1

times found to be in a rich old mifer, without family to provide for, or friend to oblige by it, and to whom confequently it is no longer (and he may be fenfible of it too) of any real ufe or value: yet is this man. as much overjoyed with gain, and mortified by loffes, as he was the firft day he opened his fhop, and when his very fubfiftence depended upon his fuccefs

in it.

By thefe means the cuftom of approving certain actions commenced; and when once fuch a custom hath got footing in the world, it is no difficult thing to explain how it is tranfmitted and continued; for then the greatest part of thofe who approve of virtue, approve of it from authority, by imitation, and from a habit of approving fuch and fuch actions, inculcated in early youth, and receiving, as men grow up, continual acceffions of ftrength and vigour, from cenfure and encouragement, from the books they read, the converfations they hear, the current application of epithets, the general turn of language, and the various other caufes, by which it univerfally comes to pafs, that a fociety of men, touched in the feebleft degree with the fame paffion, foon communicate to one another a great degree of it. This is the cafe with moft of us at prefent; and is the caufe alfo, that the process of affociation, defcribed in the laft paragraph but one, is little now either perceived or wanted.

66

"From inftances of popular tumults, feditions, factions, pa"nics, and of all paffions, which are fhared with a multitude, we may learn the influence of fociety, in exciting and fupporting any emotion; while the moft ungovernable diforders "are raifed, we find, by that means, from the flightest and most frivolous occafions.-He must be more or less than man, who "kindles not in the common blaze. What wonder then, that "moral fentiments are found of fuch influence in life, though fpringing from principles, which may appear, at first fight, . fomewhat fmall and delicate ?"

Hume's Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.

Sect. IX. p. 326.

Amongst

Amongst the caufes affigned for the continuance and diffufion of the fame moral fentiments amongst mankind we have mentioned imitation. The efficacy of this principle is moft obfervable in children; indeed, if there be any thing in them, which deferves the name of an inftinct, it is their propenfity to imitation. Now there is nothing which children imitate or apply more readily than expreffions of affection and averfion, of approbation, hatred, refentment, and the like; and when these paffions and expreions are once connected, which they foon will be by the fame affociation which unites words with their ideas, the paffion will follow the expreffion, and attach upon the object to which the child has been accustomed to apply the epithet. In a word, when almost every thing elfe is learned by imitation, can we wonder to find the fame caufe concerned in the generation of our moral -fentiments?

Another confiderable objection to the fyftem of moral inftincts is this, that there are no maxims in thefcience, which can well be deemed inpate, as none perhaps can be affigned, which are abfolutely and univerfally true; in other words, which do not bend to circumstances. Veracity, which feems, if any be, a natural duty, is excufed in many cafes towards an enemy, a thief, or a madman. The obligation of promifes, which is a firft principle in morality, depends upon the circumftances under which they were made: they may have been unlawful, or become fo fince, or inconfiftent with former promifes, or erroneous, or extorted; under all which cafes, inftances may be fuggefted, where the obligation to perform the promife would be very dubious, and fo of most other general rules, when they come to be actually applied.

An argument has been alfo propofed on the fame fide of the queftion of this kind. Together with the inftinct, there must have been implanted, it is faid, a clear and precise idea of the object upon which it was to attach. The inftinct and the idea of the ob

ject are infeparable even in imagination, and as neceffarily accompany each other as any correlative ideas whatever: that is, in plainer terms, if we be prompted by nature, to the approbation of particular actions, we must have received alfo from nature a diftin&t conception of the action we are thus prompted to approve; which we certainly have not received.

But as this argument bears alike against all inftincts, and against their exiftence in brutes as well as in men, it will hardly, I fuppofe, produce conviction, though it may be difficult to find an anfwer to it.

Upon the whole, it feems to me, either that there exift no fuch inftincts as compofe what is called the moral fenfe, or that they are not now to be diftinguished from prejudices and habits; on which account they cannot be depended upon in moral reafoning: I mean that it is not a fafe way of arguing, to affume certain principles as fo many dictates, impulfes, and inftincts of nature, and then to draw conclufions from thefe principles, as to the rectitude or wrongnefs of actions, independent of the tendency of fuch actions, or of any other confideration what

ever.

Ariftotle lays down, as a fundamental and felfevident maxim, that nature intended barbarians to be flaves; and proceeds to deduce from this naxim a train of conclufions, calculated to juftify the policy which then prevailed. And I queftion whether the fame maxim be not ftill felfevident to the company of merchants trading to the coaft of Africa.

Nothing is fo foon made as a maxim; and it appears from the example of Ariftotle, that authority and convenience, education, prejudice, and general practice, have no fmall fhare in the making of them; and that the laws of cuftom are

very apt to be mistaken for the order of na

ture.

For which reafon, I fufpect that a fyftem of morality, built upon inftincts, will only find out reafons and excufes for opinions and practices already established-will feldom correct or reform either.

But farther, fuppofe we admit the exiftence of these inftincts, what, it may be afked, is their authority? No man, you fay, can act in deliberate oppofition to them, without a fecret remorfe of confcience. But this remorfe may be borne with

and if the finner choose to bear with it, for the fake of the pleasure or profit which he expects from his wickednefs; or finds the pleasure of the fin to exceed the remorfe of confcience, of which he alone is the judge, and concerning which, when he feels them both together, he can hardly be mistaken, the moral-inftinct-man, fo far as I can underftand, has nothing more to offer.

For, if he alledge, that thefe inftincts are fo many indications of the will of God, and confequently prefages of what we are to look for hereafter, this, I answer, is to refort to a rule and a motive, ulterior to the instincts themfelves, and at which rule. motive we shall by and by arrive by a furer road-I fay furer, fo long as there remains a controverfy whether there be any inftinctive maxims at all; or any difficulty in afcertaining what maxims are inftinctive.

This celebrated queftion therefore becomes in our fyftem a question of pure curiofity; and as fuch we difmifs it to the determination of those who are more inquifitive, than we are concerned to be, about the natural history and conftitution of the hu man fpecies.

That

of

man

of the winter of
question it, this arises from the presun
who is never satise with

he does not on genate him
wist- it's from the diverite, of the
you and have lam sarder to have

Can

CHAF

(རྣ ༢༣

CHAP. VI.

HUMAN HAPPINESS.

THE word happy is a relative term; that is, when we call a man happy, we mean that he is happier than fome others, with whom we compare him; than the generality of others; or than he himfelf was in fome other fituation: thus, fpeaking of one who has juft compaffed the object of a long purfuit, "now," we fay, "he is happy;" and in a like comparative fenfe, compared, that is, with the general lot of mankind, we call a man happy who poffeffes health and competency.

In ftrictnefs, any condition may be denominated happy, in which the amount or aggregate of pleafure exceeds that of pain; and the degree of happinefs depends upon the quantity of this excefs.

And the greateft quantity of it ordinarily attainable in human life, is what we mean by happiness, when we enquire or pronounce what human happiness confifts in.

In

If any pofitive fignification, diftinct from what we mean by pleasure, can be affixed to the term "happiness," I fhould take it to denote a certain flate of the nervous fyftem in that part of the human frame in which we feel joy and grief, paffions and affections. Whether this part be the heart, which the turn of moft languages would lead us to believe, or the diaphragm, as Buffon or the upper orifice of the ftomach, as Van Helmont thought; or rather be a kind of fine, net-work, lining the whole region of the præcordia, as others have imagined; it is poffible, not only that each painful fenfation may violently fhake and difturb the fibres at the time, but that a series of fuch may at length fo derange the very texture of the fyftem, as to produce a perpetual irritation, which will fhew itfelf by fretfulness, impatience, and releffnefs. It is poffible alfo, on the other hand, that a fucceffion of pleasurable fenfations may have such

an