a better man. So that the valuableness of our Perfons, in the prefent cale, does not arife, ftrictly speaking, from the ule of the means, viz. the practice of pofitive Duties; but only from their end being anfwered upon us in the practice of moral duties, and which alone renders us justly, and truly valuable. From which, I think, it appears, that moral duties are greatly preferable to pofitive duties, with refpect to our perfonal valuablenefs in the ufe of them.

If it fhould be faid, that obedience to juft authority, is itfelf truly valuable, and the more hard and difficult the thing commanded is, the more valuable is our compliance; becaufe fuch difficulty is a trial upon our obedience, which renders it the more valuable and confequently, obedience to a pofitive law, which has no other reason for it, but the will of the lawgiver, is more valuable than obedience to a moral law; becaufe, in the latter cafe, there is the reafon of the thing, as well as the command of the lawgiver to induce us to a compliance with it:

I anfwer; to command for commanding fake, or to make laws which anfwer no good end, but only fhew the abfolute fovereignty of the lawgiver over his fubjects, is the produce not of juft, but of unjust authority, it being very unequal and unreasonable, that one intelligent being fhould affume and exercife fuch dominion over another. And

when fuch unreasonable authority is affumed, we can, in reafon, be under no obligation to obedience, but that prudential one of avoiding the inconvenience which our disobedience may otherwife bring upon us, as I obferved above. The avciding of which inconvenience is (I verily think) the principal, if not the only motive, to obedience in all fuch cafes that is, either our hope or our fear is the principal fpring of action to us. And if we should yield obedience to fuch laws, merely because they are commanded, our compliance could not be the produce of love; because there is nothing lovely in the command, nor in the lawgiver, on the account of it, to excite that affection. So that obedience, in thofe cafes, is no other, nor more valuable, than that of flaves to an arbitrary master. Of which, to lay the best, it would be only yielding to the humour and unreasonable will of a lawgiver, whom it would be wrong to contend with, or to difoblige. And obedience furely, in fuch cafes, cannot render a perfon equally valuable with him who obeys a moral law from a much better principle. However, this is not the cafe with refpect to God, who never makes any fuch unreasonable laws for his laws creatures. Again,

Thirdly and Laftly, Moral and pofitive duties admit of a comparifon, as the practice of these render us more or lefs pleafing and acceptable to God. And here likewife, I think,

the

the preference is due, and ought to be given to moral duties; becaufe thefe render us pleafing and acceptable upon their own account, and for their own fake, as they render us the most fuitable and proper objects of divine approbation and affection. The moral perfection of all intelligent beings confifts in their being perfectly fubjected to the original primary law of reafon, as I obferved above. And as the practice of these are steps and approaches towards the perfection of our nature; fo moft certainly these must, on their own account, render us pleafing and acceptable to that Being, who is the fum and perfection of all moral perfections, if I may so speak whereas, pofitive duties do not render us valuable, or pleafing to God, but as they are means to excite and lead us on to the practice of moral duties, which, in reality do fo. God does not require our obedience to his pofitive laws, as marks and evidences of our fubjection to him, because then he would act from mere fovereignty; and thefe would be acts, not of government, but of tyranny, as they are the produce not of reafon, but of the mere will of the lawgiver. And obedience, in fuch a cafe, would be no other than that of flaves to a tyrannical mafter; which, in reality, is no reputation neither to the lawgiver, nor to the fubjects. God therefore must require our fubmiffion to these his pofitive laws, as means to an end, viz. to excite and lead us

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on to the practice of moral duties, and thereby to the perfection of our natures. So that it is the end being anfwered upon us, viz. the fubjecting our affections and actions to the law of reafon, and not the practice of pofitive duties, which are only means that lead to this end, 'that render us the proper objects of God's approbation and affection, and thereby pleafing and acceptable to him; and which means, when confidered abftractedly from that end, do not render us pleafing nor acceptable to God at all. From all which, I think, it plainly appears, that moral duties are highly preferable to pofitive duties, as they render us most pleafing and acceptable to God in the use of them.

Thus I have fhewn, that moral duties are highly preferable to pofitive duties, in all the forementioned refpects; and thefe, I think, are all the ways in which they are capable of being compared. Indeed pofitive duties may be fubfervient to one particular purpose, which moral duties may not, viz. to excite and promote an extravagant flight of fancy, and to raife warm and exalted imaginations in mens minds; which, as they flow from an intoxicated brain, fo weak and enthusiastic persons are apt to efteem them as acts of great devotion, and their fpiritual experiences. But then, I think, this affords no real reputation to pofitive duties, because that heat, which men

feel

feel upon those occafions, is more fitly called chriftian diftraction, than chriftian perfection, as it tends to diftract and mislead mens minds into a wrong judgment of perfons and things. For when men find their imaginations thus upon the float, and this too in the exercife of pofitive duties, then, tho' they work up themselves mechanically into these heats, yet they are too easily led to think that they feel in themselves fomething which is heavenly and spiritual. And thele enthusiastic raptures (if I may fo call them) they esteem fpiritual experiences, or the work of God upon their fouls; and as fuch thefe become evidences to them, that they are good men, and confequently that they are interested in God's favour. And as they raife in themselves by this means, a fallacious rule to judge of themfelves and others by, and a falfe foundation of hope and comfort; fo they are too eafily led to have a low and mean opinion of, and to neglect to improve in themselves, that rectitude of mind and life, wherein true chriftian perfection confifts, and which alone will render them truly pleasing and acceptable to God.

If it should be faid, that pofitive duties ferve to another purpose, viz. to the obtaining of God's grace in the use of them, and that this is a point which I have not yet confidered: I anfwer; if by God's grace, be meant God's favour, and good