ed in such a manner as to prevent all possibility of bribery and corruption.

However happy the Venetians might think themselves under their Government, an Englishman, who has experienced what true liberty is, would not feel himself easy under such a constitution. The State Inquisition which existed here, was extremely severe. None of the common people durst even mention any thing that concerned the state, and even the Nobles durst not interfere in matters of a political nature, except when they were met in council. This form of government, therefore, though perhaps the best species of Aristocracy, is not calculated for a people in whose breasts a spirit of freedom reigns.

Since then neither a simple Monarchy nor Aristocracy is productive of the advantages which are necessary to constitute a good government, let us now see if they are to be found in a Democracy.

When every Freeman of the State has a right to vote in the Supreme Assembly, there is no doubt but there will be the greatest Fidelity; as every man will consider the interest of the public as his own but on the other hand, every other advantage will be wanting. It is impossible that there should be Unity in a council composed of so many members. Nor can Wisdom be expected in it; for the views of the generality of mankind are confined within very narrow limits. They are incapable of discerning what is best, and are liable to be influenced by men of popular and persuasive abilities, to act directly contrary to their true interest. This was often the case at Athens, and Philip, taking advantage of it, pro'cured some of the Athenian orators to work upon the minds of the people, in such a manner as to make them favour his schemes, at the same time that they thought they were acting consistently with their own welfare. The best speakers are not always the wisest and best men,

and in a government purely popular, the man who can talk with the greatest fluency, will gain the ascendancy over those who are superior to him in every other attainment.

Unless the state be very small, it is impossible the people should meet together without the utmost confusion. This inconvenience the Romans often experienced; and whenever any person among them wanted to succeed in his attempt, he had nothing to do but to gain the greatest mob on his side, and he was sure to be successful. The history of ancient Rome, of modern France, and many other countries, shews the great danger there is of a perfect Democracy, or a form as near it as can exist in a large State, terminating in a Military Despotism.

There have been few governments in the world which were purely democratic. That of Athens was more so than that of

Rome, although the Freemen at Athens, bore a small proportion to the number of strangers and slaves, and were looked up to as possessing a kind of Nobility. The Comitia Centuriata instituted at Rome by Servius Tullius, partook in a very high degree of the spirit of Aristocracy.

In fact, the only species of Democracy which can take place in a large state, is when the Supreme Power is lodged in the hands of a certain number of persons appointed by the community, and who are their representatives. In such a form, it is probable that Wisdom and Fidelity will be secured, but still Unity, Secrecy, and Expedition will be wanting, and the road will be open for Seditions and Commotions, and a spirit of party with

out restraint.

Nothing has yet taken place in the Representative Government of America, (which indeed has not existed long enough to be considered as a fair experiment,) which can justify us in drawing a con

clusion different from that which has just been laid down. However plausible such a Government may be in theory, it still remains to be shown that it is in practice most favourable to the peace and comfort of domestic life, to the improvement of the arts and sciences, to refinement of taste, expansion of intellect, and to energy and dignity of character. Let it not be forgotten that the exalted character which claims our highest admiration, the characters of great, though inferior merit, which we likewise admire on that Continent, were formed under the old system.

All the simple forms then have many inconveniences attending them, and are not sufficiently adapted to answer all the purposes of Government.

Since, therefore, this is the case, we must have recourse to some combination of these, in order to secure those advantages which are wanted in the simple forms. And the best Constitution seems