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weakness and ignorance of the people. And then reafon is to be depreffed as much as it can be; because its light tends to difpel the mift which they are for introducing. And, by this means, religion and divine revelation are made fubfervient not to the good and benefit, but to the hurt and damage of mankind; and are indeed, only talking-borfes to the pride and avarice of thofe, who affume to themfelves the fole power of teaching and explaining them. A lad inftance of this we have in the church of Rome; in which, as reafon is laid afide, fo religion is funk into the dregs of paganifm. And as the underStandings and confciences of the people are captivated to their pretended guides; fo all is made fubfervient to gratify the lufts, and paffions, and avarice of a vicious clergy. Ought not Proteftants therefore to be upon their guard, when reafon is attacked? seeing that every depreffion of reafon is a ftep to popery; and feeing that reafon is our only fecurity against it. Certain it is, that when reafon is laid afide in matters of religion and divine revelation, then these may be molded into every fhape, and made to ferve every purpose.

Let me then intreat my fellow Proteftants, efpecially the laity, to contend for, and hold faft their reafon, and to follow its guidance in matters of religion, and divine revelation: this being their beft fecurity against popery, which fome think gains ground among us. For if once we let go our reafon in matters

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of religion and divine revelation, we are in danger of being captivated to the fee of Rome, or to a body of Clergy who may be equally injurious to us. The power of the clergy in the church of Rome, which hath done fo much mifchief in the world, doth not fpring up in a day; but it arofe gradually, (fuch power being too monftrous to be put upon the world at once,) and this may be the cafe amongst Proteftants,if timely care be not taken to prevent it. However, whether we of this nation may have any juft ground to apprehend danger, is out of the reach of my enquiry. What I would obferve is, that others harm ought to be our warning: and that we, as well as all other proteftants, ought to be upon our guard; efpecially when reafon is attacked, the free ufe thereof being our best preJervative and fecurity against all corruption and impofition in matters of religion, and divine revelation. And that as the interest of the clergy feems to be diftinct from the common intereft of mankind; 10 it is the intereft, and ought to be the care of all focieties, not to be brought under the power of any body of clergy whatfoever.

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REFLECTIONS

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The comparative excellency and useful nefs of moral and pofitive duties.

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S moral and positive duties are, in a late controverfy, put in compe tition with respect to their excellency, &c. And as it is a point in difpute to which of thefe the preference ought to be given, fo I have thought proper to make a few reflections on this fubject, becaufe, I think, it is a matter which nearly concerns mankind. And that I may be fully understood I will fhew what I mean by moral, and what by pofitive duties; and what are the true grounds of our obligation to obedience in either cafe; and thereby fet the point in queftion in as clear a light as I can.

By moral duties, I understand the perfor mance of fuch actions as are in themfelves right and fit to be performed by every intelligent being, or moral agent, in equal circumitances; which fitnels refults folely

from

from the nature and reafon of things, when confidered abstractedly from, and antecedent to any promulged law, whether human or divine. And that there is fuch a fitness and unfitness arifing from, and founded in the natural and effential differences in things, when confidered abftractedly from, and antecedent to the determination of any intelligent being concerning them, is, I think, as clear and evident as that the whole is equal to all its parts, or as any other felf-evident propofition. And to fuppofe a power in God to constitute fuch a difference, when there is none in nature, is very abfurd; for as right and wrong, good and evil, truth and error, neceffarily fuppofe a natural difference in things, (take away the difference and there can be no fuch diftinction, crooked and ftrait cannot take place without a diffe rence in nature) fo to fuppofe a power in God to conftitute fuch a difference, when there is none in nature, is to fuppose that things can differ while they are alike, which is a contradiction.

Pleasure and pain are plainly distinct and different in nature, the one is naturally the object of our choice, and the other of our averfion and fhunning; and this is manifeftly the case when confidered abstractedly from and antecedent to any divine determi

nation concerning them. And as pleafure is manifeftly preferable to pain, fo the communicating of pleafure is preferable to E

the

the communicating of pain, when these are confidered fimply in themfelves, and abftractedly from any other confideration. There may, indeed, be cafes fo circumftanced, as that the communicating of pain may be preferable to the communicating of pleafure; but this does not arife from pains being preferable to pleafure, when confidered abftractedly, but only from the particular circumftances of thofe cafes. And when, I fay, that the communicating of pleasure is preferable to the communicating of pain, my meaning is, that the communicating of pleafure is an action which, in itself, is kind and good; it is commendable and praifeworthy; and therefore, in reafon, is right and fit to be performed: Whereas the communicating of pain is an action which is unkind and evil, it is difapproveable and blame-worthy; and therefore, in reason, is wrong and unfit, and confequently the former is preferable to the latter. And this difference betwixt the communicating of pleasure and pain, and the preference which is due to the former, does not arife from any law of God, or from any divine deternation concerning them, but from the natural and effential differences in things, and muft and will always be the fame, whether God interpofès and determines any thing concerning them, or not. * So that, from

* See Supplement to the Previous Queflion, page 35, 36, 37. Or my Collection of Tracts, page 233, 234.

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