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he then communicates it to the successor whom he had previously selected, and to whom he had already taught all the other rights and ceremonies pertaining to the dance.

The various liquids or medicine-waters' are not procurable by those not in the order, as they are very jealously guarded. Wiki, the high snakepriest, in an interview held after the dances at a ranch in the neighborhood, was quite communicative for a while, but, when this subject was approached, became very much agitated. He said, that, were he to reveal the secret of the preparation of these liquids, his life would be the penalty. Dr. Yarrow succeeded, however, in obtaining a bottle of the liquid used after the dance, and it is now in the army medical museum.

It should be mentioned that these liquids are not looked upon by the Indians as antidotes. The liquid taken after the dance has no direct bearing on the question of poison. In reply to Dr. Yarrow's question as to the object of this ceremony (the vomiting after the dance), Wiki told him that "the presence of the snake between the lips of the dancer caused a profuse flow of saliva, which the dancer was necessarily obliged to swallow, and that if he did not get rid of this saliva, which was poisonous, his stomach would swell up and burst," an operation, it is hardly necessary to say, which never occurred from this cause; and the account must have been derived, therefore, from some source outside the facts of the


Mr. Trumble speaks of gorging on the part of the participants in the dance; he also says the snakes are fed until they become inert, and finds in these practices a partial preventive of evil effects from snake-bite.

Neither of these apply to the Moki dances. The performers go into the dance after four days of what is practically fasting (they eat but one meal each day); and the snakes themselves, so far as I could learn, are given nothing whatever to eat. It is true that in Wiki's accounts the phrase, “and I bathed him, and gave him to drink of the liquid," occurs; but the giving of drink is metaphorical, and consists of sprinkling the snake with the liquid by means of a feather.

I think the study of the rites pertaining to serpentworship, as they occur among the lower races of mankind, would throw much light on the serpentsymbolism which prevailed among quite highly civilized people; the Egyptians, for example: but our knowledge of the early phases of this form of worship is rather meager. Perhaps the tribes mentioned by Mr. Trumble may supply some of the needed information.

A writer in Harper's weekly (March 25, 1882), quoted by Captain Bourke, gives an account of a performance very similar to the Moki dance, but occurring among some Central American tribes. In this ceremony each performer has his own particular snake, which he has previously trained, and with which he performs various feats. This, however, is jugglery, an element which is entirely lacking in the Moki performances. On this point I cannot do better than to quote Dr. Yarrow's closing remarks: "I went to Wolpi expecting to find a good deal of humbug about the snake-dance; I came away convinced of the earnestness and fair dealing of the people, and without a doubt that they fully believed that their ceremonies would bring about the desired result."

I think Mr. Trumble is mistaken about the effects of curari; but the word has been applied to so many different varieties of poison, that it has come to have a rather vague meaning. Curarine, the active principle of curari, is said to cause paralysis of the motor nerves, and it has been used in medicine as an antidote for strychnine and as a remedy in hydrophobia and in tetanus. But this part of the subject I must leave for those better qualified for the discussion. The subject has excited much interest; and many eminent investigators, from the days of Sir Walter Raleigh (who published his account in 1595) down to the present time, have given it their attention. Probably the most complete account is that published by Dr. S. Weir Mitchell and Dr. W. A. Hammond in the latter's 'Physiological memoirs,' 1863.

There is a point in Mr. Trumble's letter which seems to deserve special attention: this is the use, by Indians, of antidotes against poisons. To the savage there is no unknown: every thing is explained; and this explanation is always the most simple, the most direct, and, as a rule, the most superficial, that could be applied. The savage can no more realize the physical causes of phenomena than he can the laws which govern the solar system.. Instances of this are furnished in abundance by the Moki myths; but they need not be quoted here, as they occur in all tribes, and can be found in any work treating on mythologic philosophy. The inability to realize the facts of physical causation, the grandest which have yet been discovered by man, is not confined to savages, however, but is present, in a greater or less degree, in what we are accustomed to call the highest civilization. It follows, then, that poison as a physical cause of death is a conception which is beyond the ken of the savage mind, and such is actually the case. Poison, when it is conceived of at all by savages, and this conception is rarer than is generally believed, is not thought of as a substance containing in itself its fatal properties, but as being endowed with them by some outside power, either human, as in witchcraft, or else supernatural. The antidote to poison as thus conceived consists of an appeal to the same powers which produced the poison, or, in other words, to charms, or prayers, or incantations.


Prehensile-tailed salamanders.

It is not well to be hasty in accepting the idea that the tail of the salamanders is of so little value to them that they might get along quite as well without it. Observation proves the organ to be of constant use in pushing, when the animal makes its way among weeds, grass, rocks, or other obstructions. It is the main dependence of such as swim; and of climbing species its importance as a support and a lever is very manifest. Those suggested are general uses, common to all tailed batrachians. Particular species have the tail still more specialized. It is to some extent an organ for grasping in the long-tailed terrestrial species. A frequent practice of the 'spotted salamander,' Amblystoma punctatum, when taken up, is to curl the tail around the fingers or hand to prevent falling. Suspended thus, hanging head downward, it will again and again try to regain footing rather than drop. Peculiar serpentine curves, and the motions of the very flexible tip, often give the

tail of this species the appearance of feeling about for something, on its own account. The curves are so irregular at times, that the organ appears as if broken in several places. When at rest, some individuals have the habit of curling the tail closely against the body in a flat coil. Its capabilities are best seen in slender specimens, in which the tail is less thick and clumsy. Very likely Amblystoma jeffersonianum, and species of similar build, have the organ similar in sensitiveness and utility. Amblystoma mavortium, however, is lower in rank, and has the tail better adapted for swimming or pushing, as in other more aquatic forms. S. GARMAN.

Cambridge, Mass., June 27.

Association of official agricultural chemists.

The next meeting of this association will begin Thursday, Aug. 26, in the library of the Department of agriculture. All agricultural chemists holding official positions under the national or state governments, in agricultural colleges or experiment-stations, are entitled to membership. All other chemists interested in any way in the analysis of fertilizers or food-products are invited to attend the meeting, to present papers and take part in the discussion.

One of the chief objects of the association is to secure uniformity in methods of analysis employed. The attainment of such uniformity is of little less value than accuracy, in work of this kind.

I take this method of calling the attention of the chemists of the country, who are not members of the association, to the coming meeting.

Washington, June 26.

H. W. WILEY, Pres., and chairman of exec. com.

Barometer exposure.

I have read with pleasure the paper referred to by Mr. Gilbert in his letter (Science, vol. vii. p. 571). His method seems to have shown, as clearly as could be without direct experiment, that the wind had the effect of lowering the barometer-readings in the building on Mount Washington. This direct evidence, if needed, has, I think, been supplied by the observations on Blue Hill, where it has been noticed, not only that the barometer in the building suddenly falls if the wind-velocity suddenly increases, but that during high winds the pressure in the building can be varied at will by merely opening and closing an aperture in the top of the building.

It does not seem unsafe, then, to draw one or two conclusions from these facts. In Loomis's tenth paper (Amer. journ. sc., January, 1879), from an examination of a large number of storms, he arrives at the remarkable conclusion that "the low centre at the height of Mount Washington sometimes lags behind the low centre at the surface of the earth, apparently as much as two hundred miles." Mount Washington is only about one mile high; and if we draw two lines, one to represent the earth's surface, and the other the storm-axis, and make them diverge only one division in two hundred in length, the two lines will appear to the eye almost parallel. Such an inclination of the storm-axis seems incredible, and renders it probable that the apparent lagging was due to some other cause. Loomis shows, in this same paper, that the occurrence of high winds

on Mount Washington from any easterly quarter is exceedingly rare; and in his eleventh paper he says. "In a majority of those cases in which an area of low barometer passes ever New England, attended by the usual system of circulating winds at the surface stations, this system of circulating winds does not extend to the height of six thousand feet." The effect of the indraught below only makes itself felt at the height of Mount Washington in front of storms by lessening the velocity of the prevailing westerly current, and in the rear of storms by increasing the velocity of this current.

This at once suggests that the apparent lagging of the storm-axis, or rather of the time of minimum pressure, on Mount Washington, is due to a mechanical effect of the wind on the observatory.

Mr. Gilbert has shown in his paper (pp. 531-533), from a series of observations, that wind-velocities of forty miles per hour from the north-west had the effect of lowering the pressure in the observatory on Mount Washington as much as eight-hundredths of an inch; wind-velocities of fifty miles, as much as thirteen-hundredths of an inch; and he estimated that wind-velocities of one hundred miles would lower it as much as half an inch. This equals any of the effects found by Loomis, and gives a plausible reason why the minimum pressure should occur later on Mount Washington than at sea-level. The same explanation applies to the lagging of the times of maximum pressure, since Loomis has shown in his second paper (Amer. journ. sc., January, 1875) that the wind-velocities are larger in front than in the rear of maximum pressures.

Loomis also found that there was a lagging of the diurnal curves of pressure on Mount Washington and other mountains. He says in his tenth paper. "At the base of Mount Washington the principal maximum occurs at 8.30 A.M., but on the summit it does not occur until noon, being a retardation of three hours and a half."

Mr. Gilbert shows, on p. 526 of his paper, that from June 26 to June 28, 1873, some element on Mount Washington, which was undoubtedly the pressure, went through a diurnal variation coincident with the wind-velocity. During this time the wind each day reached a maximum near midnight, and a minimum near noon. This is a normal feature on high mountains; and if an increased windvelocity tends, by a mechanical action on the building, to make the barometer read lower, it is readily seen that the pressure would tend to be lowest near midnight, and highest near mid-day. If, now, a double diurnal oscillation due to other causes be superposed on this, the chief maximum would occur much nearer noon than at lower stations, where the action of the wind is in the opposite direction.

The variations in the wind's velocity may not be the only cause of the phenomena considered in this letter. Loomis thinks that the wind-directions, and Ley that the upper cloud-motions, indicate a lagging of the storm-axis; and it seems probable that the expanding and contracting of the air from heat and cold have something to do with the occurrence of the chief maximum on mountains near noon, and in the lagging of the minimum pressure in storms; but the variations in the wind-velocity are undoubtedly an important factor, and it is very desirable that its influence might be eliminated.

Blue Hill meteor, observ., June 28.



FRIDAY, JULY 2, 1886.


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MR. INGRAM, in his excellent article upon political economy in the Encyclopaedia Britannica,' states as a characteristic feature of the historical school of economists, that they recognize a close relation to exist between economics and jurisprudence. "The point," he says (and this he takes from Dr. Adolph Wagner of the University of Berlin), upon which all turns, is the old question of the relation of the individual to the community. Whoever, with the older juristic and political philosophy and national economy, places the individual in the centre, comes necessarily to the untenable results which, in the economic field, the physiocratic and Smithian school of free competition has set up. Wagner, on the contrary, investigates before every thing else the conditions of economic life of the community, and, in subordination to this, determines the sphere of the economic freedom of the individual." It is my purpose in what follows to expand somewhat the view thus expressed, and to show why it is impossible for the economist to arrive at just conclusions in economic matters unless he consciously allows his thought to be influenced by a keen appreciation of the science of jurisprudence, as also of the juridical structure of the society to which his attention is addressed.

It may avoid some misapprehension if we state clearly at the outset what is meant by the terms ⚫ jurisprudence' and economics.' In the science of jurisprudence it is common to consider the legal structure of society, that phrase being used in its broadest sense. It might indeed be said that this science builds the framework of society, were there not danger of pressing the metaphor so far as to give rise to the conception of a purely mechanical arrangement in human relations. Questions of government, if they do not pertain to administration or to pure politics, find treatment under jurisprudence, as also do established customs which grant personal rights and liberties, and established laws which determine the nature of property. Or, to state the matter concisely, the material out of which a science of jurisprudence is formulated is, 1°, "the essential institutions of human society, by the use of which the objects of that society are carried out through the medium of government;" 2°, the established

opinions of society, expressed in law, by which rights and duties, liberties and limitations, are determined for individual members of society.

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Economics, on the other hand, deals with industrial activity. It has to do with men, with corporations, and with governments as industrial agents. It may, indeed, be properly defined as the science of industrial society; and one obtains for the first time a clear view of its general bearing when he discerns its subordinate relation to the science of society as a whole. The material out of which this science is built includes, 1°, the economic nature of man, to which all industrial activity may be traced; 2°, the material surroundings of men, to whose physical laws their industrial activity will in the long-run conform; 3°, the legal structure of society, which conditions the exercise of such industrial rights as are granted. None of these factors may be disregarded by the economist, if he would arrive at correct conclusions respecting the industrial actions of men; and the lego-historic' facts, although they may vary from time to time, are of as much importance while they last as the permanent facts of nature. Throughout the entire history of the world, until the dawn of what we technically term modern times,' the form of undertakership was dependent on the political structure of society. We observe property rights to have developed from communal to personal ownership; and with each step in this direction there has been a corresponding development of industrial methods. It has frequently been pointed out that personal liberty, and the freedom of action that it implies, were necessary to the realization of the industrial organization with which we are now familiar. And it is not too much to say that the economic character of man itself has been modified by means of the hereditary transmission of habits first contracted through the pressure of changes in the social structure; for, as the stroke of the shuttle is limited by the framework of the loom, so the industrial movements of men are bound by the liberties of law and of custom, and, to carry the metaphor a step further, the industrial weaving of society is largely determined by its legal structure.

If the analysis thus suggested be correct, one cannot disregard the close relation that exists between economics and jurisprudence. Both branches of thought are part of the larger study of society, and neither can be satisfactorily pur

sued to the exclusion of the other; at least, the economist must hold ever in view the juridical system of the society with which he is concerned in order to fully explain the facts he may observe.

Such statements as the above, however, do not seem to adequately present the views entertained by historical economists. Not only does the jural system influence economic activity, but the theory of jurisprudence at any time accepted has much to do in giving shape and color to the accepted theory of economics. This is not a matter of speculation. It is declared by the history of both jurisprudence and economics during the last one hundred years. It will probably pass without question, that political writers of the last century, whose enthusiasm sprang from a desire for the free exercise of all manly powers, assumed some conception of inalienable rights as the basis of all their important arguments.

The rule of authority which they endeavored to shatter was the jus dei; and it was wholly logical, that, under the direction of such a rule, society should be regarded as a mechanical appliance permanently imposed upon men by some power outside society itself. This idea was shattered by the victory of French philosophy, but this did not go very far in realizing for the men that freedom which they sought. Its full effect, indeed, was to supplant the jus dei by the jus naturae; and though this change may have had decided results, extending political rights, the new principle adopted exercised as great a tyranny over men's minds as it was ever possible for any conception of a divine arrangement in the affairs of men to exercise. It was this new principle, first well formulated by political philosophers in their criticism upon the existing structure of government and jurisprudence, this desire to secure some natural law for the conduct of the affairs of men, that gave character to English political economy. English economy, indeed, is but the application of the jus naturae to industrial affairs. Or, to speak of modern economists, the historical school itself is an historical development. The views of this school, says Mr. Ingram, "do not appear to have arisen, like Comte's theory of sociology, out of general philosophical ideas: they seem rather to have been suggested by an extension to the economic field of the conception of the historical school of jurisprudence, of which Savigny was the most eminent representative. The juristic system is not a fixed social phenomenon, but is variable from one stage in the progress of society to another it is in vital relation with the other co-existent social factors; and what, in the jural sphere, is adapted to one period of development, is often unfit for another. These ideas were seen

to be applicable to the economic system also. The relative point of view was thus reached, and the absolute attitude was found to be untenable. Cosmopolitanism in theory, or the assumption of a system equally true of every country, and what has been called perpetualism, or the assumption of a system applicable to every social stage, were alike discredited. And so the German historical school (of economists) appears to have taken its rise."

But we have not yet arrived at a full statement of the relation that exists between economics and jurisprudence. The modern school of political economy goes further than merely to recognize the existence of such a relation as has been suggested above. Having formulated a theory of society in harmony with the teachings of the science of history, the adherents of this school endeavor to bring their economic doctrines into accord with their social theory. It would be incorrect to claim uniformity of opinion respecting any theory of society. The Germans, in their general discussions, use the word 'state' as representing the final analysis of human relations; English and American writers, when they endeavor to present German ideas, employ the word 'nation;' and perhaps I show the leanings of my own mind in choosing the word 'society.` But whether state,' or 'nation,' or 'society,' the fundamental thought is the same. The thing itself brought to view is an organic growth, and not a mechanical arrangement. The springs of its action are not imposed from without, but lie wholly within itself. The law of its own development is the only permanent and universal fact which its analysis discloses all other facts are relative truths; and those systems of thought based upon them, temporary systems.

But there are two ways in which this organism -the state, the nation, society - may be regarded. It may be regarded as an organism moved by no conscious purpose, and consequently with no control over the course of its own growth; or it may be conceived as a continuous conscious organism that is capable of placing before itself an ideal structure to be attained. The first conception reduces society to the grade of a physical organism. It places social relations under the same law of evolution that is disclosed by a study of the organic world. But, as Mr. Ward truly says, the philosophy of evolution applied in this manner to society becomes sterile, "because, while justly claiming a social science, it falls short of admitting its complete homology with other sciences, and, while demonstrating the uniformity of social as of physical phenomena, it denies to the former that susceptibility to artificial modifi

cation which, applied to the latter, constitutes the only practical value that science has for man." The second conception of the social organism endeavors to correct the error thus pointed out. It recognizes in society a power of self-control. It admits the truth of M. Thiers's sentence, that ⚫ the nation is that being which reflects and determines its own action.' It holds it as useless to stop one's study with a reading of nature, and refuses to allow that the perfection of human conduct consists in following nature. The jus naturae finds first its true place when subordinated to the jus hominum.

I do not wish to be drawn from the question in hand to a discussion of the general theory of sociology, but the distinction that has been pointed out appears to me essential for a just appreciation of any study whatever that has to do with social relations. It lies back of the theory of both economics and jurisprudence, and points out the manner in which each may exercise an influence on the other. If we adopt the view that the social organism is subject to the same law of development as a physical organism, our study will be crowned only by negative results. Laissezfaire would then be logical, and the philosophy of anarchy inevitable. But if, on the other hand, we perceive that society may have a conscious purpose, we have discovered a scientific basis for positive and constructive study. We find that no incongruity exists in uniting the science and the art of society in the same discipline. The law of evolution, with its survival of the fittest' and its 'adaptation to environment,' comes to be the basis of a scientific theory of revolution or of reformation; for the fittest type to survive may first exist in the conscious purpose of society, and be realized by means of an environment arbitrarily determined.

This view of social relations leads to certain practical results in the study of economics that cannot be overlooked; and of these, none is perhaps more important than the new light thrown upon the nature and limitation of legal enactments in the process of social growth. The sphere in which law exerts a direct influence is quite restricted, but within that sphere it becomes a most efficient agency. Every change in law means a modification in rights; and when familiar rights are changed, or, what amounts to the same thing, when new duties are imposed, the plane of action for all members of society is adjusted to a new idea. In many instances legal enactments undertake to enforce certain lines of conduct on a stubborn minority; but this is not always the case, nor is it the most fruitful assistance rendered by law in the realization by society

of its conscious purposes. As contrasted with this, it may occur that the entire community is in favor of some method of procedure, and yet the practice will be universally disregarded unless granted the sanction of law. This fact, which may at first seem strange, is easily understood when it is noticed that men are more powerfully moved by immediate than by ultimate interests, and that, in the absence of a law which restrains all alike, the fierceness of competition will lead individuals to disregard public opinion, even though they admit the rightness of its commands: for each man says to himself, "If I do not do this thing, which, I confess, is to the permanent injury of society, some one else will; the evil will be done, and I will lose the personal advantage of the doing of it. But pass a law which restrains alike my neighbor and myself, and I will gladly obey it." That is to say, public opinion considers the social interest; and with this the individual interest does not always harmonize. The one

holds in mind the ultimate, the other the immediate, results; and the only way in which the social purpose can influence the practice of individuals is for law to establish uniformity of action. This is the most important use of law as an agency of reform. The thought has nothing to do with 'paternal government,' but is in perfect harmony with the idea of democracy. It is the means by which the social organism may realize its conscious purpose, and it needs no words of mine to show how important is this view of the efficiency of law in matters pertaining to industrial organization. The constructive economist is forced to admit its pertinency.

But there are other conclusions which spring from this idea of social relations, and which are of especial interest because they touch directly the great economic questions of the day. This is a time when much is heard of industrial re-organization as a means of solving the social problem; but the lesson taught by the foregoing analysis is, that, in all matters pertaining to re-organization, it should be held as a first principle to maintain harmony between the various parts of the social order. A study of history declares that no part of the social structure may be considered as good or bad in itself. What appears now to be wholly pernicious may once have been capable of complete defence. Most of the evils experienced, so far as they spring from established law or permanent custom, may be traced to the fact that some right or custom has outlived its time, or that some principle, in itself just, fails to be applied to all departments of social activity. We need not turn the pages of history in search of examples of uneven and disjoined development: the source

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