reafon of things the rule and measure of his actions.

But farther, legiflature or authority is either natural or derived, that is, it is a power or truft which either refults from that natural relation which one intelligent being stands in to another, or others; or else it is a power committed in truft to fome perfon, or perfons, to make laws for the good and benefit of those who are fubjected to that jurifdiction. The former of thefe is the cafe of parents, from whofe relation to their children naturally arifes a right, or refults a truft, to make fuch laws for, and give fuch rules of action to, them, as are for their and others good, just as the circumstances and the reafon of things fhall require. And this is the cafe with respect to God and his intelligent creatures, he is their common parent, to whom they owe their exiftence in a much higher fenfe, than children do to their parents, and from whose relation to his creatures naturally arises a right, or results a truft, to make fuch laws, or lay down fuch rules of action, as are for the good of thofe to whom they are given, or for the good of the whole, juft as the circumstances and the reafon of things fhall require. The latter of these is the cafe of thofe to whom legislative power is committed in truft, and these are the Civil Magiftrates, who are intrusted with

power

*See my Answer to Mr Stone's Remarks, upon the cafe of Abraham, with regard to his being commanded by God to offer up his fon Ifaac in facrifice.

power to make laws for the fociety's good, and to answer the purposes of civil affociation, just as the circumftances and the reason of things fhall require. And,

Here it is to be obferved, that natural legiflature or authority is not the natural offspring of power, but of paternity. God does not become a governor to the intelligent and moral world by his being poffeffed with Almighty power, but by his being a common parent to his creatures. For, as he called them into being without their confent; fo reafon requires that he fhould take care of their well being, which it is the bufinefs of government to fecure, and it is this which conftitutes him our guardian or governor. God's being poffeffed with great and uncontroulable power enables him to play the tyrant over us, (were he difpofed to ufe his power to fo vile a purpose) but it does not invest him with a right to be our guardian or governor, that being the refult of his relation to us. And, this is the cafe of parents with respect to their children, their authority over them is not the natural offspring of power; but it naturally arifes from that natural relation they stand in to them. And, indeed, in a fecundary and lefs proper fenfe, this is the cafe in civil fociety, where legiflative power is lodged in truft. For, as in fuch focieties every one is by nature upon an equality, (there being not any one who has a natural right of dominion over his fellow-creatures,) and, as law and government are neceffary to the wellbeing

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being of fociety, feeing the end of civil affociation cannot be obtained nor fecured without it; fo this makes it neceffary and reafonable that legislative and governing power should be lodged in truft, in the hands of fome perfon, or perfons, to be exercised for the fociety's welfare; and the perfons with whom this trust is lodged are by this conftituted, not the natural, but the step-parents of the people, and guardians of their happiness; and by this they are invefted with a right, not natural, but derived, a right derived from the people to make fuch laws as are for the fociety's good, and to answer the purposes of civil affociation, And,

As legislature itself is founded in reason; fo the reafon of things is the rule and measure of it. That is, thofe upon whom legislative power naturally devolves, or to whom it is committed in truft by others, are not at liberty to make what laws they pleafe, but they are directed, limited, and bounded in the exercife of that power, by the grounds and reasons, and by the ends and purposes upon which legislature itself is founded, viz. the publick or general good of those who are fubjected to their jurifdiction: fo that law, ftrictly speaking, or that law which is in reafon obliging, is nothing more than that rule of action exemplified, which is founded in the reason of things; and duty is not the effect or refult, but it is the foundation of law. That is, an action does not become our duty because it is com

manded;

manded; but it is commanded because it was our duty antecedent to the command. And confequently, a thing or action does not become fit, or unfit, by it's being commanded, or forbidden; but it is commanded, or forbidden because it was fit, or unfit, when confidered abftractedly from, and antecedent to the promulgation of that law; and which antecedent fitness, or unfitnefs, was the ground and reason of fuch law. This, I fay, is, or at leaft, ought always to be the cafe. It is. true, the word law, in it's common acceptation, fignifies the will of a fuperior: but then, this fuppofes that the will of the fuperior is not lawless will, (if I may fo fpeak,) or a will which is exerted without rule, or reafon, but a will which is directed by reason, a will which commands nothing to be done, but what was fit should be done, antecedent to the command, and which prohibits nothing but what was fit fhould be avoided, antecedent to the prohibition 1 fay, this is fuppofed to be the will of the fuperior or law-giver, for otherwise legislature would be an unnatural and a monftrous thing. And,

When legislative power is rightly employed, in making laws to anfwer the true ends of government; then, it is in itself right; and then, it conftitutes a legal or juft authority. But when it is employed to anfwer other and contrary purposes, then, it is in itself wrong, and then, it degenerates into tyranny. When legislative power is employed in making bad

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laws,

laws, or laws which will ferve a bad purpose; this is manifeftly wrong, and therefore, it cannot be deemed juft authority, but properly comes under the denomination of tyranny. Or when it is employed idlely and triflingly, by commanding or forbidding actions which are perfectly indifferent, and which ferve only to exemplify the commanding power of the lawgiver, and to extort fubmiffion from the fubject; this is plainly a prostitution of legislative power; this is what the ends of law and government will not excuse or justify; and therefore, this cannot justly be deemed legal authority, but properly comes under the denomination of tyranny, tho' in a much lower, and in a much lefs hurtful degree than in the former cafe. The cafe is the fame whether legislative power be confidered as lodged in a human or in the divine hand; it being equally as unfit that God fhould act wrong in his legiflative capacity, as it is that any of his creatures fhould do fo. There is indeed this difference, if God fhould mifapply his legislative power, he is above controul or correction; whereas if men abufe their trust, they are liable to be controuled in, and be punished for

that abuse.

I am fenfible, it is commonly urged in this cafe, that God, as he is the great governor of the universe, has a right, or it is fit that he fhould, in fome inftances, command for commanding fake, that thereby he might make tryal of our obedience. But alas! our obedience