Secondly, Refined felf-intereft, when indulged, is a much deeper and more dangerous error than the grofs, because it shelters itself under fympathy, theopathy, and the moral fenfe, fo as to grow through their protection; whereas the grofs self-interest, being avowedly contrary to them, is often stifled by the increase of benevolence and compaffion, of the love and fear of GOD, and of the fenfe of duty to him.

Thirdly, It is allied to, and, as it were, part of the foregoing objection, which yet deferves a particular confideration, that the pride attending on refined felf-intereft, when carried to a certain height, is of an incorrigible, and, as it were, diabolical nature. And, upon the whole, we may obferve, that as grofs felf-intereft, when it gets poffeffion of a man, puts him into a lower condition than the mere sensual brutal one, in which he was born; fo refined felfintereft, when that gets poffeffion, depreffes him ftill farther, even to the very confines of hell. However, it is still to be remembered, that fome degree muft arife in the beginning of a religious course; and that this, if it be watched and refifted, is an argument of our advancement in piety and virtue. But the best things, when corrupted, often become the worst.

I come now, in the laft place, to confider what objections lie against rational felf-intereft, as our primary pursuit.

Now, here it may be alleged, First, That as we cannot but defire any particular pleasure propofed to us, as long as the affociations, which formed it, fubsist in due ftrength; fo, when any thing is believed to be the means of attaining our greatest poffible happiness, the whole frame of our acquired nature puts us upon pursuing it. Rational felf-interest must therefore always have a neceffary influence over us.

Secondly, It may be alleged, that I have myfelf made rational felf-intereft the basis of the prefent inquiry after the rule of life, having fuppofed all along that our greateft poffible happiness is the object of this rule.

And it certainly follows hence, that rational felfintereft is to be put upon a very different footing from that of the grofs and refined; agreeably to which the fcriptures propofe general and indefinite hopes and fears, and efpecially thofe of a future ftate, and inculcate them as good and proper motives of action. But then, on the other hand, the fcriptures inculcate many other motives, diftinct from hope and fear; fuch as the love of GoD and our neighbour, the law of our minds, &c. i. e. the motives of fympathy, theopathy, and the moral fenfe, as explained in this work. And we may fee from the reafoning ufed in refpect of grofs and refined felfintereft, that a conftant attention to that which is the most pure and rational, to the most general hopes and fears, would extinguish our love of GOD and our neighbour, as well as the other particular defires, and augment the ideas and defires, which centre immediately and directly in felf, to a monftrous height. Rational felf-intereft may therefore be faid to lie between the impure motives of fenfation, imagination, ambition, grofs felf-interest, and refined self-intereft, on the one hand, and the pure ones of fympathy, thcopathy, and the moral fenfe, on the other; fo that when it reftrains the impure ones, or cherishes the pure, it may be reckoned a virtue; when it cherishes the impure, or damps the pure, a vice. Now there are inftances of both kinds, of the first in grofsly vicious perfons, of the laft in thofe that have made confiderable advancement in piety and virtue. In like manner, the impure mo

tives of fenfation, imagination, &c. differ in degree of impurity from each other; and therefore may be either virtues or vices, in a relative way of fpeaking. It feems, however, moft convenient, upon the whole, to make rational felf intereft the middle point; and this, with all the other reafoning of this paragraph, may ferve to fhew, that it ought not to be cultivated primarily. But I fhall have occafion to confider this matter farther under the next propofition but one, when I come to deduce practical obfervations on selfintereft and felf-annihilation.

It may be reckoned a part of the grofs and refined felf-interefts, to fecure ourselves against the hazards of falling into the pains of the other fix claffes, and a part of rational felf-intereft, to provide againft our greatest danger; and it might be fhewn in like manner, that neither ought these to be primary pursuits.

PROP. LXVI.

Aftrict Regard to the Precepts of Benevolence, Piety, and the Moral Senfe, favours even grofs SelfIntereft; and is the only Method, by which the refined and rational can be fecured.

HERE we may observe,

First, That fince the regard to benevolence, piety, and the moral fenfe, procures the pleasures of fenfa tion, imag nation, and ambition, in their greatet perfection for the most part; it must favour grofs felfintereft, or the pursuit of the means of these.

Secondly, This regard has, in many cafes, an immediate tendency to procure thefe means, i. e. to procure riches, power, learning, &c. And though it happens fometimes, that a man muft forego both the

VOL. II.

means for obtaining pleasure, and pleasure itself, from a regard to duty; and happens often, that the best men have not the greatest share of the means; yet it seems that the best men have, in general, the fairest profpect for that competency, which is most suitable to real enjoyment. Thus, in trades and profeffions, though it feldom is obferved, that men eminent for piety and charity amafs great wealth (which indeed could not well confift with these virtues); yet they are generally in affluent or eafy circumftances, from the faithful discharge of duty, their prudence, moderation in expenfes, &c. and fcarce ever in indigent A fenfe of duty begets a defire to discharge it; this recommends to the world, to the bad as well as to the good; and, where there are inftances apparently to the contrary, farther information will, for the most part, difcover fome fecret pride, negligence, or imprudence, i. e. fomething contrary to duty, to which the perfon's ill fuccefs in refpect of this world may be ascribed.

ones.

Thirdly, A regard to duty plainly gives the greatest capacity for enjoyment; as it fecures us against thofe diforders of body and mind, which render the natural objects of pleasure infipid or ungrateful.

Fourthly, As to refined felf-intereft, or the purfuit of the means for obtaining the pleasures of fympathy, theopathy, and the moral fenfe, it appears at firft fight, that a due regard to thefe muft procure for us both the end, and the means.

Fifthly, However the grofs or refined self-intereft may, upon certain occafions, be difappointed, the rational one never can, whilft we act upon a principle of duty. Our future happiness must be secured thereby. This the profane and profligate, as far as they have any belief of GOD, providence, or a future ftate (and I prefume, that no one could ever arrive at more than fcepticism and uncertainty in these

things), allow, as well as the devout and pious Chriftian. And, when the rational felf-intereft is thus fecured, the difappointments of the other two become far lefs grievous, make far lefs impreffion upon the mind. He that has a certain reverfion of an infinite and eternal inheritance, may be very indifferent about prefent poffeffions.

PROP. LXVII.

To deduce practical Obfervations on Self-Intereft and Self-Annihilation.

SELF-INTEREST being reckoned by fome writers the only stable point upon which a fyftem of morality can be erected, and felf-annihilation by others the only one in which man can rest, I will here endeavour to reconcile thefe two opinions, giving at the fame time both a general description of what paffes in our progrefs from felf-intereft to felf-annihilation, and fome fhort hints of what is to be approved or condemned in this practice.

1

First, then, The vicious pleafures of fenfation, imagination, and ambition, being often very expen five, are checked by the groffeft of all the felf-interefts, the mere love of money; and the principle upon which men act in this cafe is esteemed one fpecies of prudence. This may be tolerated in others, where it is not in our power to infufe a better motive; but, in a man's felf, it is very abfurd to have recourse to one which muft leave fo great a defilement, when others that are purer and ftronger, rational felf-intereft particularly, are at hand.

Secondly, The defire of bodily and mental accomplishments, learning particularly, confidered as