as just now mentioned, tends, for most eminent and beneficent final caufes in both cafes, to affect the imagination and memory with stronger and more lafting impreffions, fo as to occur more readily to the invention in all inquiries and speculations of this kind. Fourthly, If we fuppofe, that natural good prevails, upon the whole, in the world, analogy feems to require, that moral good (which is, in general, its cause) should also prevail in like manner. Farther, as we judge, that natural good prevails from the general defire of life, the pleasure of recollecting perfous, and places, and renewing our acquaintance with them, &c. fo the fame things feem to determine, that mankind is, upon the whole, rather amiable and respectable, than hateful and contemptible, i. e. rather virtuous than vicious.

Laftly, It is to be observed, that, in an accurate way of speaking, virtue and vice, are mere relative terms, like great and little. Whence the average of mankind may be confidered as a middle point between the positive and negative quantities of virtue and vice, as a neutral fituation. And, upon this fuppofition, we might firft fhew, that it is man's greatest interest, his fummum bonum, at least, to be neutral; and afterwards, that he ought to prefs forward with all poffible earneftness towards the infinite perfection of GoD, though ever at an infinite distance. For, as every finite length is infinitely nearer to nothing, than to a metaphyfically infinite one (to make this fuppofition for argument's fake;) fo all finite virtue is infinitely more distant from the infinite perfection of GOD, than from nothing. And thus indeed all our righteoufnefs is filthy rags, and all our virtue infinite vice. But this method of confidering the present fubject is far from oppofing the purport

of this fection.

If we should call all mere felf-regards vice, and all regards to GOD, and our neighbour, virtue; which is a very proper language, and one that would render the terms of this inquiry precife; it feems probable to me, that virtue abounds more, upon the whole, than vice. A view to the good of others, at least near relations, is a general motive to action; and a defign to please Gon, at least not to offend him, is very common in the bulk of mankind, or even the worst. The most ordinary and trivial actions are performed without any explicit view at all, at leaft any that we remember a few moments after the action, i. e. are automatic fecondarily; and fo cannot be confidered as either virtuous or vicious; or, if they be, we must judge of their complexion by that of the more eminent ones.

Secondly, It may be objected, that, according to the fcriptures, mankind are in a loft fallen ftate; that they are all gone out of the way, and become corrupt and abominable; that there is none that doth good, &c. I answer, that thefe and fuch like expreffions feem to refer to a former state of innocence in paradife, to a future kingdom of righteousness, promised in both the Old and New Testament, and to the rule of life laid down there, with the conditions requifite to our admittance into this happy ftate: and that, in this view of things, the virtue of mankind in general is as deficient, as their happiness falls fhort of the joys of the bleffed; agreeably to which, the prefent life is, in the fcripture, reprefented as a scene of vanity, labour, and forrow. And it is a moft important and alarming confideration, that the common virtue of mankind will not entitle us to a future reward after death; that few fhall find the straight gate; and that, unless our righteousness exceed that of the Scribes and Pharifees, we can in no wife enter into the kingdom of heaven, here or hereafter. But then,

as, notwithstanding the curfe paffed upon man, and upon the ground, GOD is reprefented in scripture as opening his hand, and filling all things living with plenteousness, as being kind to all, and manifefting his infinite and invifible goodness by visible things, i. e. as making natural good to prevail upon the whole, that fo we may, on this account, be thankful to him, and love him with all our hearts, as he commands; fo the correfponding precept of loving our neighbour as ourselves, feems to infer, that our neighbour is amiable upon the whole. And we may fuppofe that moral good prevails in general, in a degree proportional to the prevalence of natural good: or however we understand the fcripture language on this head, it cannot be contrary to the foregoing reafoning. It must appear from thence, that we ought to be, at leaft, as good as mankind at a medium, in order to obtain the medium of happiness; and that, if we have higher views, our road lies towards the infinite perfection of virtue, towards fpirituality, benevolence, and piety, and not towards fenfuality, felfishness, or malevolence.

PROP. XLIX.

The Rule of Life drawn from the Practice and Opinions of Mankind, corrects and improves itself perpetually, till at last it determines entirely for Virtue, and excludes all Kinds and Degrees of Vice.

FOR, fince the imperfect rule, drawn in the last propofition, is, at leaft, fo favourable to virtue, as to exclude all great vices, we may conclude that all grossly vicious perfons ought to be left out in collecting the rule of life from the practice and opi

nions of mankind; and that our rule will approach nearer to a perfect one thereby. And as this our fecond rule, taken from the virtuous and fuperior orders of the vicious, determines more in favour of virtue than our first, taken indifferently from all the orders both of the virtuous and vicious, fo it will engage us to exclude more of the vicious from our future estimate; and fo on, till at last we determine entirely in favour of virtue. At least, this is a prefumption, which rifes up to view, when we confider the fubject in the method here proposed. Since it appears from the first general confideration of the practice and opinions of mankind, that grofsly vicious perfons must be unhappy, it is not reasonable to allow them any weight in determining what is the proper method for attaining the greateft poffible happiness. And as the fame obfervation recurs perpetually, with respect to all the orders of the vicious, we fhall at laft be led to take the most virtuous only, as the proper guides of life.

Grofsly vicious perfons may also be excluded, from the manifeft blindnefs and infatuation in common affairs, which attends them; and as this extends to the vice of fenfuality in particular, fo this vice may be farther excluded from that tendency of our natures to fpirituality, in our progrefs through life, which is allowed by all, and explained in the foregoing part of this work upon the principle of affociation. Malevolence is alfo excluded, because it is itself misery, and, by parity of reafon, benevolence must be a proper recommendation for thofe, whofe example and judgment we would follow in our endeavours after happiness. And it does not appear in this way of propofing these matters, that the ultimate ratio of things admits of any limit to our fpirituality or benevolence, provided we fuppofe, that, at the expiration

of this life, a progreffive fcene of the fame kind

commences.

The method of reafoning here ufed bears fome resemblance to, and is fomewhat illuftrated by, the method of approximation practifed by mathematicians, in order to determine the roots of equations to any propofed degree of exactnefs. Farther, as it is common in infinite feriefes for the three or four first terms either to fhew what the whole feries is, or, at least, that it is infinite; fo here the evergrowing and fuperior excellence of fpirituality and benevolence, which the foregoing confiderations open to view, by recurring perpetually, and correcting the immediately precedent determination in every step, may incline one to think, in correfpondence to that method of reafoning in feriefes, that fpiritu. ality and benevolence ought to be made infinite in the ultimate ratio which they bear to fenfuality and felfishness.

But this method of reafoning may also be illuftrated, in a more popular way, by applying it to more obvious inquiries. I will give two inftances of this, the first in the health of the body natural, the second in the welfare of the body politic.

Suppofe, then, that a perfon entirely ignorant of phyfic, theoretical and practical, and difpofed to treat it as mere guefs-work and uncertainty, should, however, be defirous to know, fince he must eat, what diet is most conducive to health. The first and most obvious answer will be, the general diet of mankind; because this is the refult of general experience, and of the natural appetites, which are in fo many other inftances fitted to the objects themselves, and to the ufes and pleafures, public and private, of human life. And thus the inquirer would be reftrained from all grofs exceffes in the quantity or qualities of his diet. But if he farther obferves