At the same

therefore lies in the verse-man, not in the verse. time it must be remembered that, as accent and quantity are, in English, convertible terms, a word may very likely at one time be employed as long, which at another is short. No words can be more distinctly short than a and the. Yet emphasize, ie. accent them, and they naturally and fairly become long,

e.g.

'A man might have come in, but the man certainly never.'

So in monosyllabic verbs, the imperative by force of the emphasis is long, while the indicative or infinitive may be short. It does not fall within our subject to discuss the question whether, in a translation of the Iliad, Greek or Latin names of the deities should be employed. To our own mind, indeed, the matter seems clear; and we certainly wonder to see Lord Derby, though with a half apology in the preface, using Latin names.

But it is another question whether, in such names, English accent or Greek quantity should be adopted: whether one should say Andrómeda, or Andromedé. Kingsley not only takes Greek quantity, but occasionally declines proper names. Mr. Dart chooses a via media, which, if not strictly logical, is perhaps the most satisfactory. In the continuous list of nymphs or towns, where the English pronunciation would necessitate a vast amount of verbiage, and which to the English reader are generally unfamiliar, he employs the Greek; but, elsewhere, our own accentuation: Andrómache, for instance. Indeed, one could hardly get Helen, Hecuba changed to Helené, Hecabé. He is, however, not very consistent in his spelling. If he gives us Achilleus and Odysseus, why not Hélena and Eas? In the lists to which we have just referred, he seems to us especially happy in his use of too, as representing Te. Nor must we forget to add that his notes, from their great vividness of description, and the unflinching faith which they display in the historical truth of the Iliad, are very interesting.

We now take our leave of him with the earnest hope that he will, ere long, give us a similar version of the Odyssey: where, with a little more attention to accent, he may unite equal scholarship and correctness.

214

ART. VIII.-History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe. By W. E. H. LECKY, M.A. Longman, 1865.

MR. LECKY'S book, as was to be expected, has been much commended, nor, looking at the matter in a purely literary point of view, is our estimate of it very different from the popular one. It is in many respects a charming work. There is none of that haziness about it, so often to be met with in the mild speculations of the present day. We have not to turn back and hunt after a missing link. The author knows his own meaning, and expresses it in clear and very beautiful English. But when we come to look apart from its literary merit to the solid contents of the work, then our judgment alters. Mr. Lecky holds a theory of human opinion which would be eminently respectable in a thorough-going Hegelian, but which, when removed, as he removes it, from the sphere of the absolute to the every-day judgments of English life, wears an aspect which to our mind is very whimsical. It continually suggests to our perverse imagination, the idea of Sambo in a general's uniform. Then, again, the necessities of this theory, so held, have compelled him to look only at the outside of the changes which it is his purpose to chronicle. He thus misses their real causes and their real import, and arrives at conclusions which are as startling as they are superficial.

described in small He believes in this Man's chief end is

The philosophy of our author may be compass. He is an apostle of this world. world, whatever else he may not believe in. to dig and spin, to gather wealth, and enlarge the circle of his enjoyments. It is true there may be higher ends; and they may be allowed a certain significance. They are very well as art, or poetry, or elevated sentiment; but they must not be held to be real. It is beautiful to speak of God and infinite love: it may be necessary at times to recognise the fact of sin, and even to allude to punishment; but for men to set these things before them, to grapple with them as realities, and work out their destiny in view of them, is-what shall we say?-simply pernicious. It impedes the progress of civilization, and gives rise to miserable superstition. The thought of God induces miracles; the thought of sin, magic and witchcraft; while the idea of punishment gives rise to persecution and frightful cruelty. Mr. Lecky has undertaken the pleasing task of show

ing how these and kindred superstitions have given way before the onward march of thought. A power antagonistic to themthe power of Rationalism-has been at work from very early times; from the Reformation downwards it has made very rapid strides. It has been continually undermining the theological fabric, and bringing down huge masses of superstitious structure, till, happily, in our day, this sapping process has advanced so far, that the whole edifice is tumbling to pieces. Society, thus freed from a dreadful incubus, has a glorious prospect before it. Like the worshippers of John Brown's body, it may now go marching along.

Mr. Lecky's book is a History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism.' But what is Rationalism? Who is this terrible and relentless persecutor of old world divines? Mr. Lecky's readers have been very much puzzled, and we must confess to a similar bewilderment. But, seriously speaking, what does the author mean by Rationalism? We may regard his use of the word as a simple misnomer; and if we look at it in this light, it implies either gross ignorance, or an amount of carelessness and perversity utterly to be condemned. Nor do we think Mr. Lecky will be able effectually to clear himself of the charge-and it ought to be regarded as a very serious one -of introducing confusion into human knowledge by the misuse of terms. Rationalism has a very clear and defined meaning in theology and philosophy; nor ought the word ever to be used outside these branches of human knowledge. But Mr. Lecky has both diluted its meaning and increased the sphere of its application. According to him any sensible opinion, upon any subject whatever, is Rationalism. Thus, we may have Rationalism not only in a philosophy of the absolute, but in the needful art of shoemaking. It is true that Mr. Lecky proposes to give us a history, not of Rationalism, but of the spirit of Rationalism. But this will not save him. It rather adds to the gravity of his fault; for it is the cause of letting in a stream of error. In the heterogeneous compound of intellectual influence, which he denoninates the spirit of Rationalism, there is a large element which is really Rationalism; there is, perhaps, a larger which is nothing of the sort. A double error is thus occasioned-first, in regard to Rationalism itself, its nature, and its prowess; secondly, in the estimate which is formed of the great controversies of the present day. Throughout his book Mr. Lecky assumes that the verdict of Rationalism must be the truth; and he is able to point, in justification of this assumption, to a series of changes which have been brought about, as he affirms, by its influence. But is this really the case? Is it a well-established position that Rationalism is the truth? Has its course been a continual

conquering process from the earliest times to the present day? Is it now so well established that every educated man must be presumed to hold it, and its opponents may be legitimately set down as divines or fools? To any one really acquainted with the nature and history of Rationalism, the grave statement of these positions is intensely ridiculous. Rationalism is undoubtedly one phase of the human intellect, and as such it has attained a certain position. But to say that it is the truth, or anything more than partial truth, is a thorough mistake. Equally untrue is it to represent it as a growing power. On the contrary it had its birth at the very dawn of speculation, and was probably stronger then than it has been at any subsequent period. But what is most ludicrously untrue is to represent Rationalism as the cause of permanent changes in human opinion. It is undoubtedly a power which has striven for the mastery, and has at various times predominated. But its dominion has always been both partial and temporary. It has only advanced to be driven back; and in point of fact those changes which our author chronicles have been due, not to Rationalism, but to the Non-Rationalistic element which he has combined with it.

And this reveals Mr. Lecky's second error-the mistake as to the real import of the great religious controversies of the present day. The present is one of those ages, of which, in the history of the human race, there have been so many, in which the star of Rationalism is undoubtedly in the ascendant. Its fundamental positions, through some mysterious process, have gained possession of the public mind; and the consequence has been that not only the Bible history, but the very foundations of all religious faith have been assailed. In what point of view are we to regard this phenomenon? Is it the legitimate result of advancing knowledge, or the temporary ascendency of a false philosophy? Mr. Lecky adopts the former alternative; and in consequence sounds his pæan and erects his trophy over the grave of theology. We have only to remark-wait a bit; as of old, so now, unless we are much mistaken, Rationalism will reveal the cloven foot, and from that hour its doom is sealed.

But, lest we should seem to dogmatize without ground, it may be well to state our own view of what Rationalism really is. This will have a double advantage, if our idea is correct. It will not only rescue an honest word from a mean advantage which has been taken of it, but it will at the same time reveal principles which will help us to estimate the value of those ultimate inferences which Mr. Lecky draws from the sum of his labours.

From the earliest dawn of speculation the human mind has oscillated between two systems, and these systems have their

origin in two distinct kinds of knowledge of which the mind is capable. In the world around us, through the outer senses, we are cognizant of a vast multiplicity of phenomena, and in our own minds, through the inner consciousness, we know of mental states, thoughts, feelings, volitions. This is one kind of knowledge, and its peculiarity is that it can not only be perceived by the outer or inner sense, but can be conceived or reproduced again by the mind. From this peculiarity-the power of representing this knowledge by conception-it is called rational knowledge, and it forms the domain of logic and the understanding; but it is not the only knowledge of which the mind is capable. When we turn the attention inwards upon ourselves, we are cognizant not only of mental states, but of a personality which we call ourselves, in which these reside. In like manner, when we contemplate the changing phenomena of nature, we have an indelible conviction that there is a substratum or subjectivity in which these reside, and which in different aspects we denominate substance and cause. So, too, when man intensely realizes his own personality, and feels himself set face to face with nature, he becomes conscious that there is over him, and very near to him, a Being in whom both himself and outer nature are comprehended. The peculiarity of this knowledge is that it can be perceived, but cannot be conceived. We know that these objects exist, but when we try to represent them to the mind under a conception, we totally fail. Neither substance, cause,

the human soul, nor God, can be pictured to the mind. To use in a different sense the saying of Bishop Berkeley, their esse is percipi.

This statement will elucidate the distinction between Rationalism and what, for want of a better term, we might denominate Intellectualism. Rationalism, proceeding on the fundamental and often unperceived assumption, that the only existence is the conceivable, wages a constant warfare with that department of our knowledge which is inconceivable. Its constant tendency is to eliminate it. It makes human conceptions the measure of all things, and constructs the universe out of these conceptions. In its lesser flights, it contents itself with attacking human liberty, and the principles of morality. But, wielded by bolder and more logical minds, it soon rises far higher. The existence of our own personality or that of the Divine Being is ultimately as inconceivable as is our liberty. Hence, in its onward movement, Rationalism proceeds to attack these positions. In this phase it becomes Pantheism. The individual is now swallowed up in the general. Our thoughts, feelings, and volitions, which mankind suppose are the products of our personal activity, are referred to general laws. In an a posteriori or materialistic point