to his Maker, as he hereby renders himself the Suitable and proper object of the divine diflike and refentment. This, I fay, is most apparently the true state of the cafe. For, as God is the moft perfect intelligence, if I may fo fpeak; fo he muft, if he acts confiftent with himself, approve of every intelligent being who acts conformable to that principle of intelligence that is planted in him; and God muft likewife difapprove of every intelligent being who acts greatly contrary to that intelligent principle. And therefore, when a man acts fuch a part in life as in reafon he ought, he will of course be accepted and approved of God, it being morally impoffible that it fhould be otherwife. When a man makes the law of nature the rule and meafure of his affections and actions, he then acts that very part in life which his Creator defigned he fhould act, and hereby he answers the end and purpose of his creation; and therefore, we may with as much juftness and propriety doubt of the existence of a God, as doubt whether fuch a being will be acceptable to him. And, on the other fide, if a man's conduct is the reverse of this, then, we are affured, from the reason of the thing, that such a man will be reprobated or difapproved by his Maker. This is the ftate of the cafe, independent of any promulged law, and when confidered in the abstract nature and reafon of things. I am fenfible, God may, if he please, give a revelation to mankind. That is, it is no way repugnant to our natural notions of a Deity to I fuppofe fuppofe, that God may kindly interpofe and give a revelation, when the circumftances of things render fuch an interpofition expedient and useful to men. And this was plainly the cafe of the Chriftian Revelation. Men were greatly funk in their understandings, and greatly debauched in their affections and actions; and this rendered the Chriftian Revelation greatly expedient, and greatly useful to mankind. But then, the expedient of this arofe, not from any defect in the natural conftitution of things, fo as that man could not have done without it, fuppofing him to have used those abilities and advantages that nature has furnished him with; I fay, that the expedience of a revelation does not arife from any fuch imperfection in the natural constitution of things, but only from a general corruption as aforefaid. Befides, a plain rule of action laid down, is what the bulk of the people can have easy access to, and be guided by, without reasoning upon every fact they happen to be concerned with, and this renders a promulged law of farther ufe to mankind. Tho' indeed, all revelation and promulged laws have their difadvantages attending them alfo; viz. they are liable to be corrupted, altered, and changed, as they fall into the hands of weak or artful men, by which great mischief may accrue to our fpecies. And this must, in the nature of the thing, be the cafe of all revelation in general, and has been the case of the Chriftian Revelation in particular, as experience and fact do abundantly teftify. Nothing furely has been. more more tortured, and made to speak different and oppofite things than the Chriftian Revelation, which has been very fatal in it's confequences to mankind. There has been nothing more oppofite and contrary than the various principles and fchemes of Chriftians, the adherers to which have each of them confidered his principles and his scheme to be Chriftianity; and all thefe, tho' never fo oppofite, have been grounded, or at least pretended to be grounded on the Chriftian Revelation; by which means men have been led, not only into falfe ways of preferving the happiness of another world, but also groundlefsly to hate and perfecute, and ufe one another ill in this. So that, tho' there are great advantages which may attend a revelation and a promulged law; yet these have their disadvantages alfo. But farther, Divine Revelation, fo far as it comes under the denomination of a law, can be no more, nor no other than a publication, or republication, or an exemplification, of the ori-, ginal and primary law of nature. The law of nature or reason is a perfect law. It is a perfect law as it takes place in, and is a proper rule in all instances and cafes, and under all poffible circumftances where a law or rule of action is wanting, and as to all other cafes that are in themselves perfectly indifferent, legislature is not concerned with them. It would be an imperfection, even in a human legislator, to command for commanding fake, much more in the great governor of the univerfe, who has no vitiated affection to gratify thereby, and therefore can be under no temptation to act below his character. It is alfo a perfect law as it is a proper rule of action to all intelligent beings; and confequently to the Deity as fuch. It is by this law that God governs his actions, as well when he acts in his legislative, as in his creating capacity; that is, he makes the reafon of things, and not capricious humour and arbitrary pleasure, the measure of his actions in both. God can, with regard to his natural liberty, and as he is above controul, act unreasonably both in his creating and in his legiflative capacity; that is, God can create beings on purpose to make them miferable, and he can give fuch laws to his fubjects as no way anfwer the ends of government to them, and which ferve only to increase the burthen of his fubjects duty, and enlarge their guilt upon the breach of fuch laws; but then we are morally certain that he never will act thus, becaufe fuch a conduct is wrong in itself, and because there is nothing in nature to excite him to it. To say that God may act thus in order to try our obedience, is moft weakly urged; because, (as I have already obferved) our obedience is fufficiently tryed without God's giving us any fuch laws, and therefore fuch tryal would be both needles and ufelefs; and because such tryal can answer no good purpose, and may anfwer a very bad one, viz. the greatly increafing of our guilt; and confequently there is a reafon, refulting from the nature of things, against againft God's giving any fuch unneceffary and ufelefs, or rather hurtful, laws to mankind. From what I have obferved, I think, it plainly appears that divine revelation, fo far as it comes under the denomination of a law, can be no other, nor no more, than a publication, or republication, or an exemplification, of the original and primary law of nature. I am fenfible likewife that God may, if he pleafe, act the part of a Physician to his creatures, by appointing or directing them to the ufe of fuch means as are proper for their fpiritual health; that is, for their improvement and establishment in piety and virtue. But then, thefe inftitutions, (as I have before obferved) do not properly come under the denomination of laws, but rather of kind prefcriptions, to mankind; thefe being inftituted and intended to be, not fo much confidered as acts of bomage to God, as means of good to us. God requires the use of these, not so much confidered as acts of obedience to himself, as that we should become wifer and better in the use of them; or at least to preserve us in that good ftate in which we are. As thus, we are required or directed to eat bread and drink wine as memorials of actions that are past, in order to excite in us proper reflexions, and thereby to produce in us fuitable affections and actions. Now, it is not our paying obedience to a command, by eating bread and drinking wine, and barely thinking of those things the memory of which was intended to be perpetuated by |