Works of Thomas Hill Green: Philosophical works

Front Cover
Longmans, Green and Company, 1894
 

Contents

Yet reality involves complex ideas which are made by the mind
27
The confusion covered by use of particulars
33
8
35
There must have been something from eternity to cause what
54
That from which he derives idea of cause presupposes
56
Identity of objects an unavoidable crux for Hume
57
Are there general ideas? Berkeley said yes and
63
Lockes way of interchanging idea and quality and
65
In which he equivocates between body as unknown opposite
83
True that we are conscious of objects in an order in which each
84
Are the primary qualities then a nominal essence?
89
Feeling and felt thing confused
94
Distinction between Humes doctrine and that of the hypothetical
98
Fatal to the notion that mathematical truths though general
100
His equivocal use of antecedent
104
Two lines of thought in Locke between which a follower would
106
Two ways out of such difficulties
112
32
115
Can it be applied to him figuratively in virtue of the indefi
118
152
125
The world which is to prove an eternal God must be itself
129
Sense in which the self is truly real
133
Two ways of dealing with it Berkeley chooses the most
135
For Lockes idea of a thing he substitutes idea simply
142
182
148
The fact that colours mix not to the purpose
152
He supposes a divine decree that one feeling shall follow another
153
But this order does not belong to or determine the matter
159
Confirmations of the testimony turn upon the distinction
161
So the Positivist juggles with phenomena
168
204
169
Properly with him it is a fiction in the sense that we have
170
What is meant by restricting the testimony of sense to present
172
Only in regard to identity and causation that he sees any diffi
174
6
176
Knowledge of relation in way of Identity and Causation excluded
181
Not relations of resemblance only but those of quantity also
186
230
190
True rationale of Lockes doctrine
192
Can perceptions exist when not perceived?
193
To make sense of them we must take perception to mean per
198
240
199
451
270
With Hume the only uniformity is in expectation as determined
274
Lockes treatment of relations of cause and identity
276
According to Lockes account they are relations and thus inven
279
Not seeing this Hume has to explain inference to latter system
282
But this distinction he only professes to adopt in order to explain
288
Disposes of personal identity by showing contradictions
295
In what sense of happiness is it true that it is really just as
308
What is meant by present and future pleasure?
314
Conformity to law not the moral good but a means to
320
Of moral goodness Butlers account is circular
327
Yet he admits passions which produce pleasure but proceed
333
34
336
Another device is to suggest a physiological account of pride
339
49
354
In order to account for the facts it has to become sympathy with
359
As real existence the simple idea carries with it invented
360
What is meant by an action which ought to be done
365
Ground of distinction between actual sensation and ideas in
366
How does he make this aggregate into an unknowable reality
392
It involves a judgment in which mind and thing are distin
393
Correlativity of cause and substance
396
Confusing consciousness for which there is neither subject
399
He does not see this because he makes sensations consciousness
406
Nor is the distinction between perceived and conceived or
419
It assumes that simple ideas are consciously referred to things
423
Mr Spencers doctrine of the independence of matter as either
433
65
442
Lockes proof of the real existence of
445
Two meanings of real essence
449
And is equivalent to what he afterwards calls knowledge
452
Unless the process is already a process for a conscious subject
454
Body is the complex in which they are found
460
88
466
Summary view of Lockes difficulties in regard to the real
472
In fact he ignores the distinction between succession of feelings
477
The fallacy of which in treating the object as outside con
479
Of this the key lies in his doctrine of the real What then
485
How then can sensation be like the real? Only if he makes
492
Why nevertheless common sense identifies the real with the
498
120
500
While his actual feeling if it is to be of the real involves
2

Other editions - View all

Common terms and phrases

Popular passages

Page 538 - SUNBEAM ' ; OUR HOME ON THE OCEAN FOR ELEVEN MONTHS. Library Edition. With 8 Maps and Charts, and 118 Illustrations.
Page 7 - THE HOUSE OF WALDERNE. A Tale of the Cloister and the Forest in the Days of the Barons
Page 541 - DEAD SHOT (THE): or, Sportsman's Complete Guide. Being a Treatise on the Use of the Gun, with Rudimentary and Finishing Lessons on the Art of Shooting Game of all kinds.
Page 109 - The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.
Page 283 - The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind ; nor have we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it is composed.
Page 34 - When therefore we quit particulars, the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making, their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding of signifying or representing many particulars. For the signification they have is nothing but a relation that by the mind of man is added to them.
Page 9 - Hints to Mothers on the Management of their Health during the Period of Pregnancy and in the Lying-in Room. By T.
Page 158 - If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, thro' the whole course of our lives ; since self is suppos'd to exist after that manner.
Page 64 - Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas; and ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time and place and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one: each of which, having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call it) of that sort.

Bibliographic information