Aristotle tells us, Ethic. Nicomach., vii., 1, belong to the domain of vice, the last two to that of virtue. According to another classification, the two extremes denote respectively the perfection of moral excellence and of moral depravity, the complete separation of all heterogeneous elements from both, or, in other words, the purely wicked and the purely virtuous; while the two means would represent those mixed states wherein the one or the other moral quality may have a temporary superiority, yet neither can be said to be triumphant.

'Akoλaoía (from a, privative, and Kóλaois, restraint) would denote uncontrolled licentiousness-the Nous (to use Plato's anthropological division) in utter darkness, the upòs in complete subjection to the movuía; or, in other words, the will not simply overpowered, but the consenting slave of appetite and lust. Compare Plato's description of the δημοκρατικὸς ἀνήρ, or the man whose soul is a perfect democracy of ungoverned propensities, Republic, lib. viii., 559, 560. Such a character is free to sin; or, to adopt a mode of speech directly opposite, yet equally correct, he is bound in the iron chain of that free will for which some so strenuously contend as the highest prerogative of man, a will which is its own tyrant, cursed with its own selfdetermining power, and utterly unrestrained by any fear of man, or any grace of God.

'Akρaтεía is want of moral power. and has some sense of its bondage.

The soul is awaking, It feels the chain which

* See Remarks on the two senses of the word äytos, p. 322, 323, and note.

† All the seeming paradoxes and contradictions connected with this expression arise from the different points of view from whence the subject is contemplated. See Romans, vi., 20, örɛ yàp doûĥoɛ ἦτε τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐλεύθεροι ἦτε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ, κ. τ. λ. "For when yo were the servants of sin ye were free from righteousness, but now, being freed from sin, and having become subject to God," &c.

the first character mistakes for freedom. The rational will is overpowered, but unreconciled to its degradation, and struggling feebly against it.

'Eуkpáтɛia, temperance, or inward power, would denote the rational will a conqueror, yet holding the sceptre over a turbulent and rebellious foe ever seeking to regain the supremacy, and requiring constant watchfulness and restraint.

Zwopooúvn is the spiritual Hygeia, and signifies the will not only superior, but triumphant-in perfect harmony with the reason, and presiding, with ever-unresisted sway, over appetites and propensities in cheerful submission to its true and rational authority. In its highest Platonic sense it is the spirit healed-in harmony with itself, and only falling short of the Scriptural idea of harmony with Heaven.

Such are the thoughts suggested by the very terms, a faint outline of which may be found in Aristotle, Ethic. Nicomach., lib. vii., c. i., 5, 6, c. ix. Almost, if not quite, all the words derived from φρήν (φρον), such as φρόνησις, φρόνιμος, σώφρων, σωφροσύνη, φρονέω, although generally rendered wise, wisdom, prudentia, &c., partake more of a moral than of an intellectual quality, or, rather, may be said to express a combination of both. They refer to what may be styled practical wisdom, in distinction from speculative knowledge even of the science of morals. This moral wisdom formed a peculiar trait both in the life and philosophy of Socrates. Xenophon has most admirably said of him, Σοφίαν καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, Memorabilia, iii., 9

LXIX.

Peculiar Use of the Indicative Mode in certain Cases. Comparison of Passages from the New Testament.

PAGE 70, LINE 2. πείθουσι θωπείαις λόγων— Would persuade by flatteries." We thus render, because the context, in this place, requires it, and because other examples justify us in thus sometimes taking the indicative mode subjectively, as expressing desire, disposition, tendency, or nature of a thing-what it ought to do, or would do, rather than what it actually does; thus seeming to occupy the place of the subjunctive. This is probably the case, to some extent, in all languages, and there is no great difficulty in determining by the context when it is thus employed. The usage occurs a number of times in the New Testament, as, for example, John, 1st Epist., iii., 9: πãç ó γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἁμαρτίαν οὐ ποιεῖ-Whosoever is born of God committeth not sin; that is, it is not his nature, tendency, or disposition-he would not sin. A much clearer example, and one about which there can be no question, although very similar to the preceding, may be found, Romans, ii., 4 : ἀγνοῶν ὅτι τὸ χρηστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰς μετάνοι áv σɛ ǎyet-not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance. Such is its tendency or nature, that is, what it would do, although wicked men often furnish the most striking proof that the actual effect does not always take place. Compare, also, Mark, xiv., 21: kaλòv žv avrậ -It would have been better for him, &c.; 2 Peter, ii., 21: κρεῖττον ἦν αὐτοῖς μὴ ἐπεγνωκέναι It would have been better for them not to have known, &c.

LXX.

Use of the Word ПIλovežía. Aristotle's Distinction between Arithmetical and Geometrical Equality.

PAGE 71, LINE 4. пλEOVEžiav. This is a very general term, and, although usually rendered covetousness wherever it occurs in the New Testament, may be applied to any case in which one seeks to have more than others, be it in respect to wealth, worldly honours, or sensual enjoyment. Plato, as well as the Scriptures, would place them all in the same low scale, and regard the passion, whatever may be its immediate object, as in all cases alike opposed to the harmony of the universe; that is, to the good of the whole, the good of the parts, the good of the individual who exercises the feeling, besides being intrinsically, or irrespective of consequences, an evil, and a disease in the spirit. It comprehends all that is included under our term ambition, and, when directed to personal distinction, is pre-eminently "a lust of the mind," in distinction from those bodily propensities which some moralists would regard as the only sources of sin.

Plato here compares it to a plethora, or a tendency in one member to absorb into itself more than its share of what belongs to the whole body : τὴν πλεονεξίαν ἐν μὲν σαρκίνοις σώμασι νόσημα καλούμενον. We may call it, generally, a violation of the law of equality; not simply of that arithmetical equality which would reduce all ranks of being, be it angels, men, or the lower animals, to the same undistinguishing level, but of that geometrical equality without which harmony could not exist, or would become only a dead and monotonous unison. A violation of this equality would consist in the desire or tendency of any member to grow out of its natural proportions. Those who have it may call it a lofty ambition; the Scriptures, however, and

true philosophy, represent it as a low and selfish passion, utterly blind to that infinitely nobler sentiment which, while it causes the soul to acquiesce, and even rejoice in ranks and distinctions, as necessary parts of the Divine scheme, yet enables it to lose sight of them all in its aspirations after "that honour which cometh from God only."

For the distinction alluded to between arithmetical and geometrical equality, or loórns (from which, we can hardly help thinking, comes the Latin jus, justus, justitia), see Aristotle, Ethic. Nicomach., lib. v., c. iii. and iv.; also, the sixth book of The Laws, 757, A., at the passage commencing, δυοῖν γὰρ ἰσοτήτοιν οὔσαιν.

LXXI.

Impiety and Folly of Attempting to Bribe Heaven. PAGE 71, LINE 11. ἂν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀδικημάτων τις ἀπονέμη. Αδικημάτων is an elliptical expression, and may be rendered, of the fruit of their wrong doings. There cannot be a baser conception than this, that God could be bribed by a share of the product of iniquity; and yet, in all ages of the world, and under all religions, men have been both weak enough and wicked enough to entertain it; that is, if they can disguise it under some delusive name and appearance, since, in its gross, naked form, it would revolt even the most brutish soul. Instead of making clean hands and a clean breast by giving up the gains of iniquity, we often find men, even in Christian lands, endeavouring to make atonement, and to purchase ease of conscience, by devoting a part of their ill-gotten wealth to religious uses. How indignantly, in the fourth book of The Laws, does Plato repudiate the very thought that God, or even a good man, can receive gifts from the wicked: παρὰ δὲ μιαροῦ δῶρα οὔτ ̓ ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε Θεόν ἐστί ποτε τόγε ὀρθὸν δέχεσθαι.