For whatever, in reafon, becomes a law to intelligent beings, thofe beings will, for the fame reason, be obliged to yield obedience to that law. And where there is no reason for a command, there can be no reafon for our complying with it, except it be that prudential one of avoiding the evil, which otherwise our disobedience may bring upon

And this is the cafe of all laws, whether human or divine. That is, our obligation to obedience, in any cafe, does not arife from the things being commanded, but its being fit and reasonable upon fome account or other, when all things are taken into the cafe (and when confidered abftractedly from the will of the lawgiver) that we fhould yield obedience to that law. For as the reafon of things is the ground and foundation of all authority and government; fo it must likewife, in the nature of the thing, be the ground and foundation of all obligations to obedience. And,

As there is fuch a rule of action founded in the reafon of things, as aforefaid; fo the moral perfections of all intelligent beings arife from, and confift in their being perfectly fubjected to this law. Thus the moral perfection of the Deity confifts in his being abfolutely and perfectly fubjected to this law of reafon; that is, in his making the reafon of things the rule and meafure of his affections, and actions, in all his dealings with his creatures. And herein confifts the

moral

moral perfection of the human nature (when fuch perfection is attained) viz. in being perfectly fubjected, both in affections and actions, to this law of reafon; and every approach to it is an approach to the perfection of our nature. And if our fpecies were univerfally and perfectly fubjected to this law, then there would be no ufe nor place for any promulged law of any kind; because the ufe and end of all promulged laws and government, whether human or divine, is (or at least ought to be) to enforce and lead men on to obedience to this original and primary law of nature. Again,

By pofitive duties, I understand the performance of fuch actions, as, in reason, we are not obliged to perform, when confidered abftractedly from, and antecedent to any promulged law that requires our performance of them. Pofitive duties come under a twofold confideration, viz. First, fuch as are the produce of mere fovereignty, and are required not to anfwer any wife and good end; but only to fhew the abfolute power and dominion which the lawgiver has over his fubjects. Or, Secondly, fuch as are instituted to answer fome wife and good end, viz. to prevent our doing what is evil, or elfe to lead us (as it were by the hand) into the practice of what is good.

As to the firft, viz. fuch pofitive duties as are the produce of mere fovereignty, the reafon of which is founded folely in the

will of the lawgiver, and are laid merely as taxes on the fubject: in this cafe we cannot be under any obligation to obedience from the actions themielves; becaufe there is nothing in thefe actions which can be a foundation for fuch obligation. And as to their being commanded, this cannot, in reafon, oblige us, becaufe there can be no obliging reafon given why fuch commands, or taxes, fhould be laid upon us; and therefore, all the obligation to obedience, which we can, in reafon, come under in the prefent cafe, is only to avoid the inconvenience to our felves, or others, which our difobedience may unavoidably bring upon us, or them, either by barring the enjoyment of fome good, or by introducing fome greater evil. For as the end and defign of all promulged laws and government, whether human or divine, is (or at leaft ought to be) to enforce and lead men on to obedience to the original and primary law of nature, or reafon; fo if any governor fhould fo far exceed the bounds of his authority, as to command actions which are not, nor cannot be any way fubfervient to this end, and which ferve only to fhew the abfolute fovereignty of the lawgiver; the fubjects, in fuch a cafe, cannot in reafon, be obliged to yield obedience to such laws, any otherwife than as when two evils prefent themfelves, and one or other muft unavoidably be fubmitted to, they are, in reafon, obliged

H

obliged to chufe the leaft. But this cannot be the cafe with refpect to any divine inftitution; becaufe God does always make the reafon of things the rule and measure of his actions, in all his dealings with his creatures: and confequently he never commands out of mere fovereignty, or for commanding fake, but always with regard to the good of his creatures. All arbitrary commands are inftances not of government, but of tyranny; and are fo many marks and inftances of the moral imperfection of the lawgiver; which furely is not the cafe with refpect to God: and therefore all pofitive dutics, which are the produce of mere fovereignty, have no place in our prefent enquiry. And,

As to the second, viz. fuch pofitive duties as are required to answer fome wife and good end; namely, to prevent our doing what is evil, or to lead us, (as it were by the hand) to the practice of what is good, the ground or reafon of fuch inftitutions ought to be the ground or reason of our fubjection to them. That is, the ground or reafon of our obedience to fuch laws, ought to be, not because they are commanded, but because we would obtain the end which our wife and good lawgiver has appointed these as a means to lead us to. Thefe inftitutions are not laid on us by way of tole or tax; but are rather held forth to us as handmaids to lead and guide us to our duty; that is, to the practice of thofe things,

which are fit and reafonable in themselves, and fo are our duty in the most strict and proper fense of that term. And therefore, thele obfervations become duties, not by being commanded, but by being means to the aforefaid end; and our compliance with these becomes valuable, not by being done in obedience to a command, but by being fubfervient to the end to which they are directed. And if we should pretend that their being commanded is the fole ground or reafon of our compliance with fuch laws, then this would be to confider thefe inftitutions, not as proper means towards the attaining fome wife and good end, but as the produce of mere fovereignty; tho' even then, the true ground of our fubjection would be, not fo much because they are commanded, as to avoid the inconvenience which our difobedience would unavoidably bring upon us, as I obferved above, And,

As all pofitive duties, which are of divine inftitution are appointed as means to fome wife and good end; fo they operate as means, not by having any physical influ ence upon the fubject, nor by way of charm; but morally, if I may fo call it: that is, by producing in, or leading men to proper reflections, and thereby to fuitable and pro per affections and actions. Thus, by eating bread, and drinking winę, and remembring Chrift, in the performance of thefe actions men are naturally led to proper reflections; H 2

that