fuch a man must and will be approved and accepted of God; and the reason is most obvious, because, by fuch a conduct, he renders himself the fuitable and proper object of God's approbation and affection. This muft and will be the cafe, whether men be of high or low rank in the world, or whether their advantages in it be more or lefs. And this must and will be the cafe, in all ages, and under all difpenfations, and in all worlds, if I may fo fpeak; because God is equally difpofed at all times, even from everlasting to everlasting, to accept and approve of every creature, who renders himself the fuitable and proper object of his approbation and affection; and to dif approve or reprobate every creature, who by his misbehaviour renders himself the fuitable and proper object of his diflike and resentment. And though divine revelation may affift and help our difcerning faculty in the discovery of truth and good, and in distinguishing them from their contraries; yet it cannot poffibly alter the grounds of our acceptance with God, because that is eternally and unchangeably the fame.

But farther, as there are many things that are liable to mislead the understandings of men, and as there are many and ftrong temptations with which men are furrounded, and by which they are in great danger of being fometimes betrayed into folly; fo this renders it unreasonable to expect that man, in his prefent circumftances, fhould be either infallible or impeccable;

K 2

that

that is, it is unreafonable to expect that he fhould be without error, or without fault, because it is great odds but he will in fome inftances fall into both. And, as this is the prefent ftate of mankind; fo from hence it will follow, that when a man does his best to have his understanding rightly informed, and when, in the general courfe of his actions, he acts agreeably thereto, and in thofe instances in which, through the ftrength of temptation, he has tranfgreffed the rule of his duty, he is fenfible of, and humbled for his faults, and makes his mifcarriages a reafon to himself to be more watchful and careful of his behaviour in time to come, fuch a man muft and will be accepted and approved of God, because he has, by fuch a behaviour, rendered himself the fuitable and proper object of the divine approbation and affection.

This, I fay, ought in reafon to be the cafe; and therefore, most certainly it is fo. For, as man is fo conftituted and circumstanced aş that it is ten thousand to one but he will act arong in fome inftances; and were God to be fo extream as to mark every thing that man does amifs, and would not accept of a man's fincere repentance and reformation as a proper ground of mercy to him, for thofe offences which through the ftrength of temptation he has been hurried into; then, man would lie under a very great difadvantage, and existence would be fo far from being a favour and a benefit, that, on the contrary, it would be a

very great hardship and an injury to him; and then, it could not have been goodness and kindness, but it must have been malice and ill will which was the spring of action to God in the creation of man. And, if this were the cafe, then, man would not be dealt with in a way of justice and equity. For, if man's feet are, by his Creator, fet in fuch flippery places, as that it is ten thousand to one but he will fall; then, if he should fall, and fhould rife again by repentance and reformation, and yet fhould not find mercy at. the hands of his Maker, which in reafon and equity he ought, in this cafe, his existence would be a very great hardship, and an injury to him, and he would not be equally dealt with. And, on the other fide, he, who in the general courfe of his actions, acts the contrary part, muft and will be difapproved of God; because, by fuch a conduct, he renders himself the fuitable and proper object of the divine reprobation. It is not a particular action, but a man's general behaviour which conftitutes his character, and denominates him to be a good or bad, a virtuous or vicious, a religious or irreligious,

man.

From what I have obferved, I think, it plainly appears, that Religion (when the term is ufed to exprefs the grounds of our acceptance with God) is founded in nature, and that nature or reafon affords a plain obvious rule, by which true religion may be diftinguished from that which is falle. For, if there is a natural

and

and an effential difference in things; and if there is a rule of action refulting from that difference, which every moral agent ought in reafon to govern his behaviour by; and if God makes this rule the measure of his actions, in all inftances and cafes in which it can be a rule to him, which is most apparently the true ftate of the cafe; then, from hence it will naturally, neceffarily, and unavoidably follow that perfonal valuableness, or the governing our minds and lives by that rule of action which is founded in the reafon of things, or, in other words, the acting that part in life which in reafon we ought, this is true religion; this will render us truly pleafing and acceptable to God. And, on the other fide, whatever is reprefented as the grounds of our acceptance with God, befides perfonal valuableness in us, befides the being in our felves the fuitable and proper objects of the divine approbation and affection, fuch things will not render us truly pleafing and acceptable to the Deity, and confequently, all fuch things are falfe religion, let them come from what quarter foever, even though Paul, or an Angel from Heaven, were to be the promulger of fuch doctrines. God is not only infinite in all natural perfections, as he is all prefence, all knowledge, and all power; but he is alfo infinite in all moral perfections, as his conduct, in the exercise of his knowledge and power, is, in all inftances and cafes, perfectly conformed to that eternal and invariable rule of action which refults. from,

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from, and is founded in the natural and effential differences in things. And, as the reafon of the thing requires, that nothing should be approved by an intelligent being, but what is in itself the proper object of fuch approbation, and it's being fuch an object should be the ground or reafon of that approbation; and, on the other fide, that nothing fhould be dif approved by an intelligent being, but what is in itself the proper object of fuch reprobation, and it's being fuch an object should be the ground or reafon of that reprobation; I fay, as the reason of the thing requires this; fo from hence we may be morally certain, that nothing but perfonal valuableness in a moral agent, can be the ground of that agent's acceptance with God, and that nothing but perfonal vileness in fuch an agent, can be the ground of the divine reprobation of him. So that true religion, in the prefent cafe, confifts in this, and in this only, viz. the acting fuch a part in life as in reafon we ought; or, in other words, the governing our affections and actions by the law of reafon; or, at least, the coming as near to this as may reasonably be expected from us in our prefent circumstances. This, I fay, is true religion, and this only; because it is this, and this only, which renders us the proper objects of the divine approbation and affection; and therefore, it must be this, and this only, which can and will be the ground of our acceptance with God. And for as much as there is

nothing