe of comment and illustration than he is with regard to the Ethics. In the introduction to the first book, he endeavours to refute fome of Locke's maxims of government; and, by way of appendix to the second, he has reprinted, with additions, his interesting account of the little republic of St. Marino.

As fpecimens of the differtation on politics, and of the translation of it, we fubjoin the obfervations on the proper age for marriage, and on limited monarchy.

According to this fyftem of arrangement, the first care of the legiflator ought to confift in afcertaining the age and qualities of perfons fit to be joined in wedlock. Perfons fo united, ought to defcend together into the vale of years; and their powers of producing beings like themselves ought together to co-exist, uniformly to decay, and nearly at the fame time to ceafe: the contrary of which feldom fails to occafion much domeftic uneafinefs. Refpect alfo fhould be had to the fucceffion of children, who ought neither to be too remotely diftant, nor too closely to tread on the heels of their parents. When the former takes place, parents can expect to derive but little benefit from their children; and when the latter is the cafe, children will feldom entertain much reverence for their pa rents, who being nearly their equals in age, will be confidered as on a foot of equality in all other refpects; and with whom, therefore, they will be often ready to differ in matters of opinion, or to quarrel about matters of interest. It happens most fortunately that all these ends and purposes may be attained and answered by precisely the fame means, the coupling parties in wedlock at the proper and seasonable age.

About the age of feventy, men commonly ceafe to be huf bands; and after the age of fifty, women feldom become mothers. The times of entering into marriage for the different fexes ought to