his infinite nature will bear down all oppofition from our impotence, ignorance, vice, or mifery: he is our Creator, Judge, and King, our Friend, and Father, and GOD.

And though the transcendant greatness and glori oufnefs of this profpect may, at first view, make our faith stagger, and incline us to disbelieve through joy; yet, upon farther confideration, it seems rather to confirm and establish itself on that account; for the more it exceeds our gratitude and comprehenfion, the more does it coincide with the idea of that abfolutely perfect Being, whom the feveral orders of imperfect beings perpetually fuggeft to us, as our only refting-place, the cause of caufes, and the fupreme reality.

However, on the other hand, it must be acknowledged, that the evils which we fee and feel are strong arguments of the poffibility of ftill greater evils, of any finite evils whatever, and of their confiftency with the divine attributes. All finites are equally nothing in refpect of infinite; and if the infinite power, knowledge, and goodnefs of God can permit the least evil, they may permit any finite degree of it, how great foever, for any thing that we know to the contrary. And this most alarming confideration cannot but compel every thinking perfon to ufe his utmost endeavours, firft for his own prefervation and deliverance; and then, in proportion to his benevolence, for the prefervation and deliverance of others.

Nor can fuch a perfon long hefitate what method to take in the general. The duties of piety, benevolence, and felf-government, confidered in the general, have had fuch a ftamp fet upon them by all ages and nations, by all orders and conditions of men, approve themselves fo much to our frame and conftitution, and are fo evidently conducive to both public and private happiness here, that one cannot

doubt of their procuring for us not only fecurity, but our fummum bonum, our greatest poffible happinefs, during the whole courfe of our existence, whatever that may be.

These are the genuine dictates of what is called natural religion. But we, who live in Chriftian countries, may have recourse to far clearer light, and to a more definite rule: the Christian revelation is attested by fuch evidences historical, prophetical, and moral, as will give abundant comfort and fatisfaction to all who seek them earnestly. A future life, with indefinite or even infinite rewards and punishments, is fet before us in exprefs terms, the conditions declared, examples related both to encourage our hopes, and alarm our fears, and affurances of affiftance and mercy delivered in the strongest and most pathetic terms.

Yet ftill there are difficulties both in the word of GOD, and in his works; and these difficulties are fometimes fo magnified, as to lead to fcepticism, infidelity, or atheism. Now, the contemplation of our own frame and conftitution appears to me to have a peculiar tendency to leffen thefe difficulties attending natural and revealed religion, and to improve their evidences, as well as to concur with them in their determination of man's duty and expectations. With this view, I drew up the foregoing obfervations on the frame and connection of the body and mind; and, in profecution of the fame defign, I now propose,

First, To proceed upon this foundation, and upon the other phænomena of nature to deduce the evidences for the being and attributes of GOD, and the general truths of natural religion.

Secondly, Laying down all these as a new foundation, to deduce the evidences for revealed religion. Thirdly, To inquire into the rule of life, and the particular applications of it, which refult from the

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frame of our natures, the dictates of natural religion, and the precepts of the fcriptures taken together, compared with, and cafting light upon, each other. And,

Fourthly, To inquire into the genuine doctrines of natural and revealed religion thus illuftrated, concerning the expectations of mankind, here and hereafter, in confequence of their obfervance or violation of the rule of life.

I do not prefume to give a complete treatise on any of these subjects; but only to borrow from the many excellent writings, which have been offered to the world on them, fome of the principal evidences and deductions, and to accommodate them to the foregoing theory of the mind; whereby it may appear, that though the doctrines of affociation and mechanifm do make fome alterations in the method of reasoning on religion, yet they are far from leffening either the evidences for it, the comfort and joy of religious perfons, or the fears of irreligious ones.

OBSERVATIONS ON MAN,

HIS FRAME,

HIS DUTY, AND HIS EXPECTATIONS,

CHAP. I.

Of the BEING and ATTRIBUTES of GOD, and of NATURAL RELIGION.

PROP. I.

Something must have exifted from all Eternity, or, there never was a Time when nothing existed.

FOR, when we place ourselves in fuch an imagi

nary point of time, and then try to conceive how a world, finite or infinite, fhould begin to exift, absolutely without caufe, we find an instantaneous and irresistible check put to the conception, and we are compelled at once to reject the fuppofition: fo that the manner in which we reject it, is a proper authority for doing so. It is fuperfluous, in this cafe, to inquire into the nature of this check and rejection, and diffent grounded thereon; fince, after all our inquiries, we must still find an infuperable reluctance to affent. The fuppofition will not remain in the

mind, but is thrown out immediately; and I do not fpeak of this, as what ought to follow from a proper theory of evidence and affent, but as a fact, which every man feels, whatever his notions of logic be, or whether he has any or none; and I appeal to every man for the truth of this fact. Now, no truth can have a greater reality to us, nor any falfehood a greater evidence against it, than this inftantaneous, neceffary affent or diffent. I conclude, therefore, that there never was a time when nothing existed; or, in other words, that fomething muft have exifted from all eternity.

PROP. II.

There cannot have been a mere Succeffion of finite dependent Beings from all Eternity; but there must exift, at least, one infinite and independent Being.

IF an infinite fucceffion of finite dependent beings be poffible, let M, N, O, &c. represent the feveral links of this chain or feries; N is therefore the mere effect of M, O of N, &c. as we descend; and as we afcend, M is the effect of L, L of K, &c. Each particular being, therefore, is a mere effect; and, therefore, the fuppofition of fuch a fucceffion finite: à parte ante would be rejected immediately according to the laft propofition, fince A, the first term would be an effect abfolutely without a caufe, and the fame thing holds, whatever number of terms be added à parte ante. If, therefore, an infinite number be added, (which I here fuppofe poffible for argument's fake,) fo that the feries may become infinite à parte ante, the fame conclufion must be valid according to the analogy of all mathematical reasonings