judgments which we make upon matters of such importance to us, and fo much above our capacities. However, it does not appear to many other learned and devout perfons either that the fcripture paffages alluded to are a proper foundation for this opinion, or that of philofophical free-wil, though allowed, can afford a fufficient vindication of the divine attributes.

These observations feem naturally to occur, upon confidering these five fuppofitions, and comparing them with one another, and with the word and works of GOD. But there is alfo another way of confidering the third fuppofition, which, as it is a prefumption for it, though not an evidence, agreeably to what was intimated above, I fhall here offer to the reader.

First then, Affociation has an evident tendency to convert a state of fuperior happiness, mixed w th inferior mifery, into one of pure happinefs, into a paradifiacal one, as has been thewn in the firit part of thefe obfervations, prop. 14. cor. 9. Or, in other words, affociation tends to convert the ftate of the third fuppofition into that of the fecond.

Secondly, When any fmall pain is introductory to a great pleasure, it is very common for us, without any exprefs reflection on the power of affociation, to confider this pain as coalefcing with the fubfequent pleasure, into a pure pleasure, equal to the difference between them; and, in fome cafes, the fmall pain itself puts on the nature of a pleasure, of which we fee many inftances in the daily occurrences of life, where labour, wants, pains, become actually pleasant to us, by a luftre borrowed from the pleasures to be obtained by them. And this happens moft particularly, when we recollect the events of our past lives, or view thofe of others. It is to be observed also, that this power of uniting different and oppofite fenfations into one increases as we advance in life, and in our intellectual capacities; and that, ftrictly speaking, no

fenfation can be a monad, inafmuch as the most simple are infinitely divisible in refpect of time, and extent of impreffion. Thofe, therefore, which are esteemed the pureft pleasures, may contain fome parts which afford pain; and, converfely, were our capacities fufficiently enlarged, any fenfations, connected to each other in the way of cause and effect, would be esteemed one fenfation, and be denominated a pure pleasure, if pleasure prevailed upon the whole.

Thirdly, As the enlargement of our capacities enables us thus to take off the edge of our pains, by uniting them with the fubfequent fuperior pleasures, fotit confers upon us more and more the power of enjoying our future pleasures by anticipation, by extending the limits of the prefent time, i. e. of that time in which we have an intereft. For the prefent time, in a metaphysical sense, is an indivifible moment; but the prefent time, in a practical fenfe, is a finite quantity of various magnitudes, according to our capacities, and, beginning from an indivifible moment in all, feems to grow on indefinitely in beings who are ever progreffive in their paffage through an eternal life.

Suppofe now a being of great benevolence, and enlarged intellectual capacities, to look down upon mankind paffing through a mixture of pleafures and pains, in which, however, there is a balance of pleafure, to a greater balance of pleasure perpetually, and, at last, to a ftate of pure and exalted pleasure made fo by affociation: It is evident, that his benevolence to man will be the fource of pure pleasure to him from his power of uniting the oppofite fenfations, and of great prefent pleafure from his power of anticipation. And the more we fuppofe the benevolence and capacities of this being enlarged, the greater and more pure will his fympathetic pleafure be, which arifes from the contemplation of man. It follows therefore, that, in the eye of an infinite mind, crea

tures conducted, as we think, according to the third of the foregoing fuppofitions, are conducted according to the fecond, and thefe according to the firft; or, in other words, that the firft, fecond, and third, of the foregoing fuppofitions, are all one and the fame in the eye of GOD. For all time, whether past, prefent, or future, is prefent time in the eye of God, and all ideas coalefce into one to him; and this one is infinite happiness, without any mixture of mifery, viz. by the infinite prepollence of happiness above mifery, so as to annihilate it; and this merely by confidering time as it ought to be confidered in ftrictnefs, i. e. as a relative thing, belonging to beings of finite capacities, and varying with them, but which is infinitely abforbed in the pure eternity of GoD. Now the appearance of things to the eye of an infinite being must be called their real appearance in all propriety. And though it be impoffible for us to arrive at this true way of conceiving things perfectly, or directly, yet we fhall approach nearer and neares to it, as our intellectual capacities, benevolence, devotion, and the purity of our happiness, depending thereon, advance: and we feem able, at prefent, to exprefs the real appearance, in the fame way as mathematicians do ultimate ratios, to which quantities ever tend, and never arrive, and in a language which bears a fufficient analogy to other expreffions that are admitted. So that now (if we allow the third fuppofition) we may in fome fort venture to maintain that, which at first sight feemed not only contrary to obvious experience, but even impoffible, viz. that all individuals are actually and always infinitely happy. And thus all difficulties relating to the divine attributes will be taken away; GOD will be infinitely powerful, knowing, and good in the most abfolute fenfe, if we confider things as they appear to him. And furely, in all vindications of the divine

attributes, this ought to be the light in which we are to confider things. We ought to fuppofe ourfelves in the centre of the fyftem, and to try, as far as we are able, to reduce all apparent retrogradations to real progreffions. It is alfo the greatest fatisfaction to the mind thus to approximate to its firft conceptions concerning the divine gooduefs, and to answer that endless queftion, why not lefs mifery, and more happiness? in a language which is plainly analogous to all other authentic language, though it cannot yet be felt by us on account of our prefent imperfection, and of the mixture of our good with evil. Farther, it is remarkable, that neither the fourth nor fifth fuppofitions can pafs into the third, and that the fifth will always have a mixture of mifery in it, as long as the principium individuationis is kept up. And if this be taken away, the fuppofitions themselves are destroyed, and we entirely loft.

I have been the longer in confidering the divine benevolence, on account of its importance both to our duty and happiness. There feems to be abundant foundation for faith, hope, refignation, gratitude, love. We cannot doubt but the judge and father of all the world will conduct himself according to justice, mercy, and goodness. However, I defire to repeat once more, that we do not feem to have fufficient evidence to determine abfolutely for any of the three laft fuppofitions. We cannot indeed but with for the third, both from felf-intereft and benevolence; and its coincidence with the first and second, in the manner just now explained, appears to be fome prefumption in favour of it.

PROP. V.

There is but one Being infinite in Power, Knowledge, and Goodness; i. e. but one God.

FOR, if we fuppofe more than one, it is plain, fince the attributes of infinite power, knowledge, and goodness include all poffible perfection, that they must be entirely alike to each other, without the leaft poffible variation. They will therefore intirely coalefce in our idea, i. e. be one to us. Since they fill all time and space, and are all independent, omnipotent, omniscient, and infinitely benevolent, their ideas cannot be separated, but will have a numerical, as well as a generical, identity. When we fuppofe other beings generically the fame, and yet numerically different, we do at the fame time fuppofe that they exist in different portions of time or space; which circumftances cannot have place in respect of the supposed plurality of infinite beings. We conclude, therefore, that there is but one infinite Being, or God.

The unity of the Godhead is also proved by revelation, confidered as fupported by evidences which have no dependence on natural religion. And as this proof of the unity is of great importance even now, fo it was of far greater in ancient times, when the world was overrun with polytheism. And it is highly probable to me, that as the first notions of the divine power, knowledge, and goodnefs, which mankind had, were derived from revelation, fo much more were their notions of the unity of the Godhead.